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Abstract
The co-creation of new products between firms and customers has been shown to be
associated with higher new product quality, the development of products that more closely match
customers' unmet needs, lower development costs, and faster speed-to-market (Hoyer, Chandy,
Dorotic, Krafft, & Singh, 2010; O'Hern & Rindfleisch, 2010). However, little is known about the
evaluation and selection process in the co-creation of innovation (Bayus, 2013). To be
successful, product development teams must identify customer ideas that have the potential to
both fulfill unmet market needs and be profitable for the firm. This dissertation examines two
cognitive factors related to team decision-making, a prevention or promotion regulatory focus
(Higgins, 1998) and team reflexivity (West, 1996) , to examine what drives a development
team's ability to accurately pick "winners" and "losers" from a pool of customer ideas for new
products. Data is analyzed from a series of team-based lab experiments, as well as a virtual
ethnographic analysis of video footage from a firm's evaluation and selection meetings for 186
co-created product concepts. In addition to regulatory style and reflexivity, the moderating
effect of customer expertise is also analyzed in order to further explore development team
decision-making in the co-creation of innovation.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

For marketers, the ability to develop new products and services is a significant source of
competitive advantage in the marketplace. However, a large percentage of new products fail, and
the rising cost of innovation, coupled with increasingly short product lifecycles, has created
challenges for firms wishing to develop and launch new products. In response to this difficult
innovation landscape, many firms are beginning to adopt an open innovation paradigm in which
the traditional boundaries of the firm are becoming more and more permeable to external ideas
(Chesbrough, 2003). One manifestation of this paradigm is that firms are increasingly looking to
their customers to collaborate with them in the ideation and production processes for new
products. Co-creation of new products with customers has been shown to be associated with
higher new product quality, the development of products that more closely match customers’
unmet needs, and greater market success. These initiatives can take the form of crowd-sourced
innovation contests (Afuah & Tucci, 2012; Boudreau & Lakhani, 2013; Jeppesen & Lakhani,
2010), the development and curation of user communities (Hienerth, Lettl, & Keinz, 2014; J.
West & Lakhani, 2008), or the posing of innovation-related problems to groups of lead users
(Lilien, Morrison, Searls, Sonnack, & Hippel, 2002; Schreier & Prügl, 2008; Urban & Von
Hippel, 1988). Several streams of research have investigated co-creation from a customer
perspective (e.g., what motivates customers to collaborate, how customers benefit from cocreation, firm benefits from co-creation). However, scholars still know relatively little about the
process of co-creation from a managerial perspective.
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Despite its considerable promise to improve the success rate of new products, only about
50% of co-creation efforts are successful (Verhoef, Beckers, & van Doorn, 2013). Involving
customers in the co-creation of new products may be a double-edged sword for firms. On one
hand, customers often have ideas that are on par with, or better than, internally-developed ideas
(Poetz & Schreier, 2012), and co-created ideas have been shown to dramatically outperform
internally-developed ideas in both profitability and market longevity (Nishikawa, Schreier, &
Ogawa, 2013). Therefore, managers who dismiss customer ideas as infeasible or are overly
restrictive in considering customer input may do so to the detriment of the quality and market
potential of their new products.
On the other hand, inviting customers into the product development process can create
significant challenges. Managers who are open to a wide variety of customer ideas for new
products and services may find themselves overwhelmed by the sheer volume of customer input
(Gloor & Cooper, 2012). They may also find that a large percentage of customer ideas are
redundant, not attractive to a critical mass of customers, or not feasible to implement (Bayus,
2013; Hopkins, 2011). In addition, customers are focused on satisfying unmet needs, but do not
often consider firm capabilities or profit potential when developing new product ideas with firms
(Poetz & Schreier, 2012). In summary, a major challenge for firms in co-creating innovation is to
identify customer ideas that have the potential to fulfill unmet market needs and can be
implemented profitably.

Co-creation of Innovation in Business Practice
Examples abound of companies that are increasingly relying on customers to help
generate new market offerings. Companies like Threadless and Quirky have business models
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which rely completely on customer-submitted designs and product concepts that they then
manufacture and sell in their online retail stores (Fuchs, Prandelli, & Schreier, 2010; Kornish &
Ulrich, 2014). Other companies have developed online communities in which customers can
interact with the company and with each other, and have the ability to submit ideas for new
products and improvements to existing products to firms’ product portfolios. Lego, BMW, and
Fiat have all developed online innovation portals where customers can share their designs and
insights and directly contribute to the development and launch of new products (Antorini, Muniz,
& Askildsen, 2012; Dell, 2015; Füller, Hutter, & Fries, 2012). Dell’s IdeaStorm website (Dell,
2015) combines elements of both to give its customers a forum in which they can propose
radically new products or simply make suggestions as to how to improve existing products and
services (Bayus, 2013). In all of these cases, firms have begun to realize that inviting customers
into the new product and service development process, as active and direct contributors, often
produces superior results (e.g., market offerings that more closely match customer needs)
compared to traditional market research efforts (Ogawa & Piller, 2006).

Customer Co-creation as an Extension of the Open Innovation Paradigm
Synthesizing the definitions that have been given for co-creation in the marketing
literature (Hoyer et al., 2010; Lusch & Vargo, 2006; O'Hern & Rindfleisch, 2010; Prahalad &
Ramaswamy, 2004), this dissertation defines customer co-creation of innovation as the
collaboration between firms and their customers (or potential customers) in the product or
service development process, which may include customer input into ideation, design, and
production of new market offerings.
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Following the logic of the open innovation paradigm (Chesbrough, 2003), customer cocreation of innovation involves managers looking outside of their firm boundaries for new
product ideas and viewing customers as collaboration partners in innovation efforts. Many
successful firms conduct market research to determine the latent needs of their customers when
developing new products. Co-creation differs from the concept of market research because it
entails directly involving customers in the new product ideation and/or production process
(Füller, 2010; Witell, Kristensson, Gustafsson, & Löfgren, 2011), rather than simply learning
about customers.
From a customer perspective, scholars know a good deal about what motivates customers
to participate in co-creation activities, and the ways that co-creation activities might influence
customer perceptions of the value of new products and services. Customers are motivated to
contribute their time and creative energy by social benefits, learning benefits, hedonic benefits
and benefits related to personal gain (Nambisan & Baron, 2009). For example, Tynan,
McKechnie, and Chhuon (2010), in their study of the co-creation of luxury goods, found that cocreation allowed customers to create personalized brand experiences by co-developing products
that expressed their own sense of style, aesthetics, and relational value. Kristensson, Matthing,
and Johansson (2008) found that that the process of customer co-creation can help customers to
understand their own needs more clearly by facilitating deeper thinking about various usage
situations and roles they may not have encountered before in a particular product domain. In the
marketing services literature, co-creation efforts have been found to improve customer
satisfaction during service failure recovery (Dong, Evans, & Zou, 2008), and to encourage
customers to adopt new services by allowing them to test drive experiences before they commit
to purchasing them (Edvardsson, Enquist, & Johnston, 2005).
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From a firm perspective, scholars know that innovation strategies which involve cocreation have the potential to bring substantial benefits to companies’ product development
efforts. Specifically, co-creating innovation with customers helps firms to develop new market
offerings that more closely mirror customer needs, are of higher quality, and involve less
development risk (Fang, 2008; Hoyer et al., 2010). Customer co-creation may also be a key
aspect of customer relationship management, since customers may increasingly prefer to be
involved in the creative experience of developing products, services, and experiences (Boulding,
Staelin, Ehret, & Johnston, 2005). Some research has also looked at how co-creation influences
frontline employees. Chan, Yim, and Lam (2010) found that co-creation creates stronger
relational bonds with customers and increases the perceived value of products and services, but
can increase employee job stress and decrease work satisfaction.
Taken as a whole, the co-creation literature has extensively explored the outcomes of cocreation, including benefits to both customers and firms. However, the decision-making process
of how development teams review, select, and develop customer ideas for new products is still
underexplored in co-creation research.

Managerial Challenges in Customer Co-creation of Innovation
Not all forms of customer involvement in innovation are an inexpensive panacea for
generating innovative ideas. For example, Campbell’s Soup abandoned its online community
designed to generate new product ideas because of the lack of participation by customers
(Phillips, 2011). In a recent Wired Magazine article, the president of TopCoder, a crowdsourcing
development firm, predicted that 2014 could be the year that crowdsourced innovation initiatives
experience hyper-growth. He also predicted that a substantial number of firms will subsequently
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abandon the practice when it fails to engage end users in the NPD process in a way that
substantially improves firm innovation output (Singh, 2014). Given the anecdotal evidence from
industry regarding the mixed track record of co-creation efforts, several challenges in co-creation
are apparent.
Extant research has identified several problematic issues which influence the adoption of
open innovation in general, but also would likely impact whether firms pursue a co-creation
strategy with customers. These challenges include designing appropriate interface mechanisms
for user innovation (Terwiesch & Xu, 2008), recruiting qualified idea contributors (Jeppesen &
Lakhani, 2010), managing customer relationships in co-created innovation programs (Füller,
Hutter, & Faullant, 2011; Singh, 2014), dealing with intellectual property issues related to
customers’ ideas (Bogers, Afuah, & Bastian, 2010; Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010; Nambisan, 2002),
and developing radical (versus incremental) innovation in collaboration with customers (Bogers
et al., 2010; Hoyer et al., 2010).
This dissertation focuses specifically on the challenges associated with how development
teams select the best ideas from customers, and which aspects of group cognition influence
teams’ ability to recognize and implement innovative ideas from customers. Based on the
literature on innovation, there are several key challenges which may make customer co-creation
of innovation uniquely challenging.

Quality and Volume of Customer Ideas
First, research in crowdsourcing and soliciting ideas from large groups has argued that
not all customer ideas are worth pursuing but that the very best customer-generated ideas can be
as good (or better) than those generated by firms’ own internal development teams (Chesbrough,
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2003; Magnussen, Matthing, & Kristensson, 2003; Nishikawa et al., 2013; Poetz & Schreier,
2012). When firms consider customer-generated ideas for new products, they typically look for
ideas that are novel and valuable in terms of their profit-generating potential (Amabile, 1996;
Bayus, 2013; Burroughs, Dahl, Moreau, Chattopadhyay, & Gorn, 2011). Researchers have
argued that a large percentage of customer ideas in such initiatives are either redundant with
existing firm development projects, overlapping with other customer ideas, or infeasible to
implement (Bayus, 2013; Hopkins, 2011). As a result, the careful selection and filtering of
customer ideas is essential to creating value for firms.
Second, the sheer volume of ideas can also be a factor in co-creation projects that can be
challenging for firms to manage (Gloor & Cooper, 2012). Innovation teams that are unprepared
for idea volume can quickly become overwhelmed to the point of abandoning strategies to
involve users. Although online innovation communities can play a role in the filtering and
selection process (e.g., firms only consider ideas that receive a certain level of votes from the
community), the volume of ideas that managers must evaluate is still higher than is typically
encountered in internal innovation processes (Hoyer et al., 2010).
Third, development teams must look for the best customer ideas that serve the needs of
their customers, while also creating value for their firms. These dual goals in open innovation are
what Chesbrough (2003) refers to as value creation and value capture, respectively. Balancing
value creation and value capture poses a challenge for decision-makers. On one hand, customer
ideas may contain novel and useful suggestions for tapping into unmet customer needs, offering
the potential for deeper penetration into existing customer markets or tapping into new customer
markets (Hoyer et al., 2010). On the other hand, customers are unlikely to have a deep
understanding of firms’ implementation capabilities (Poetz & Schreier, 2012). Therefore,
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customer ideas for new products and services, while addressing unmet needs, may not always be
feasible to implement, or may require considerable adaption to be profitable for the firm. If
decision makers err too far in either direction (i.e., too restrictive or not discerning enough in
idea selection), the firm’s ability to capitalize on promising customer ideas may be
compromised, or firms may develop products that do not meet unmet needs in their respective
markets.

Team Cognitive Limitations
Finally, firms’ new product development teams may not always recognize the most
promising ideas when they see them. While the variance in the quality and quantity of customer
ideas can influence selection, decision teams’ ability to interpret and make sense of customer
ideas also plays a role in which ideas they select. Part of the “black box” surrounding the process
of managing co-creation from a firm perspective has been an underlying assumption that product
development professionals almost always recognize the best ideas when they see them. Various
streams of literature related to organizational behavior and organizational psychology suggest,
however, that innovation and corporate entrepreneurship teams, like individuals, are subject to
biases, cognitive inertia, satisficing, and cognitive overload that influence their ability to always
recognize the most promising ideas (Baron, 2004; Smith & Tushman, 2005). In the context of
customer co-creation, firms must not only recognize good ideas, but be able to adapt good
customer ideas in a way that fits their implementation capabilities (Poetz & Schreier, 2012).
Selection and implementation of new product ideas can be a challenging process, particularly if
customer ideas are radically divergent from the existing mental models that development teams
hold about the target market, form, and function new market offerings should have. Afuah and
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Tucci (2012) argue that looking for innovation outside of the firm’s four walls often entails
“distant” search, as opposed to “local” knowledge domains more closely related to their core
business. In this case, the selection problem may not only be related to managers’ inability to
deal with the sheer volume, but it could also be related to having the requisite knowledge and
cognitive frames to meaningfully interpret divergent ideas that customers might generate. When
development teams ignore “distant” sources of ideas, they cut themselves off from potentially
valuable sources of innovation insight. Jeppesen and Lakhani (2010), for example, found in the
crowdsourcing of innovation that the most promising concepts came from contributors who were
cognitively distant (e.g., had deep experience in other product domains, or were in the
demographic minority) from the focal firm. In the case of co-creation, firms that ignore “distant”
customer ideas may do themselves a greater disservice because of the unique potential of
customer-generated ideas to address unmet needs in the marketplace.
Given the potential challenges associated with managing co-creation, understanding
teams’ cognitive limitations may add unique insight into how firms successfully manage cocreation. These limitations might keep development teams from recognizing and pursuing ideas
that have the greatest potential to be successful in the marketplace. Ideally, co-creation decision
makers in firms should be cognitively flexible enough to consider new ideas without being
overwhelmed by immense quantities of data, or slowed down to the point of losing the ability to
be agile in the implementation of promising innovation concepts.

Research Questions
This dissertation focuses on the cognitive factors that drive successful development team
decisions about customer-generated ideas for new products. Given the challenging nature of
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interpretation, selection, and perceived ease of implementation that product development teams
face in the co-creation process, examining this phenomenon from a group cognition perspective
may yield insights into how successful firms manage the process of customer-co-created
innovation.

Specifically, this dissertation addresses the following research questions:
1. How do the team regulatory focus and reflexivity influence the skill of NPD teams in
evaluating and selecting customer-generated new product ideas?
2. How does the expertise of customers who submit ideas moderate those relationships?

Contribution to Theory
By exploring the topic of how firms manage co-creation though an organizational
behavior lens, this dissertation contributes to the theoretical understanding of how teams process
and make decisions about customer co-created ideas for new products. Previous literature has
argued for the benefits of customer co-creation for firms (Hoyer et al., 2010). However, little, if
any, research has investigated the decision-making process of how firms review, select, and
develop customer ideas for new products. There have also been several recent calls in the
marketing literature to investigate marketing phenomena and innovation practices through the
lens of organizational behavior and organizational psychology (Hauser, Tellis, & Griffin, 2006;
Marketing Science Institute, 2014).

Specifically, this dissertation makes the following contributions:
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Past research has primarily adopted a customer-centric perspective for studying cocreation, or has looked only at high-level benefits that firms may realize from co-creating
new products with customers. This research is among the first to shed light on the “black
box” that exists in our understanding of the phenomenon of co-creation in the phases
between involving customers in product development and new product success.



Past research applying regulatory style in innovation has explored this topic in the
context of new products and services developed in-house, but not in the more complex
evaluation situation of co-creation. This research explores how regulatory style
influences evaluation and selection when ideas come from outside the firm, which creates
a more complex decision environment for firms.



This research explores how reflexivity assists new product development teams in the cocreation of innovation, as well as how reflexivity interacts with a prevention or promotion
regulatory style to influence how skillful teams are in the selection of customers’ ideas
for new products.



Pursuant to a research priority put forth by the Marketing Science Institute (2014), this
research adopts theories from organizational psychology to help explain how firms adapt
to changing markets through co-creation activities and the cognitive orientation that firms
need to successfully manage the co-creation of new products.

Contribution to Practice
This program of research also offers several contributions to practice. In a general sense,
this research offers practical guidance for implementing a co-creation of innovation strategy with
customers. Given the skepticism expressed by the CEO of TopCoder (Singh, 2014), developing
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the capability to effectively manage and incorporate customers into the innovation process may
be an increasingly important source of competitive advantage for firms. This dissertation
contends that firms that can innovate with customers successfully will be those that effectively
manage the process and have the flexibility to avoid using a one-size-fits-all approach to cocreation initiatives. Specifically, this dissertation offers the following insights for the practice of
managing co-creation:


This study offers insights into how managers should conduct their co-created product
development team evaluation practices, based on whether they have a promotion focus or
a prevention focus.



This study offers insights into what types of team information processing are best for
pure selection tasks versus tasks that require substantial creative elaboration by
development team members.



This study offers insights into how teams should evaluate customers’ new product ideas,
based on the expertise and knowledge level of the customer inventors themselves.

Theoretical Background

Group Cognition and Decision-Making in Innovation Teams.
In the strategic management literature (e.g., Barr, Stimpert, & Huff, 1992; Reger & Huff,
1993; Schwenk, 1988), social cognition has been a lens through which scholars have studied
strategic decision-making. In the innovation literature, cognitive variables have been used to
examine how new product development managers use evaluation criteria, consider latent
customer needs, and whether or not development teams use democratic leadership styles to make
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decisions about potential new products (McNally, Durmusoglu, Calantone, & Harmancioglu,
2009), as well as the degree to which managers pursue risky development projects (Mullins,
Forlani, & Walker, 1999). McNally et al. (2009) argue that the psychological forces within
organizations and teams are key components in understanding how managers interpret and make
successful decisions about innovation strategy and new product development.
In a co-creation decision-making context, teams may face considerable cognitive
complexity in making skillful evaluations about customers’ ideas. Development teams have to
consider whether or not a given product idea would meet unmet market needs in parallel with
considering what their firm can profitably commercialize. Customers have been shown to be
adept at developing highly novel ideas that are attractive to a broader base of consumers.
However, in the process of generating product concepts, they tend to focus almost exclusively on
meeting their unmet needs (Poetz & Schreier, 2012) to the exclusion of the profit potential of
their ideas. Further, as noted by Bayus (2013) customer ideas are often vague, immature, or
under-elaborated, which may require substantial effort by firms to evaluate whether or not an
idea has latent potential. Firm decision-makers must often evaluate under-elaborated ideas that
may be difficult to implement, and ideas which were not created explicitly with profit-making
potential in mind. Given this complexity, cognitive flexibility, or the ability to simultaneously
think across multiple knowledge domains is an important characteristic of teams that can
skillfully make decisions in the co-creation of innovation. Cognitive flexibility has been shown
to be related to superior opportunity detection, the ability to think across multiple knowledge
domains, and the ability to engage in the deliberate processing of information when making
decisions (Laureiro-Martínez, Brusoni, & Zollo, 2009; Louis & Sutton, 1991).
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At the group level of analysis, two theories related to cognitive flexibility, regulatory
style and group reflexivity, are particularly relevant to the study of evaluation and selection in
the complex decision environment that exists in the co-creation of innovation. Examining these
variables offers specific insights into how development teams balance the double-edged sword of
the co-creation of innovation, choosing products that both create value for customers and capture
value for firms.
Regulatory style, the pursuit of achievement versus the avoidance of negative outcomes,
is associated with how broad or narrow the search efforts are, and what signals innovation
organizations look for to indicate whether a product idea will be successful (Baron, 2004). It is
also related to whether or not development teams look toward new product opportunities through
the lens of achieving market success or avoiding market failure. Reflexivity, or the degree to
which teams intentionally reflect on their knowledge and decision-making process, is associated
with how flexible teams are in the process of selecting customer ideas and in the pursuit of cocreation-related goals (Gurtner, Tschan, Semmer, & Nägele, 2007; Hoegl & Parboteeah, 2006).
Figure 1 shows the conceptual model for this research. In this model, a development
team’s level of reflexivity (depth of information processing about decision processes and shared
knowledge) and regulatory style (prevention or promotion) influences the team’s ability to
successfully identify innovative ideas from customers and to filter out ideas that have little
market promise. The moderators shown, discussed in subsequent chapters of this dissertation,
represent contextual factors related to co-creation inputs and firm innovation context which may
influence the relationships between team regulatory style or reflexivity and group decisionmaking outcomes.
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Regulatory Focus in Innovation Teams.
Regulatory Focus Theory (RFT) is a theory of human motivation that explains decisionmaking and goal pursuit based on two self-regulation types – a prevention or promotion
orientation (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 1998). According to this theory, people make
decisions using a promotion orientation when their primary focus is on pursuing gain,
advancement, and accomplishment.

Figure 1. Conceptual Model

A prevention orientation occurs when people pursue goals by avoiding losses. Individuals with a
chronic promotion focus are more creative in problem-solving, more sensitive to the presence or
absence of rewards, more risk-tolerant, and more concerned with accomplishments and
aspirations. Conversely, prevention-focused individuals are more sensitive to the absence or
presence of punishments, and are more concerned with duties, safety, and obligations (Brockner,
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Higgins, & Low, 2004; Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Friedman & Förster, 2001; Kark & Van Dijk,
2007).
Regulatory focus has been shown to be a chronic individual predisposition (i.e., some
people have a natural tendency toward prevention or promotion), but can also be situationally
dependent. Individuals may use both orientations at different times in the pursuit of goals (Crowe
& Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 1998). Support for regulatory focus can also be found by examining
physiological evidence, as measured by EEG scans. Individuals with a chronic prevention focus
show more right frontal lobe activity, while individuals with a chronic promotion focus show
more left frontal lobe activity (Kark & Van Dijk, 2007; Shah, Higgins, & Friedman, 1998).
Regulatory focus also has been demonstrated empirically in group-level decision making.
Levine, Higgins, and Choi (2000) conducted an experiment in three-person groups and found
evidence that group members’ responses converged on either a prevention or promotion
orientation, even when individuals’ chronic orientations were opposite that of the group. In
studies relating to RFT in a business environment, regulatory focus has been posited to influence
how successful entrepreneurs, investors, and innovation-focused teams are in interpreting and
responding to the business environment (Baron, 2004; Brockner et al., 2004; Florack and
Hartmann, 2007). Innovation researchers have posited that RFT might explain how development
teams make decisions, although the vast majority of the papers using RFT in innovation contexts
have not tested their assertions empirically.
From a broad perspective, regulatory focus represents two conflicting, but necessary
human motivations: a preference for change (promotion) and a preference for stability
(prevention) (Kark and Van Dijk, 2007). In an organizational context, these motivations exist as
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motivations to create value through exploration, innovation, and creative thinking, and the
motivation to capture value through exploitation, routinization, and cost reduction.

Reflexivity in Innovation Teams.
Another cognitive component which may influence how innovation teams filter and
select the best ideas from customers is the concept of reflexivity. Reflexivity is defined as “the
extent to which team members overtly reflect upon the group’s objectives, strategies, and
processes and adapt them to current or anticipated endogenous or environmental circumstances”
(West 1996, p. 559). In the context of this study, reflexivity is the degree to which development
teams actively reflect on their collective knowledge as they pursue the successful launch of a
new product.
In team decision-making, reflexivity has been shown to increase team learning and team
performance (DeDreu, 2002; Gurtner et al., 2007). By increasing communication quality and
creating shared mental models among team members, reflexivity is argued to enhance the
performance outcomes of group decisions. This relationship is driven by the ability of groups to
shift strategies mid-project, if needed, to attain desired outcomes (Gurtner et al. 2007).
For innovation teams, reflexivity may be positively associated with the quality of new
products. Hoegl and Parboteeah (2006) found in a cross sectional study that innovation teams
developing in-house projects that had high levels of reflexivity developed higher quality projects,
but that reflexivity was not positively associated with teams finishing projects on time and within
budget.
The literature on reflexivity suggests both benefits and drawbacks of team reflexivity. It
may be beneficial for teams by improving their ability to consider a wide range of alternatives

18
and to engage in more creative problem-solving, which has aspects related to value creation. On
the other hand, team reflexivity may incur additional costs or cause delays in development times,
thus reducing the level of value capture attained by development teams. However, when
considering the development efforts of teams managing customer co-creation, high reflexivity
may be desirable. Because of its association with greater cognitive flexibility (Gurtner et al.
2007), reflexivity may be necessary for innovation teams to be able to act on ideas from
customers that are highly novel and satisfy unmet customer needs, but may need adaptation or
adjustment to be profitably implemented. Decision teams with high levels of reflexivity may
consider developing additional capabilities for particularly promising ideas, or refining the scope
of the project to accommodate ideas with high market and commercialization potential, even if
they fall outside of the original project scope.

Dissertation Organization
The rest of this dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 includes an in-depth review of
the literature on user innovation and group cognition, and hypothesis development for studies 1,
2, and 3. Chapter 3 describes the methodology, measurement approach, and analysis used in each
study. Chapter 4 describes the results of the data analysis for each study. Chapter 5 has a
discussion of the findings, including implications for theory and practice, limitations, and future
research directions, as well as remarks that conclude the dissertation.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

In this chapter, the conceptual background and a review of the relevant literature are
summarized in order to develop the hypothesis to be tested in Study 1, Study 2, and Study 3.
First, co-creation is defined in an innovation context, drawing from existing definitions in the
marketing literature. Second, existing typologies of co-creation are integrated to create a broader
taxonomy of the various forms that co-creation can take in innovation efforts. Third, the relevant
literature related to co-creation, regulatory style and reflexivity in innovation are reviewed.
Based on the relevant literature, several hypotheses are developed which are then tested,
analyzed, and discussed in subsequent chapters.

Defining Cocreation in a New Product Development Context
The term co-creation has been used in several different ways in the marketing literature.
In this section, the author presents the various definitions of this term and synthesizes them into a
working definition as it pertains to innovation for this dissertation research.
Two primary research streams have emerged from the work on customer co-creation, and
definitions of the term co-creation from these streams is shown in Table 1. The first, which has
its roots in service dominant logic, focuses on co-created value as value-in use. Definitions of cocreation that fall into this paradigm come from work by Prahalad and Ramaswamy (2004),
Vargo and Lusch (2006), Payne et al. (2008). In this perspective, products have value to the
extent that they perform a valuable service for consumers. For example, a power tool does not
necessarily have inherent value for a customer. Its value lies in the extent to which such a
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product gives customers the ability to drill a hole or cut lumber. As a result, the value of this
type of product comes from its use by customers. Another variant in the service dominant logic
view of co-creation is that customers create their own hedonic experiences. In this view, firms
provide the raw inputs of materials and/or knowledge, while it is the end customer who
configures these operant resources to create a customized experience.

Table 1. Definitions of Cocreation in the Marketing Literature
Cocreation is…
Shifting the process of value creation from a product- and
firm-centric view to personalized consumer experiences.

Citation
Prahalad and Ramaswamy
(2004)

Value that is created with and determined by the user in the
‘consumption’ process and through use (value-in-use).

Vargo and Lusch (2006)

The notion of marketing as a facilitator and structurer of the
mutual creation and enjoyment of value [with customers].

Payne, Storbacka, and Frow,
2008

A collaborative new product development activity in which
consumers actively contribute and/or select various elements
of a new product offering.

Hoyer et al. (2010);
O’Hern and Rindfleisch (2010)

The coproduction of knowledge by customers that is valuable
for the firm’s innovation process.

Mahr, Lievens, and Blazevic
(2013)

Allowing customers to participate in value-creating activities,
such as brainstorming advertising taglines or product ideas.

Verhoef, Beckers, and van
Doorn (2013)

The second perspective, which is the definition used in this dissertation, is labeled here as
a value-in-creation perspective of co-creation. Prahalad and Ramaswamy (2004) conceptualize
co-creation as occurring in one of two ways, customer-to-firm (“create value for yourself”), and
customers-to-firm (“create value for yourself and others”). The value-in-use perspective relates
more closely to the customer-to-firm conceptualization, whereas the value-in-creation
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perspective is related to the customers-to-firm (plural) conceptualization in which firms take
ideas from customers and leverage them to serve a broader market. This conceptualization of cocreation has its roots in the new product development and innovation literature, where firms use
co-creation primarily as a tool for idea generation. While there is substantial overlap with a
value-in-use perspective, this view of co-creation primarily refers to the direct involvement of
customers in the ideation process of developing new products and services that appeal to one or
more market segments. Exemplars of this type of co-creation are companies that crowdsource
product design, advertising campaigns, and product features. For example, Frito-Lay hosts a
competition every year for its Doritos brand in which consumers submit short, self-produced
television commercials, with the winning entry to be aired during the Super Bowl (Edwards,
2014). The goal of this promotion is not to tailor the product and message to each consumer.
Rather, it is to leverage the collective power and video production resources of customers to
develop highly creative ads that appeal to a broad market of consumers.
In summary, this dissertation focuses on co-creation as a value-in-creation activity
whereby firms solicit ideas for new products and services from customers. More concisely
stated, co-creation of innovation is defined as the collaboration between firms and their
customers (or potential customers) in the product or service development process, which may
include customer input into ideation, design, and production of new market offerings.

Literature Review
In this section, the literature on the co-creation of new products and services is reviewed
with emphasis on research gaps and areas where theory is more mature for the purposes of
generating hypotheses. The topics covered include customers’ ability to directly contribute to
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co-creation, customer motivations to contribute to co-creation, effectiveness and efficiency
outcomes of co-creation, the influence of co-creation on customers, co-creation and brand
management, and the challenges and research gaps in the current literature. The summary of the
topics and key findings in the co-creation of innovation literature is outlined in Table 2.

Ability of Customers to Contribute to the Co-creation of Innovation
There has been some debate in the literature as to whether customers are truly capable of
making meaningful contributions to innovation beyond participating in focus groups and market
research projects (e.g., Bennett and Cooper, 1981; Ogawa and Piller, 2006; Poetz and Schreier,
2012; Ulrich and Eppinger, 2008). The argument against customers’ ability to directly contribute
to innovation hinges on the notion that customers may not always be able to articulate their own
needs, and may have experience with only a few of the product usage situations that the broader
market of customers is likely to encounter. More recent empirical studies, however, lend strong
support to the argument that customer-generated new product concepts equal or outperform
concepts generated by firms’ own development professionals.
Magnusson et al. (2003) conducted an experiment to compare the innovativeness of ideas
for new mobile telephone services created by end-users, professionals, and users who consulted
with professionals. Their outcome measure was based on three dimensions – originality, user
value, and producibility. Their findings indicated that users who did not consult with
professionals had ideas that scored the highest on originality, scored lower than professionals and
users who consulted with professionals on producibility, and were on par with professional and
consulting users for user value. When looking at only the highest quartile of submitted ideas,
they found similar results with the exception that the best-performing ordinary users produced
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ideas that were on par with professionals in terms of feasibility. The authors conclude that the
quality of internally-generated ideas may suffer because of the cognitive inertia that develops
when product development relies too heavily on past successes or current implementation
capabilities in the idea generation process.
Kristensson et al. (2004) also conducted an experiment to directly test the premise that
customers are better able to develop innovative new product ideas than firms’ development
teams. They compared ideas created by customers, ideas created by advanced customers who
had deep product knowledge, and ideas created by professional developers on their levels of
relevance, novelty, and realizability. They found that novice customers created ideas that were
superior to both professionals and expert customers on novelty and relevance, while
professionals and expert customers scored highest on realizability. Their conclusion was that
customers are better at divergent thinking because they are unconstrained by existing designs,
capabilities, and past successes that hinder more experienced customers and firm professionals.
Ogawa and Piller (2006) directly confront the assertion that customers cannot develop
innovative product ideas, instead arguing that consumers that co-create innovation are uniquely
positioned to develop novel ideas that will surprise and delight a firm’s customers. Products
developed internally often fail because they draw on limited or faulty insight and end up
developing products for “ideal” customers that don’t actually exist. They also argue that
traditional market research (e.g., focus groups and forecasting) have failed because they offer
little realism, are subject to group interaction biases, and cannot do well in forecasting demand
for radically new products and services. In their view, consumers are best-suited to make direct
contributions to innovations when firms want to develop really innovative products for which
there is no market data from which to draw insight, and when developing products for narrow
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market segments. Despite their general favorable opinion toward the practice of co-creating
innovation, they caution that firms must maintain the “final word” on product concepts rather
than adopting an entirely democratic process, since firms are likely to have internal knowledge
that is not available to the average co-creation collaborator.
Similar to the argument presented by Magnusson et al. (2003), and Kristensson et al.
(2004), Kristensson, Matthing, and Johansson (2008) argue that customer ideas can be inherently
more valuable because product development experts often exhibit predictable thinking that
inhibits creativity. In their view, customer ideas do not suffer the experience bias that a
company’s employees might have. As a result, customers are better able to develop novel ways
of addressing problems. They also argue that, as a collective, customer ideas for innovation offer
firms a great deal of insight because they present a cross-section of usage types and roles.
Poetz and Schreier (2012) conducted an experiment to determine whether users could
outperform professionals in developing innovative product ideas. In their study, separate groups
of users and professionals generated ideas, which were judged by company managers blind to the
source of each idea on the dimensions of novelty, customer benefit, and feasibility. Their study
was driven by the assumption that users can be a good source for discovering unmet needs in a
particular product category, but are less useful for developing concepts for how those needs
should be met (e.g. what particular technologies and product design should be applied to meet
customer needs). They found that user-generated ideas were more novel and better addressed
customer needs, but were more difficult to implement compared to ideas generated by
professionals. However, like Magnusson et al. (2003), they also analyzed a subset of only the
best ideas (those with scores above the mid-point on all three dimensions) and found that user
ideas were highly comparable with professional ideas in feasibility.
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Table 2. Review of the Literature on Co-creation in New Product Development
Co-creation Topic

Supported Findings






Ability of Customers to Contribute
in the Co-creation Innovation




Co-creation creates opportunities for firms to develop new
products that surprise and delight customers in ways the
internally-generated product concepts typically cannot.
Collectively, customers may be superior to development
professionals at creating product concepts that are novel and
meaningful, in part because they are not subject to the cognitive
biases that come from domain expertise.
Collectively, development professionals may be superior to
customers at creating product concepts that are feasible to
implement.
The potential of consumer-generated ideas may have its limits
because inventors may not have access to all of the relevant
information needed to develop a successful product idea.
The meaningfulness of customers’ new product concepts drives
market adoption.
Customer communities often result in highly innovative ideas
because they tap into the collective creativity and product
knowledge of customers.
Customers can contribute directly to innovation not just in the
ideation process, but as a first filtering and selection mechanism.

Authors

Magnusson et al., 2003;
Ogawa and Piller, 2006;
Fuller et al. 2008;
Kristensson et al., 2004
Kristensson et al., 2008;
Poetz and Schreier, 2012;
Bayus, 2013;
Mahr et al., 2014;
West and Lakhani, 2008
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Table 2. Continued.
Co-creation Topic
Motivations of Customers to
Participate in the
Co-creation of Innovation






Co-created Innovation
Effectiveness and Efficiency

Supported Findings
Individuals are motivated to co-create innovation with firms
because of the perceived learning benefits
Individuals are motivated to co-create innovation with firms
because of the perceived social benefits of interacting with other
consumer-innovators
Individuals are motivated to co-create innovation with firms
because of the utilitarian benefits of designing effective solutions
that address value-in-use problems they face
Individuals are motivated to co-create innovation with firms
because of perceived hedonic benefits and the enjoyment they
receive from the creative process

Co-created New Product Effectiveness
 The co-creation of new products is positively associated with
product quality.
 The co-creation of new products is positively associated with new
product creativity.
 The co-creation of new products is positively associated with the
development of products that more closely match unmet market
needs, and subsequently, lower rates of market failure than
internally-developed products.
 Co-creation is positively associated with decreased new product
development time.
 User-generated products outperform those designed in-house
Co-created New Product Efficiency
 The co-creation of new products is positively associated with
decreased development time and costs.
 The co-creation of new products is positively associated with
lower marketing costs through positive word of mouth and/or
customer involvement in designing promotional materials.

Authors

Nambisan and Baron, 2009;
Kristensson et al., 2008;
Fuller et al. 2008

Antorini et al. 2012;
Hoyer et al. 2010;
Nishikawa et al., 2013;
O’Hern and Rindfleisch 2010;
Verhoef et al, 2013

27
Table 2. Continued
Co-creation Topic
Co-creation of Innovation and
Customer Metrics

Supported Findings




Co-creation of Innovation and
Brand Management






Authors

Co-creation positively influences customer satisfaction with
products and services.
Customers show greater purchase intentions and a greater
willingness to pay for co-created new products.
Customers are more willing to recommend co-created new
products to others (positive word-of-mouth effect).

Auh et al., 2007;
Dong et al., 2008;
Schreier et al., 2012

Participation in the development of luxury brands, particularly
with a firm’s head designer positively influences consumer
perceptions of luxury products and the status they confer.
Consumers view firms as more innovative when they promote
products as user designed. This effect is driven by the perception
that co-created market offerings are the products of a process that
includes greater diversity and better attention to customer needs
than internally-developed products.
Labeling a product as “user designed” may backfire in the context
of luxury brands, causing consumers to view such products as
lower quality and less valuable as status symbols

Tynan et al. 2010;
Schreier et al., 2012;
Fuchs et al., 2013
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Table 2. Continued.
Co-creation Topic
Challenges and Research Gaps in
the Co-creation of Innovation

Supported Findings








Co-creating often creates challenges for firms to develop
appropriate incentives to keep customers engaged and motivated
to freely give of their creative energy, efforts, and time.
Co-creating innovations with customers may present challenges in
managing customer expectations and relationships, particularly
when firms override popular customer ideas.
Co-creating with customers diminishes the amount of control that
firms have over strategic planning.
Firms may find it more difficult to manage the objectives of their
innovation strategy when the NPD process is opened to
customers.
Co-creating innovation increases the level of complexity in
evaluating and selecting customer ideas.
Firms’ development professionals may struggle in recognizing
quality ideas from customers, especially when idea volume is
high.
Marketing research has focused on improving customers’ and
employees’ ability and motivation to generate creative ideas, but
no existing research investigates how firms evaluate and select
customer ideas.

Authors

Gebauer et al., 2013;
Hoyer et al. 2010;
O’Hern and Rindfleisch 2010;
Bayus 2013;
Verhoef et al. 2013
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Bayus (2013) presents a similar view of customers’ ability to contribute directly to a
firm’s innovation efforts. He conducted a study of contributors to Dell’s online IdeaStorm
project in which customers can submit ideas for new products and services, and analyzed the
characteristics of customers whose ideas were ultimately adopted by Dell. He argues that, while
consumers do often develop innovative ideas, their potential may have its limits because
inventors rarely have access to all of the available, pertinent information needed to develop a
successful innovation concept. On the other hand, customers, especially first-time submitters, do
often have ideas that are highly promising, which may be because they are less-restricted by the
cognitive inertia which can be caused by previous wins. His findings suggest that while the
novelty and meaningfulness of consumer-submitted ideas may be high, feasibility is contingent
on access to additional information, which these individuals are typically lacking. He also finds
that serial ideators can overcome these barriers by the level to which they interact in a user
community and are exposed to other customers’ ideas.
Nishikawa et al. (2013) conducted an empirical examination of user-generated products
and designer-generated products. They followed the products over a course of three years. Their
findings showed that user-generated products dramatically outperformed those designed in-house
at one consumer goods firm. After three years, the sales revenues of user-generated products
were five times higher and the average margins were six times higher than those of products
designed in-house. In addition, the user-generated products were more likely to still be on the
market three years after introduction than the in-house products.
Mahr et al. (2014) argue that customers may be best-suited for creating concepts that are
highly relevant, but moderately novel, since highly novel products have lower market adoption
rates. In their view, optimal customer contributions come from customers with whom a firm has
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rich and deep communication, such as lead users. Their study included a survey conducted
among managers who worked with customers in developing new products. They found that
customers can indeed develop highly novel and highly relevant new product concepts, but that
relevance may matter more than novelty to successful market adoption of co-created new
products. They also found that customers with whom the firm had rich and deep communication
(e.g. lead users) were better-suited to developing innovative ideas for new products.
In exploring the potential of customers to make meaningful, direct contributions to firms’
innovation efforts, many researchers have investigated the influence of user communities in cocreation. The notion of user communities in innovation draws largely from recent thinking in the
crowdsourcing of innovation (Howe, 2006), whereby firms can tap into the collective creative
and intellectual resources of large groups of people. Although there have been some scholars
who have investigated innovative user communities unaffiliated with a firm (e.g., an
investigation of a kite surfing enthusiasts group by Franke et al. (2006), the emphasis in this
research is on communities that are firm-led as a mechanism for new product idea generation,
brand management and customer relationship management. Firm-led user communities often
play an important role in consumers’ direct contribution to firm innovation. First, they often
serve as an important motivator for individual contributors to participate, as they provide a
means for social interaction and for consumers to accrue status among other like-minded
individuals (Nambisan and Baron, 2009). Second, they often act as a first filter for ideas
submitted to the online community (Bayus, 2013; Bonabeau, 2009; Fuller, 2010). Using
communities as a first filter can have both positive and negative consequences for firms. On the
positive side, using a community to screen ideas can drastically reduce the number of ideas
internal developers have to review and evaluate (Bonabeau, 2009; Filieri, 2013; Fuller 2010). On
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the other hand, filtering new products ideas through large crowds may cause average idea quality
and potential to regress towards the mean (Bonabeau 2009), limiting the attention paid to highly
novel new product ideas.
West and Lakhani (2008, p. 224) define user communities as “a voluntary association of
actors, typically lacking in a priori common organizational affiliation (i.e., not working for the
same firm) but united by a shared instrumental goal – in this case, creating, adapting, adopting,
or disseminating innovations.” They also make an important distinction between communities
and value chains (e.g., suppliers, employees, industry networks), with the latter including actors
or groups linked through formal market mechanisms. In a co-creation context, user communities
are a voluntary association of customer with whom firms interact to develop and/or market ideas
for products and services. Voluntary association is an important distinction, because, as will be
discussed in this chapter, the loose affiliation and lack of control that firms have over customers
can sometimes prove to be problematic (e.g., Verhoef et al., 2013).
In their investigation of user communities, Fuller et al. (2008) argue that brand
communities are an important source of innovation in co-creation because they consist of
members who are both passionate about the brand and are familiar with its products. Although
the primary focus of their article is to investigate the motivations of consumers to participate in
such communities (an in-depth review of customer motivations appears in the following section),
they conduct their research under the main assumption that communities are a powerful tool
firms often use to generate insight and concepts for new products and services.
Taken together, these studies point toward several conclusions regarding the ability of
existing and potential customers to generate quality ideas for new products and services. On the
one hand, these individuals, especially first-time submitters, should be expected to develop ideas
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that are highly novel and meaningful in the degree to which they address unmet market needs.
On the other hand, customers simply may not have access to enough pertinent information about
development costs, market conditions and firm implementation capabilities to compete with
firms’ development professionals on the dimension of implementation feasibility. Customer
communities not only provide the social interaction needed to motivate some consumers to
contribute their creative energies, but they also help to ensure that firms draw insights from a
wide cross-section of customers who are an adequate representation of the broader market for the
products and services being developed.
Customer Motivations for Participating in the Co-creation of Innovation
Customers may be highly capable of generating ideas that are novel and meaningful, but
that does not necessarily mean that they are always motivated to do so. In addition to studying
customers’ ability to develop promising new product concepts, some marketing scholars have
investigated the factors that motivate customers to contribute to co-creation efforts. Often,
contributing ideas to a firm does not result in substantial monetary rewards. Consumer-inventors
often do so for free, or for only the uncertain possibility of compensation (if their idea is
selected), while firms reap the rewards of customers’ collective intellectual capital. An important
subset of the co-creation literature has looked at the factors that motivate customers to give
freely of their time, creative energy, and, in some cases, finances, to engage in firms’ co-creation
efforts, while allowing firms to profit from their ideas.
Kristensson, Matthing, and Johansson (2008), in their qualitative investigation of the cocreation of new technology-based services, found that customers were motivated to participate in
co-creation by several intrinsic factors. Among these motivations was the perceived opportunity
to learn about new usage situations for products and services that other similar customers
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encountered. They were also motivated by the perceived opportunity to learn about completely
new customer roles, such as how technology services might benefit them in their personal lives
when their previous experience with similar services had only occurred in the workplace. They
were motivated by the perceived opportunity to learn about future technology trends and to stay
abreast of the latest technology. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, many of these customers
participated because they were frustrated with the inadequacies of existing servicers and felt cocreation might be a way to be proactive in generating better solutions.
Fuller et al. (2008) identify several factors that motivate consumers to participate in cocreation. Like other authors (e.g., Kristensson et al., 2008; Nambisan and Baron, 2009), they
identify the opportunity to learn about a product domain and the opportunity to participate in a
creative act as significant drivers of participation. Their findings also support that two
characteristics of consumers – existing brand trust and domain expertise – motivate customers to
participate with companies. Customers who trust and feel comfortable with a brand are more
likely to co-create new products with that brand, and customers who already possess expertise in
a product domain are more likely to participate in co-creation.
Nambisan and Baron (2009) found that customers have a variety of potential motivations
to participate in collaborate efforts with firms. Customers may be motivated by the opportunity
to learn new skills or to gain expertise in a particular product domain. They may be motivated by
the social benefits of participating in user communities and developing ties to others. Similarly,
they may be motivated by the opportunity to gain prestige, status, and a sense of self-efficacy by
displaying their creativity and their ideas for others, especially in a user community. Finally,
many customers receive hedonic benefits from the pleasure and mental stimulation they receive
through the act of creating something novel. From a resource allocation perspective, the authors
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argue that firms should be willing to make appropriate investments in building programs that
offer these benefits (e.g., building and maintaining online user communities), rather than simply
assuming that customers will participate without being sufficiently motivated.
Several observations help to integrate these articles together. From a learning perspective,
customers are motivated to participate in the co-creation of innovation by the opportunity to
learn about new trends, usage situations, and roles related to a particular product domain. From a
social perspective, customers are motivated by opportunities to form social connections with
other individuals, and build status and reputation through their interaction with other consumers.
Consumers who are already experts may be particularly inclined to participate for this reason,
since they can showcase their abilities and build a reputation for themselves. From a utilitarian
perspective, customers are motivated to participate in co-creation projects because it affords
them the potential opportunity to enact solutions to problems that they face in their day-to-day
consumption (e.g., when value-in-use is low for existing market offerings). From a hedonic
perspective, many customers participate in the co-creation of innovation simply because they
enjoy the act of creating something that is novel. Finally, customers may be more likely to
participate in co-creation when they feel a high degree of trust in the brand.

Co-created New Product Effectiveness and Efficiency
Customers may be capable and motivated to participate as collaborators in developing
innovative ideas, but if doing so does not offer significant perceived advantages, firms are not
likely to engage in co-creating innovation. Before the concept of co-creation was formally
introduced into the marketing literature, several authors argued that involving customers in the
NPD process was beneficial (e.g., Business Wire, 2001; Gruner and Homburg, 2000). The co-
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creation literature pertaining to new product development, however, has examined how
customers’ direct involvement as designers and creative idea generators influences the
effectiveness and efficiency of co-created innovations relative to traditional, internally-developed
new products and services.
Hoyer et al. (2010) outline several phases of the new product development process in
which co-creation is effective. In the ideation stage, they argue that co-creation can create
efficiencies by obtaining low-cost input from customers, which at the same time may result in a
pool of ideas with the potential to more closely match unmet market needs than ideas generated
internally. They also contend that, in the commercialization and post-launch stage, co-creation
can be both more efficient and effective by reducing marketing costs of advertising and
education, and by receiving early warning that a product may not attractive to consumers,
reducing the risk that a product destined for failure will be taken to market.
Drawing from insights gleaned from previous work done in open source communities
(e.g. Grewal et al., 2006; Shah, 2006; von Hippel, 2005), O’Hern and Rindfleisch (2010) argue
that co-creation between firms and their customers results in increased new product creativity,
mirroring findings by scholars who have challenged the traditional assumption that customers
cannot directly contribute to the development of new products and services. They also draw on
this literature to conclude that co-creation is often associated with lower development costs and
greater speed to market.
Antorini et al. (2012) conducted an investigation of Lego’s user community. In their
analysis of how this community evolved over time, they conclude that Lego has used co-creation
to increase the number of products they offer without significantly raising long-term fixed costs.
By allowing customers to collaborate in the design of new offerings and reduce development
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costs, Lego can tailor offerings to market niches that would be too small to justify pursuing from
a cost perspective.
To summarize these findings, co-creating innovation with customers may provide several
effectiveness and efficiency advantages for firms, relative to internal development projects. From
an effectiveness standpoint, co-created new products may be of a higher quality, more creative,
and match unmet market needs better than internally-generated ideas. Firms may also leverage
customers to decrease the time to market of new products. From an efficiency perspective, cocreated new products are likely to have lower overall development costs by transferring time and
resource investment from the firm to the customer. Due to word-of-mouth effects, co-created
new products may also carry lower marketing communication costs than projects developed
internally.

Co-creation of Innovation and Customer Metrics
There may also be important implications for the effectiveness of co-creation in driving
customer outcomes. In both goods-based and service-based marketing there is empirical support
that participating in co-creation and consuming co-created products creates greater customer
loyalty, satisfaction with the focal firms’ products and services, positive future purchase
intentions, and positive word-of-mouth benefits to marketers.
Auh et al. (2007) explored the effects of customer co-creation in the financial services
industry. They found that participation with a firm in the creation of a service not only increased
customer satisfaction, but also increased customers’ attitudinal loyalty toward the focal firm.
They also found that the perception of procedural justice (i.e., being treated fairly), customers’
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level of service domain expertise, and the quality of customers’ existing relationships with the
firm positively moderated this effect.
Chan et al. (2010) conducted an investigation into the customer-related outcomes of cocreating solutions with customers and frontline service employees. Innovation in this context
took the form of improvisational creation of new solutions for customers. They found that when
customers were involved in the generation of solutions, they had greater levels of customer
satisfaction, and a greater sense of perceived value from the services they consumed. They also
find a downside. Although these co-creation encounters were a source of relationship-building
with customers, they decreased employee job satisfaction because they created role stress for
workers dealing with uncertain service provision environments.
In the context of co-created goods-based market offerings, Schreier, Fuchs, and Dahl
(2012) argue that customers do not have to be active participants in co-creating new products for
co-creation to drive customer metrics. They found, across a variety of product categories, that
when products were promoted as “user designed”, customers showed a higher willingness to pay,
had greater purchase intentions, and were more likely to make positive recommendations to
others about these products.
Taken together these studies support the assertion that co-creating innovation with
customers can positively influence customer satisfaction, purchase intentions and word-of-mouth
behaviors. Not only does this seem to apply to customers who participate in co-creation, but also
to customers who consume co-created products that they were not personally involved in
designing.
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Co-creation and Brand Management
Co-creation has also been found to play a role in branding and brand management. As
was discussed in a previous section related to customers’ ability to contribute to innovation,
Fuller et al. (2008) conceptualize brand communities as an important source of innovation in cocreation because they create a social forum for a rich exchange of ideas about product
modifications and new products. In addition to influencing the social aspect of brands (i.e., brand
communities), several authors have investigated how co-creation influences brand positioning
with customers. The work in branding a co-creation deals with two main issues. First, the degree
to which personal participation in co-creation influences consumers’ brand perceptions. Second,
the degree to which knowing that a particular product was the result of co-creation with other
customers influences consumers’ brand perceptions.
Illustrating the first perspective of the effects of participation on brand management,
Tynan et al. 2010 develop a model of co-creation for luxury brands based on qualitative
interviews. They find that participating in the co-creation of luxury brands can bolster the
perceived status of the resulting products for customers of luxury goods. This is especially
apparent when customers interact directly with luxury brands’ head designers. In this setting,
customers’ perceptions of luxury did not come just from product status and product quality, but
also from the experience itself of interacting with designers and creating a high-end good.
In addition to their findings discussed previously about customer purchase intentions,
willingness to pay, and willingness to recommend to others, Schreier, Fuchs, and Dahl (2012)
found that labeling products as “user designed” can have positive implications for a firm’s
branding strategy. In a series of experiments, they found that that customers view firms that cocreate new products with their customers as more innovative than firms that do not engage in this
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practice, which they label as the “innovation effect of user design.” Despite the fact that that
customers tend to attribute less expertise to individual ordinary users than they do to firm design
employees, consumers see firms that co-create with their customers as more innovative for four
primary reasons. The first is what the authors call the numbers argument, which simply means
that people are likely to perceive a greater innovation capacity distributed among large numbers
of people, rather than residing only with a few experts. The second argument, closely related to
the first, they call the diversity argument. In this view, customers may view firms with a cocreation strategy as more innovative because they not only draw on more individual innovators,
but more diversity of thought and insight about consumer needs goes into co-created new
products. The third reason firms that co-create are seen as more innovative is based on the user
applicability argument. This mirrors a previous discussion in this literature review about how
customer-generated ideas outperform those developed internally by firms. Finally, they argue
that customers view firms that co-create as more innovative because they perceive consumerdesigners as having fewer constraints than firm designers have (e.g., profit margin consideration,
manufacturing capabilities, etc.), freeing them to focus on optimizing value to customers in their
creative solutions rather than profit margins.
Fuchs et al. (2013) find that, in the context of luxury brands, co-creation is not
unequivocally effective in generating favorable brand impressions among consumers. Their
study supports the argument that labeling a brand as “designed by users” may backfire for luxury
or status goods, like high-end fashion goods, causing consumers to view them as having inferior
design features, lower quality, and lower value as status symbols. The exception to these findings
is when firms market user-designed products as having been developed in cooperation with the
firm’s product designer, or when the product was the result of a celebrity’s creative efforts, as
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these factors are likely to retain associations with status and luxury in the minds of customers.
They also found this backfiring effect was not as evident when the co-created good was not
viewed as a status symbol, for example, designer t-shirts versus dress shirts, etc.
In summary, co-creation has been found to be positively associated with customers’
favorable brand perceptions of resulting new products. These effects stem both from customer
participation in the co-creation process and from consuming products known to be “user
designed.” For luxury brands, however, consumers may view products designed by other
customers as being of lower quality and having a lower value as status symbols.

Practical Challenges Associated with Cocreation
Despite the existing body of knowledge reviewed in this chapter pertaining to co-creation
in new product development, there remain several significant issues and challenges that present
opportunities for research, as evidenced in the issues discussed across the co-creation topics in
this literature review. As Verhoef, Beckers, and Van Dorn (2013) note, co-creation campaigns,
despite their promise, still fail at a rate of approximately 50%. In addition to highlighting the
apparent benefits of co-creating innovation with customers, each of the topics discussed in earlier
sections of this literature review also present potentially challenging issues.
First, despite the significant advances in the scholarly understanding of what motivates
consumers to participate in the co-creation of innovation, firms often struggle with designing
appropriate mechanisms to effectively provide one or more of those motivations. Nambisan and
Baron (2009) and Fuller (2010) conclude that firms must be willing to make the required
investments in infrastructure (i.e., online communities) that facilitates the rich interaction
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between developers and customers and also the interaction between customers needed to create
and maintain motivated customer-contributors.
Second, related to customer outcomes, there are also substantial challenges in managing
customers in the co-creation of innovation. Gebauer, Fuller, and Pezzei (2013) investigate the
dark side of co-creation from a customer perspective. They studied customer contests and found
that such efforts can inadvertently create ill-will with customers. Online communities in
innovation contests often develop very specific preferences for which ideas should be adopted by
the company hosting the contest. When firms chose ideas that are not fan favorites, or when fans
disagree with the outcomes of these contests, it often results in anger and resentment among
loyal customers, who are the most likely group to participate in these co-creation initiatives.
They argue that, while co-creation can indeed create positive customer outcomes, firms should
understand the risks involved, and that inviting customer participation is not a panacea for
cultivating positive customer relationships.
Finally, co-creation creates unique forms of complexity that firms must be prepared to
manage. Although in many ways co-creating innovation is less complex than internal product
development processes (e.g., lower development costs and fewer knowledge resources required
of firms), the literature suggests that it does present unique complexities not evident in internal
innovation activities (Hoyer et al., 2010). This unique complexity typically is manifest in the
partial loss of control over planning and strategy.
First, firms must often deal with the questions of ownership and intellectual property that
are raised when customers are invited into the development process. Successful collaboration
with customers often requires that firms give up control over their NPD decisions and loosen
their policies related to intellectual property (Bonabeau, 2009; Hoyer et al., 2010; O’Hern and
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Rindfleisch, 2010). This creates the risk that customers will take innovative ideas to competitors
or will themselves seek to commercialize innovative ideas for products and services.
Ceding come portion of control to customers can also create challenges in brand
management. For example, Verhoef et al. (2013) use General Motors to illustrate this point. The
company allowed customers to create their own ads, but instead of creating helpful, user
designed promotional tools, some customers used the platform to develop unflattering and
derogatory ads about the quality of the company’s automobiles.
Finally, a significant challenge in the co-creation of innovation is related to the ability of
firms to evaluate and select the best ideas, particularly when they must filter through hundreds,
or even thousands of customer-submitted ideas (Bayus, 2013; Hoyer et al., 2010). This issue is
two-fold. First, as has been previously discussed, managers simply may not have the cognitive
capacity to meaningfully process hundreds or thousands of submitted new product concepts
(Hoyer et al., 2010). Second, the same cognitive inertia that causes internal developers to have
difficulty thinking past existing solutions and past successes (Kristensson et al. 2008; Magnusson
et al., 2003) may also influence their ability to recognize co-created new product novelty and
customer meaningfulness when they encounter it. As such, teams that can develop the ability to
be cognitively flexible, balancing both the needs of customers and the needs for profitability
(Chesbrough, 2003), should gain an advantage in managing customer co-created innovation
programs.
Evaluation and selection is an issue that many researchers have noted needs more
investigation, but for which no empirical research currently exists. As one researcher recently
noted, “The marketing literature has a long-standing interest in methods for improving idea
generation, but is generally silent on the ‘best’ approaches for idea selection…next to nothing is
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known about idea selection in crowdsourcing applications where ideas are publically submitted
and rated by consumers over time” (Bayus, 2013, p. 241). This challenge in the co-creation of
innovation – the difficulties inherent in evaluation and selection – is the focus of this dissertation
research.

Cognitive Theories in Innovation and New Product Development
As has been previously discussed, several authors have found that cognitive inertia may
hinder innovation teams from thinking past their previous success and established methods of
decision-making. This cognitive inertia may explain why customer-generated new product
concepts are often superior to those generated by development professionals (Magnusson et al.,
2003; Poetz and Schreier, 2012) on the dimensions of novelty and meaningfulness (i.e., the
degree to which they satisfy customer needs). Exploring the issue of evaluation and selection
through the lens of team cognition offers the opportunity to uncover valuable insights related to
the how firms manage the unique complexities of co-creation. A cognitive approach to exploring
the issues of selection and evaluation in co-creation rests on the premise that human decisionmakers behave with bounded rationality (Simon 1991) rather than being rational in an entirely
objective sense. Baron (2004) argues that adopting a cognitive perspective may help explain why
some individuals and organizations are better able to recognize and exploit innovation
opportunities in the environment, even when presented with the same objective information.
Several researchers in innovation and new product development have explored factors
related to new product developers’ cognitive habits and styles to explain innovation outcomes.
(Laureiro-Martínez et al., 2009) argue that cognitive flexibility, or the ability to think broadly
across domains, is associated with discovery and innovation in organizations. (Dahl & Moreau,
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2002) find that teams that use analogical thinking have greater success in new product
development. Likewise, McNally et al. (2009) find that the cognitive styles and dispositional
traits of managers are related to successful innovation portfolio management.
Theories from organizational psychology may be particularly helpful in understanding
the cognitive underpinning of team decision making about customer ideas for new products and
services. The focus is on two specific theory bases; regulatory focus theory and the literature on
team reflexivity. Regulatory focus refers to how firms approach risk, rewards, and achievement,
from a prevention- or promotion orientation, while reflexivity refers to the degree to which teams
overtly reflect on their knowledge and decision-making practices. Both of these theories offer
insight into the underlying causes of cognitive inertia, ways of thinking about opportunities, and
practices that can help teams to reduce the negative effects of cognitive inertia. They may also
explain how accurate a development team is in assessing whether or not a customer’s new
product idea is worth pursuing.

Regulatory Focus Theory
Regulatory focus theory (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 1998) posits that individuals
self-regulate and make decisions using either a prevention orientation or a promotion orientation.
When people make decisions motivated by achievement, risk-taking, and pursuing positive
outcomes, they can be said to have a promotion orientation. Individuals with a promotion
orientation typically have a strong motivation to enact change, are creative problem solvers, are
more risk tolerant, and are more sensitive to the presence or absence of rewards. Conversely, a
prevention orientation occurs when individuals or groups are motivated by avoiding negative
outcomes and losses. Individuals with a prevention orientation typically have a strong motivation
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to follow rules, are concerned with the absence or presence of punishment, with duties and
obligations, and are considered more risk averse than people with a promotion orientation.
Prevention and promotion orientations have also been empirically shown to be manifest
at the group level of analysis. For example, Levine et al. (2000) conducted an experiment to
determine how situational factors might change regulatory style. They found that in a group
decision-making context, groups tended to converge on either a prevention or promotion style,
even when individual team members had opposite chronic traits. Faddegon, Scheepers, and
Ellemers (2008) report a similar convergence on a group regulatory style and found that even the
emotions of individual group members shifted to align with the prevention or promotion
orientation of the group.
Regulatory focus is considered to be both a trait and a state in that individuals typically
have a stable preference, but different situations can elicit different regulatory styles (Kark &
Van Dijk, 2007). Among the situational factors that have empirically shown to influence group
regulatory style are punishment/reward structures (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Florack &
Hartmann, 2007), time pressure (Florack & Hartmann, 2007), the regulatory style of team
leaders (Wu, McMullen, Neubert, & Yi, 2008), and explicitly receiving instructions to adopt a
decision-making style of “eagerness” or “vigilance” (Spanjol, Tam, Qualls, & Bohlmann, 2011).

Regulatory Focus in Innovation
In innovation, regulatory focus may present an interesting tradeoff for firms wishing to
launch new products. On the one hand, conventional wisdom in innovation supports the idea that
firms must be willing to accept a certain level of risk in the exploration of new knowledge,
processes, and technologies (March, 1991), which is consistent with a promotion orientation. On
the other hand, given that there is no guarantee that exploration will yield returns (e.g., the high
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rate of new product failure), too much exploration could have serious negative consequences for
a firm or business unit. In innovation, a promotion style represents a motivation to create value
through exploration, innovation, and creative thinking, while a prevention style represents the
motivation to capture value through exploitation, routinization, and cost reduction (Chesbrough,
2003).
Despite its potential for explaining team decision-making in innovation, only a few
articles have used regulatory style to investigate outcomes for entrepreneurship and innovation.
None of these articles addresses the co-creation of innovation with consumers, but when
considered with the literature on the co-creation of innovation yield several interesting
predictions. The key findings of these studies are shown in Table 3.

Baron (2004) conceptually explores the role of regulatory style in detecting both good
and bad opportunities for innovation and entrepreneurship. He posits that regulatory style may be
instrumental in determining how accurately innovation- and entrepreneurially-oriented
individuals and organizations are in detecting signals about the market performance potential of
new projects. As he points out, successful innovators are not only adept at recognizing good
opportunities (correct identification), but they can also recognize bad ideas and dead ends when
they see them (correct rejection). In his view, both regulatory foci may offer advantages to
successful innovators. Promotion may be associated with identifying good opportunities, while a
prevention focus may be better-suited for being vigilant against pursuing ideas that would
ultimately fail
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Brockner et al. (2004), in their conceptual review of regulatory style in entrepreneurship,
argue that prevention and promotion teams differ fundamentally in how they assess the risk of
new product concepts. In their view, prevention-oriented teams have the tendency to
overestimate the risks associated with a new product undertaking, whereas promotion-oriented
teams tend to underestimate the riskiness of an innovation opportunity or new venture. They
posit that a promotion style is beneficial in developing new ideas, while a prevention style may
be more beneficial in the screening and implementation phases of entrepreneurship. One caveat
they offer, however, is that innovation and entrepreneurship may be incompatible with a
prevention orientation since they entail a certain level of inherent risk. Therefore, they argue that
promotion oriented individuals and firms may be successful, in part, because they engage in
overall higher levels of entrepreneurial and/or innovative activities.
Florack and Hartman (2007) investigated team decision making and how they chose to
invest in certain ventures over others based on perceived risk levels. They conducted a team
experiment in which a prevention or promotion focus was primed for each group. Teams were
instructed to act as small business owners analyzing investment opportunities that varied in risk,
and were asked to decide in which of those options to invest. They found that promotion-oriented
groups made significantly riskier decisions than prevention-oriented groups who tended to opt
for “safe” options. An important boundary condition they found was that time pressure seemed
to erode any disparity in risk aversion between promotion and prevention-oriented groups. Under
time pressure, prevention-oriented groups became less risk averse and promotion-oriented
groups became more risk averse.
Rietzschel (2011) conducted a survey of 33 teams, including 303 team members and 33
team leaders in Dutch firms. His findings suggest that a prevention orientation may have benefits
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in the fuzzy front end of the ideation process, as well as for the process development teams
which must go through internally to garner resources and managerial support for new product
development initiatives. Specifically, he found that a collective promotion focus was positively
associated with the frequency of original idea generation, and idea promotion (e.g., mobilizing
support internally for innovation projects. However, there were no significant differences
between prevention and promotion groups on the number of realized ideas (e.g. turned into
practical applications). An important potential implication of his findings is that, while a
development team’s promotion may be instrumental in creating original ideas and generating
organizational excitement and support for a project, it may not influence firms’ ability to develop
a superior sense of which projects will perform well in the marketplace.
Spanjol et al. (2011) analyzed data collected from a marketing simulation completed by
teams of business students that were assigned to an “eager” (promotion) or a “vigilant”
(prevention) strategy in their decision-making. Additionally, dyads were either matched on their
chronic individual regulatory style preferences (prevention matched, promotion matched, or
mixed). In terms of development team outcomes, they found that groups with a promotion focus
match introduced a greater volume of new products, were faster in introducing new products, and
introduced more novel new products (versus product line extensions). Furthermore, prevention
match and mixed groups assigned an eager (promotion) strategy outperformed groups in the
vigilance strategy (prevention) groups on the same three outcome measures. The only exception
was that when both team members were individually promotion oriented, they outperformed
mixed and prevention groups, even when assigned to a vigilant strategy. The authors conclude
that promotion-oriented individuals may be less sensitive to situational factors in regulatory
style, or resistant to perceived outside influences on their regulatory style.
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Table 3. Group Regulatory Focus Theory in Entrepreneurship/Innovation
Author(s)
Baron
(2004)




Brockner,
Higgins, and
Low (2004)






Florack and
Hartmann
(2007)



Spanjol et al.
(2011)







Rietzschel
(2011)




Key Findings
A promotion focus is associated with situational alertness and the ability to consider a broad range
of idea and knowledge domains in innovation and entrepreneurship.
A promotion focus may be more effective in idea generation, while a prevention focus may be more
effective in idea screening in innovation and entrepreneurship.
Prevention-minded decision makers may overestimate the problems and challenges of a new
entrepreneurial opportunity, while promotion-minded decision makers tend to underestimate the
problems and challenges of a new entrepreneurial opportunity.
Regulatory style may aid in signal detection about entrepreneurial/innovation opportunities; a
promotion orientation is associated with more positive hits, but more false positives, while a
prevention orientation should be associated with identifying more “dead ends”, but also more false
negatives.
Prevention oriented teams should have lower overall levels of innovation activities (successful or
unsuccessful) relative to promotion-oriented teams.
In the absence of time pressure, prevention-oriented groups showed significantly more risk aversion
than promotion-oriented groups.
Under conditions of extreme time pressure, prevention- and promotion-oriented groups displayed
similar levels of risk aversion.

Method and Sample

Conceptual article

Conceptual article

Experimental design
with high school
student teams as
subjects

When team members were matched on a promotion focus, the team introduced new products more
quickly, had a greater quantity of new products launched, and introduced more novel new products.
When team members were mismatched on regulatory focus, those that were assigned an eager goal
pursuit strategy (versus vigilant) introduced new products more quickly, had a greater quantity of
new products launched, and introduced more novel new products.

Undergraduate business
students in a new
product development
simulation

A team promotion focus was positively associated with teams’ level of idea generation and idea
promotion (e.g. internal selling and resource allocation).
Neither a prevention nor a promotion focus was significantly related to teams’ level of innovation
idea realization.

Survey of innovation
team members and
team leaders in Dutch
firms
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Collectively, these studies raise several interesting issues regarding the relationship
between team regulatory style and innovation outcomes in the co-creation of new products. A
firm’s role in co-creation typically involves evaluation, selection, and implementation rather than
idea generation (Bayus, 2013; Hoyer et al., 2010). Although firms may modify customer ideas
since they are often under-elaborated or overly general (Bayus, 2013), the amount of creative
problem solving relative to that required in idea generation may be significantly less. In a cocreation context, where the originality and utility of customers’ ideas are often inherently high
relative to internally-generated ideas (Magnusson et al., 2003; Poetz and Schreier, 2012), the
benefits of a promotion orientation may be attenuated. Development teams may feel that factors
related to value creation (e.g., market appeal, originality) are already “built in” to the
consideration set of ideas generated by their customers and are free to concentrate on factors
related to value capture (e.g., determining technological feasibility, costs, etc.). A prevention
orientation may also be particularly effective given the sheer volume of ideas that firms typically
have to filter through and evaluate in a co-creation project (Hoyer et al., 2010). Because of their
risk-aversion, prevention-oriented teams may be less inclined to aggressively pursue ideas that
don’t rank high on feasibility.
On the other hand, promotion may have benefits for teams beyond being associated with
superior idea generation. As Rietzschel (2011) found, a promotion orientation was associated
with more effective internal selling and the procurement of resources for new product
development projects. From an evaluation and selection perspective, promotion-oriented teams
may simply do a better job at detecting which customer ideas are likely to be achievable, and
may also be more prone to persist with ideas longer than prevention teams. This is a potentially
important factor in co-creation, given that customer ideas are rarely out-of-the-box or turnkey
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solutions, and may require tinkering, modification, and/or scope redefinition by the firm
development team in order to be profitably implemented (Bayus, 2013).
Second, while there is empirical support for the positive influence on a promotion
orientation on several aspect of the NPD process, such as idea generation, speed to market and
product line deviations (Rietzschel, 2011; Spanjol et al., 2011), there is no evidence in these
studies on the influence of regulatory style on the market performance of new products. While
speed to market, product originality, and volume of new product introductions may be important
considerations in a firm’s innovation strategy, these factors alone don’t necessarily ensure
market success. Ideas that poorly satisfy unmet market needs, even when well implemented
would be expected to fail on the basis of inferior value creation. Conversely, highly innovative
ideas that are poorly-implemented would be expected to fail on the basis of inferior value capture
for the firm.

Team Reflexivity
According to De Dreu (2007), teams can engage in heuristic information processing
characterized by well-learned associations, scripts, and routines, or they can rely on deeper, more
effortful processing that help them form more elaborate argument-based decision criteria.
Reflexive practices may help teams to avoid automatic decision heuristics and to develop the
ability to make decisions based on deeply processed information. As was previously introduced
in Chapter 1, group reflexivity in organizations refers to the degree to which a team overtly
thinks about and reflects on its collective knowledge and the processes it uses in decision-making
(West, 1996). Reflexivity has been shown to work in several different ways to increase team
decision-making effectiveness in organizations. First, highly reflexive teams are more likely to
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develop shared mental models and integrate their collective tacit and explicit knowledge (Müller,
Herbig, & Petrovic, 2009). Particularly in cross-functional teams where team members are likely
to have diverse knowledge stores, reflexivity practices allow for groups to think about
information, both more broadly and more deeply by drawing on the collective knowledge of
individual members. Second, reflexivity gives teams the opportunity to assess the way they
approach decision-making, which may be particularly useful in the dynamic decision
environments faced by new product development teams (Hoegl & Parboteeah, 2006). Research
in group decision making has shown that groups often adopt decision-making strategies early
and then habitually rely on them as they become engrained as a routine, but intentional reflection
can break groups out of suboptimal decision processes that develop over time (Gurtner et al.,
2007). The ability to break out of decision-making routines may be particularly important in cocreation where ideas are often not well-specified.
Although most studies report positive performance outcomes associated with team
reflexivity, there are several boundary conditions to its effectiveness. First, reflexivity seems to
work best for low-performing teams whose knowledge is not well-integrated or whose team
learning is low (Schippers, Homan, & Knippenberg, 2013). Teams that are already highperforming would be expected to benefit less from adopting reflexive practices than lowperforming teams. Second, reflexivity is most effective at driving team performance when team
members perceive that there are interdependent benefits from collaborating with team members
(DeDreu, 2007), an important consideration given the cross-functional nature of many product
development teams. Finally, reflexivity may be counterproductive when teams spend too much
time thinking about and processing irrelevant information, or when teams with low knowledge
levels are not proactive in acquiring additional outside knowledge (Gurtner et al., 2007).
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Team Reflexivity in the Innovation Literature
Reflexivity is particularly pertinent to innovation decisions because of the tendency for
firms to develop strong decision-making heuristics, organizational scripts, and work routines
around the new product development process (Leonard‐Barton, 1992; Madhavan & Grover,
1998). For example, the stage gate process has been widely used by firms to try to take a
disciplined approach to an otherwise chaotic process (Sethi & Iqbal, 2008).
However, as several authors point out (e.g., Sethi & Iqbal, 2008; Leonard-Barton 1992),
adopting rigid decision-making routines may impede organizational learning or cause firms to
rely on what has been successful in the past rather than what processes are needed to be
successful in the future. This is particularly true when products are novel, or in a turbulent
technological landscape. Given that product lifecycles are shortening, and the rate of market
change is accelerating (Day, 2011), the ability to reflect on and adapt decision-making processes
may be equally important to the actual knowledge content that firms use in product development.
The fundamental premise behind the value of reflexivity in innovation teams is not that
development teams should completely abandon innovation routines and decision heuristics, but
rather the way a firm thinks about new product development and the way teams evaluate and
select ideas should be subject to continual evaluation and/or improvement. Indeed, the literature
in innovation that has explored the role of reflexivity supports the positive connection between
new product performance and the reflexive practices of NPD teams. As articulated by Hammedi
et al. (2011), “a reflexive screening committee appears to be more likely to question itself and its
methods, to tackle challenges produced by a dynamic new product environment and the unique
features of new product ideas at hand” (p. 674).
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As with regulatory style, there are relatively few works in the literature investigating the
influence of reflexivity on innovation, and no research to date has examined NPD team
reflexivity in a co-creation context. An overview of the literature pertaining to reflexivity in
innovation is presented in Table 4 and discussed in the following sections.
DeDreu (2002) conducted a field study involving teams making decisions about
ambiguously-defined projects for which there was no clear procedure or organizational routine.
He found that minority dissent was positively associated with team innovation effectiveness, but
only when reflexivity was high. This finding underscores the knowledge integration aspect of
reflexivity. His conclusion is that when teams are highly reflexive, minority views and
information counter to teams’ working hypotheses may be listened to more carefully and
processed more thoroughly by the group, leading to more effective decision-making.
Hoegl and Parboteeah (2006) investigate the influence of team reflexivity on innovation
effectiveness and innovation efficiency in software development teams. They found that
reflexivity was positively associated with new product effectiveness (e.g., customer satisfaction
and technical proficiency with the new product, etc.), but had a non-significant relationship to
new product efficiency (e.g., within time schedule and within budget). To explain this non-effect,
they argue that reflexivity likely requires a significant time commitment from teams, since it
involves levels of exploratory learning, planning and continuous monitoring not present in teams
with low reflexivity. They also contend that maintaining a high level of reflexivity may result in
an external orientation for innovation teams as they seek to collect all the relevant knowledge
about customer need and the competitive landscaping leaving less time and resources that can be
dedicated to internally-oriented concerns, such as time and budget constraints. Finally, they
argue that reflexivity may hinder teams in later phases of new product development. In these
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stages, teams often take on even greater data processing demands, as they refine new product
concepts, add previously unplanned functionality to new products, and rework product design
specifications to more closely match customer needs.
Müller, Herbig, and Petrovic (2009) conducted an experiment with mechanical
engineering students. Participants were placed in teams and asked to develop an innovative
solution for a design task with their ideas judged by independent experts. They found that teams
that discussed the development of process and task-related goals outperformed teams that spent
time simply reviewing the individual knowledge base of each team member. They also found a
distinction between two sources of knowledge that are important in reflexive practices –
knowledge in teams and knowledge of teams. Knowledge in work teams refers to the explicit
knowledge each team member possesses (e.g., customers, competitors, technological
capabilities, etc.) that can contribute to team decision-making. Knowledge of teams refers to the
cognitive processes and styles that teams use to evaluate data and make decisions.
Maccurtain, Flood, Ramamoorty, West, and Dawson (2009) explored the relationship
between top management teams’ knowledge sharing and reflexivity and performance-based
innovation outcomes in the Irish software development industry. Their primary findings were
that reflexivity and knowledge sharing resulted in higher levels of innovation performance.
Trustworthiness was also found to be an important antecedent to reflexivity and knowledge
sharing. Developing an atmosphere of trust is important to reflexive practices because it creates
an environment in which team members can be honest and frank in discussions about product
development projects. Given other literature in marketing and innovation which describes the
political nature of innovation and strategy decisions in firms (e.g., Frost & Egri, 1991; Sethi,
Iqbal, & Sethi, 2012), reflexivity may be particularly effective at counteracting organizational
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politics in NPD. MacCurtain et al. (2009) argue this is particularly true in uncertain and complex
environments where people are likely to take advantage of performance causal ambiguities to
promote political agendas.
In addition to establishing antecedents of team reflexivity, their study is an important
addition to the body of literature because they establish support for a positive relationship
between team reflexivity and actual market performance (new product revenues as a percentage
of total revenue). Other studies in this area have either used qualitative measures (e.g., novelty,
quality, etc.), controlled lab experiments, or have used perceptual measures of innovation
success. The existence of a positive correlating between reflexivity and market performance
suggests reflexivity may be an important driver of new product success.
Schippers et al. (2010) conducted a survey of 1,156 individuals in 98 primary healthcare
teams working in community health. They asked respondents to list the major innovations their
team had introduced into their practices in the past year, and then had an independent panel of
experts rate each project on magnitude, radicalness, novelty, and impact to determine the mean
level of innovativeness for each team. They found a significant direct effect between reflexivity
and innovation. They also found that the influence of reflexivity on innovation is most positive
when workloads are high, the work is complex in nature, or when environmental conditions are
not stable. Given the nature of decision heuristics discussed previously, this finding is not
surprising. In low-complexity or stable conditions, one would expect organizational routines and
scripts to be favored for efficiency’s sake. When workloads are high, unstable, or complex, it
would be expected that “tried and true” decision heuristics would be less reliable in driving
performance.
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Table 4. Literature Review of Team Reflexivity in Innovation
Author(s)
DeDreu (2002)

Key Findings
 Minority dissent was positively associated with team innovation
and team decision effectiveness when reflexivity was high, but not
when reflexivity was low.
 Reflexive teams are more likely to listen to and thoroughly process
differing opinions and disconfirming information.

Method and Sample
Cross-sectional survey of
Dutch work teams and their
supervisors

Hoegl and Parboteeah (2006)

 Innovation team reflexivity is positively related to innovation
effectiveness, but not innovation efficiency

Survey of software
development teams

Müller, Herbig, and Petrovic (2009)

 Highly reflexive innovation teams developed ideas with higher
overall quality, but not higher originality and creativity.

Experimental design with
engineering student teams

MacCurtain et al. (2010)

 Task reflexivity has a direct and positive relationship with new
product market performance.

Survey of top executives
from software firms and
interviews with firm CEOs

Schippers, West, and Dawson (2010)

 Team reflexivity is positively related to team innovation
performance.
 The relationship between team reflexivity and innovation
performance is higher when team workload is high rather than low,
when the project is complex.

Survey of community
healthcare teams

Hammedi, van Riel, and Sasovova (2011)

 Teams tasked with screening internally-generated ideas can
improve decision quality by adopting reflexive practices.
 Reflexivity is positively related to decision-making efficiency and
effectiveness in innovation teams

Survey of executives in the
tech service sector
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Hammedi et al. (2011) conducted a survey of international managers to investigate the
influence of team reflexivity on new product selection decisions, along with manager leadership
style and cognitive style. They found positive and significant relationships between team
reflexivity and new product decision-making effectiveness (i.e., resource allocation and decision
accuracy), as well as new product decision-making efficiency (i.e., speed of decision-making and
knowledge utilization). They conclude that “stop-and-think” behaviors rather than following
more automatic development routines improved the overall quality of team decision-making in
innovation projects.
Based on this literature, several general observations can be made about reflexivity in
innovation. First, reflexivity seems to be associated with a pragmatic decision-making style
evidenced by the finding that highly reflexive teams’ ideas were high on quality, but not
necessarily originality or novelty (Müller et al., 2009). Second, there is strong support for
innovation effectiveness, but the findings are mixed with regards to how a teams’ reflexivity
influences the efficiency with which innovations were developed. In other words, reflexivity
seems to have less influence on reducing costs and efficient manufacturing than it does on
developing products that meet unmet market needs. Finally, with the exception of one study
(MacCurtain et al., 2010), there is paucity of empirical research that ties reflexivity directly to
new product performance. Further, the MacCurtain et al. (2010) study looked at top management
teams as the unit of analysis. As a result, the effects were most likely based on high level
strategic factors rather than the tactical decisions new product development teams face on a dayto-day basis.
In the context of co-creation, reflexivity may be particularly important. The argument in
the literature is that complex, non-routine situations benefit the most from reflexive team
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practices. This is manifest in co-creation in two ways: the nature of customer ideas, and idea
volume. Customer ideas may add complexity since they may be difficult to evaluate, relative to
in-house ideas since customers are primarily focused on satisfying unmet needs rather than profit
potential or economies of scale and scope (Poetz & Schreier, 2012). Particularly in firms that
have had innovation successes, cognitive inertia and core rigidities related to NPD may make
accurate evaluation challenging (Leonard-Barton, 1992), since decision makers likely carry a
decision bias favoring what has worked in the past. Underdeveloped ideas from customers may
also require extensive discussion and/or modification in order to determine their true market
potential (Bayus, 2013; Ogawa & Piller, 2006). As a result, reflexivity would likely have an even
greater effect in co-creation, as routine decision heuristics could be insufficient to evaluate
customer ideas, especially if teams are required to evaluate and modify customer ideas.
On the other hand, customer idea volume, another complexity factor associated with cocreation projects, may make reflexivity counterproductive. Even when companies use their
online innovation communities to help identify promising ideas, they must often deal with
hundreds or thousands of submissions (Bayus, 2013; Hoyer et al., 2012). The methodical
analysis, discussion, and evaluation or every idea in such cases potentially carries significant
efficiency costs in terms of time-to-market and human resources. Teams that deeply evaluate
thousands of ideas might find themselves never moving past the evaluation stage to take a
product to market.

Hypothesis Development
There are several characteristics of co-creation that make selection different from
selection in internally-developed innovation ideas which have been discussed extensively in the
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previous review of the co-creation literature. First, managers are typically dealing with a higher
number of ideas (Hoyer et al., 2010). While firms often use communities of users (e.g. online
peer ratings) to reduce the number of ideas that are reviewed by firm development employees,
firms must still often review dozens, or hundreds of ideas submitted by customers. Second,
product ideas submitted by customers have a high potential to meet the unmet needs of the target
market, relative to internally-generated ideas (Grewal et al., 2006; Hoyer, 2010; Poetz &
Schreier, 2012; Shah, 2006). While not every customer-submitted idea has the potential to be a
market success, customers may be more adept at generating new product concepts that are both
unique and fulfill unmet market needs (Grewal et al., 2006; Poetz and Schreier, 2012). Finally,
compared to innovation concepts generated by firm insiders, ideas generated by customers often
represent “distant” sources of knowledge (Afuah & Tucci, 2012; Poetz & Schreier, 2012),
making the selection process more challenging, as firms must weigh distant customer ideas
against their technological and implantation capabilities (Hoyer et al., 2010).

Innovativeness Selection Skill in Cocreation
In the initial stages of product development, firms often rely on subjective assessments of
the innovativeness of new products. These assessments are based on new product novelty
(uniqueness compared to existing market offerings), meaningfulness (degree to which a product
satisfies customer needs), and feasibility (the degree to which a firm can profitably
commercialize a new product) (Bayus, 2013; Magnusson et al., 2003; Poetz & Schreier). Each of
these dimensions is discussed below.
Novelty. The novelty of a new product is defined as the degree to which to concept is
uniquely different from products already on the market and products which might be potential
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competitors (Im & Workman, 2004; Poetz and Schreier, 2012; Amabile, Barsade, Mueller, &
Staw, 2005). The co-creation literature supports that argument that customer ideas are more
novel than internally-generated ideas (Magnusson et al., 2003; Poetz & Schreier, 2012). Even
when customers’ technical and/or product knowledge is limited, customers can often generate
highly novel and meaningful ideas for new market offerings because they are less constrained by
existing solutions and designs (Kristensson et al., 2008).
Meaningfulness. Although successful new products are often novel relative to existing
products in their category, novelty by itself does not translate into new product success (Im &
Workman, 2004). In addition to novelty, an assessment of the innovativeness of a new product
should determine the degree to which a product would be appropriate for target consumers. Im
and Workman (2004) found that the degree to which a new product resonated with unmet market
needs was significantly associated with financial measures of new product performance, but
novelty was only associated with qualitative performance assessments, such as customer
satisfaction and technological learning outcomes. This dimension associated with a product’s
inherent ability to meet unmet market needs has been labeled as meaningfulness (Im &
Workman, 2004), user value (Magnusson et al., 2003), valuable (Kristensson et al., 2004) and
usefulness (Poetz & Schreier, 2012). At the heart of this dimension is the concept of innovation
value creation (Chesbrough, 2003), or developing market offerings that fulfill an unmet customer
need.
As with novelty, the meaningfulness of new product concepts created by customers has
been empirically shown to be higher than ideas generated internally by firms (Magnusson et al.,
2003; Poetz and Schreier, 2012). Of the three dimensions of innovativeness described in this
section, meaningfulness may be the most important in that it represents the value-in-use
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component of customer value, against which costs are compared when customers assess a market
offering (Woodruff, 1997). If new products do not fulfill an unmet need in the market, even if
they are highly novel and feasible, then consumers are unlikely to adopt them.
Feasibility. Many assessments of new product innovativeness conceptualize this concept
based on work in creativity studies (e.g. Amabile et al., 1996; Amabile et al. 2005), which breaks
creativity into the two dimensions of novelty and meaningfulness. However, several authors have
also recognized that feasibility, or the degree to which a firm has the manufacturing and
technological capabilities to launch a new product, is an important factor in new product
development (Magnusson et al., 2003; Poetz & Schreier 2012). Feasibility is included here
because customers often represent distant sources of knowledge for firms that must be integrated
into existing capabilities and resource constraints and should have a direct impact on innovation
success in co-creation. At the heart of this dimension is Chesbrough’s (2003) notion of value
capture. Although identifying novel and useful ideas may be an ideal starting point for firms in
developing new products, development teams still have to be able to design, manufacture,
distribute, and sell products in a way that captures profits for their firm. Firms must not only
create products and services that fulfill unmet market needs (i.e., value creation), but they must
do so in a way that minimizes costs and maximizes revenue. Formally defined, feasibility refers
to the ease with which an idea can be commercialized, considering the technological and
economic constraints that might limit the development potential of a product (Poetz & Schreier,
2012). For example, a particle transporter seen in a science fiction movie might rank very high as
both novel and meaningful to customers, yet technological constraints limit such a product from
being developed. A more practical example might be a customer idea that is highly novel and

63
useful, but prohibitively expensive to produce or does not appeal to a large enough market to be
profitably developed. In such cases, feasibility would rate low because of economic constraints.
In co-creation, the feasibility of customer generated ideas for new products may be
inherently low, compared to ideas developed internally (Bayus, 2013; Magnusson et al., 2003;
Poetz & Schreier, 2012). Customers who collaborate with companies typically do so to satisfy
needs arising from actual usage and likely don’t consider profitability potential or firm
capabilities when generating ideas for new products and services (Poetz and Schreier, 2012). As
Bayus (2013) notes, ideas generated in communities often show low degrees of elaboration and
are often vague and immature in their scope. Customers may approach the generation of new
product solutions from a radically different vantage point than firm professionals do. This creates
complexity for teams tasked with evaluating these ideas that may not fit neatly into their frame of
reference created by organizational routines and scripts (Magnusson et al., 2003). Feasibility
may seem like a fairly straightforward assessment that firms make about customer product
concepts, but given that they must often modify the concept to tighten the scope or think outside
their routines and capabilities, accurately assessing feasibility can be a challenging task.

Performance-Based Selection Skill in Co-creation
While the ability to detect the creativity and innovativeness of a new product may be a
valuable skill for selection teams, extant research has found only moderate correlations between
the innovativeness of a new product concept and actual new product performance. Szymanski,
Kroff, and Troy (2007) found in a meta-analysis of the influence of product innovativeness on
market performance that new product innovativeness (measured as novelty and meaningfulness)
had only a small-to-moderate correlation with both product performance (r=.24) and product
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market advantage (r=.25). Therefore, an investigation of how accurate development teams are in
evaluating and selecting idea quality should also include actual market performance as an
outcome.
The ability to accurately recognize market “winners” and “losers” before making
significant financial investments in commercializing customers’ new product ideas is imperative.
When faced with development decisions, team selection decisions can take one of four
outcomes, based on a 2 x 2 typology of decision outcomes (Baron, 2004), as shown in Figure 2.
On the first dimension, is the actual market potential of the new product, high or low, and on the
second dimension is the team’s development decision, accept or reject.
In this typology, a positive hit occurs when teams accept a product for commercialization
that has high actual market potential. Negative hits occur when teams reject projects for
development that have low actual market potential. False positives occur when teams accept
projects that have low actual market potential, and false negatives occur when teams reject
projects that have high actual market potential.

Team Regulatory Focus and Customer Idea Innovativeness
In the innovation and new product development literature, regulatory focus has been used
as a theoretical lens to study how development teams generate and implement new product ideas
internally (e.g. Baron, 2004; Brockner et al., 2004; Rietzschel, 2011, Spanjol et al., 2011). In
contrast, this study investigates the influence of regulatory focus on the filtering and selection
process for ideas that originate from customers outside the firm.
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Figure 2. Decision Outcomes in Co-created New Product Development Evaluations

This creates several important differences that should influence which group regulatory style is
ideal for identifying the best ideas for customers.
As discussed in the literature review section, promotion-oriented teams are characterized
by a tendency to underestimate risk, broad thinking across multiple categories, creative problem
solving, situational awareness, and a preference for change over stability (Brockner, Higgins, &
Low, 2004; Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Higgins 1998; Kark & Van Dijk, 2007). Preventionoriented teams are characterized by a tendency to overestimate risk, narrow thinking in fewer
categories, problem-solving using well-established routines, and a preference for stability over
change (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Higgins 1998; Kark & Van Dijk, 2007).
In a co-creation context, prevention-focused groups may view novelty as a signal of risk,
since, by definition, it indicates a divergence from established norms and customer preferences.
One would expect prevention-oriented groups to have a bias in their assessment of novelty,
rating products as more novel (i.e., risky) than they really are. Based on their preference for
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stability, promotion-oriented teams may see customer ideas as inherently less risky since
customer-generated ideas often outperform the firm’s own internally-generated ideas on this
dimension. Thus, one can predict that promotion-oriented teams will be more accurate in their
assessment of customer co-created product novelty.
Since promotion-focused teams tend to underestimate the risks in involved in a given
project (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Higgins 1998; Kark & Van Dijk, 2007), they may be more
likely to view the needs, wants, and desires of small, unprofitable market segments as more
profitable than they really are. On the other hand, prevention-focused teams, with their increased
sensitivity to risky innovation projects, would be expected to assess meaningfulness with a more
hawkish decision criteria, rejecting ideas that wouldn’t appeal to a wide segment of customers or
very profitable smaller segments.
Finally, a prevention focus may aid development teams in accurately detecting how
feasible customers’ new product concepts are. Based on the risk estimation biases of both
prevention- and promotion-oriented groups, it is expected that teams with a prevention
orientation should be more motivated to assess the implementation risks of a new product
concept. Such risks include factors such as high development costs, challenges in manufacturing,
technology, and distribution that make a project more risky to pursue. Based on the assertion of
regulatory focus theory that a prevention orientation is associated with avoiding risk and (Crowe
& Higgins, 1997; Higgins 1998; Kark & Van Dijk, 2007), one would expect prevention-focused
teams to be more attuned to factors that signal economic risk, such as feasibility, as developing
complex technology or new-to-the firm technological capabilities can be a very costly endeavor.
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As a result, one can predict that a promotion focus is beneficial to assessing new product
novelty, while a prevention focus is more beneficial to assessing meaningfulness and feasibility.
Formally stated,
H1a: Promotion-oriented teams are more accurate than prevention-oriented teams
in their assessment of the novelty of customers’ new product concepts.

H1b: Prevention-oriented teams are more accurate than promotion-oriented teams
in their assessment of the meaningfulness of customers’ new product concepts.

H1c: Prevention-oriented teams are more accurate than promotion-oriented teams
in their assessment of the feasibility of customers’ new product concepts.

Team Reflexivity and Customer Idea Innovativeness
The literature on reflexivity also offers insight to make predictions about the influence of
a team’s level of reflexivity on assessments of the three dimensions of co-created product
innovativeness. Reflexive teams are more likely to incorporate the shared knowledge of team
members, pay attention to a variety of information sources and signals, and deeply process
information when making a team decision (Müller et al., 2008). DeDreu (2002) found that teams
which were highly reflexive in their decision-making were more likely to pay attention to
dissenting opinions and/or disconfirming feedback, and seek a variety of viewpoints before
making a decision. On the other hand, DeDreu suggests a dark side to reflexivity, that teams
which are too reflexive might engage in confirmatory information search (i.e., groupthink),
rather than processing knowledge in a more objective way. In such cases, a team might talk itself
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out of taking risks on a promising product or talk itself into pursuing a customer’s idea that has
little market potential or would be beyond their firm’s capability to implement. Reflexivity
researchers have also found that the positive relationship between reflexivity and innovation is
greater when the decision-making environment is complex (Schippers et al., 2010). The cocreation evaluation and selection context itself has been characterized by several researchers as
very complex (Hoyer et al., 2010; Bayus, 2013), since development teams must evaluate ideas
which are often ambiguous or not well-articulated, and then determine if those ideas are a good
fit for their firm’s capabilities.
The positive relationship between reflexivity and the accurate assessment of novelty,
meaningfulness, and feasibility is largely driven by the past findings that reflexive teams think
more broadly, tapping into the individual knowledge and experience of their team members, and
deeply about innovation decisions (DeDreu 2022; Hammedi et al. 2011). In assessing cocreated new product novelty, reflexive teams may consider substitutes and alternative across
categories, not simply within a single category. They should do a better job at tapping into the
knowledge and experience of each individual team member with respect to how closely an idea
compares to existing market offerings across a variety of similar product categories, not just a
single product category.
In assessing co-created new product meaningfulness, reflexive teams should think more
broadly across different market segments to assess whether or not a product has the potential
meet the needs of a particular customer base. They may also do a better job at assessing niche
markets to determine if very specific groups of customers would want and/or need a given
product.
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Finally, for evaluating the feasibility of co-created new product ideas, reflexive teams
should be superior in assessing their own capabilities and the capabilities of their strategic
external partners to determine how well a product idea fits with their ability to implement it.
They should also do a better job at considering alternative technologies that might make a
product less costly to implement.
Given these factors, one would expect a positive relationship between reflexivity and
selection skill for novelty, meaningfulness, and feasibility in cocreation evaluation and selection
decisions. Using this logic, the following hypotheses can be made:
H2a: Highly reflexive teams are more accurate than teams with low reflexivity in
their assessment of the novelty of customers’ new product concepts.

H2b: Highly reflexive teams are more accurate than teams with low reflexivity in
their assessment of the meaningfulness of customers’ new product concepts.

H2c: Highly reflexive teams are more accurate than teams with low reflexivity in
their assessment of the feasibility of customers’ new product concepts.

Influence of Regulatory Focus x Reflexivity on Novelty, Meaningfulness, and Feasibility
For the interaction between reflexivity and regulatory style, it is expected that reflexivity
will not have the same influence on promotion-oriented teams as it does on prevention-oriented
teams. Since promotion is associated with broad thinking, situational awareness, and creative
problem solving (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 1998; Kark & Van Dijk, 2007), promotion-
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oriented teams may gain less benefit from reflexivity than prevention-oriented teams. In other
words, some aspects of reflexivity and awareness may be inherent in a promotion orientation.
In addition, promotion-oriented teams may be less susceptible to the influence of
interventions designed to modify their modes of thinking and decision-making. For example,
Spanjol et al. (2011) found that, among teams that were explicitly instructed to adopt a “vigilant”
decision-making style, those that had team members matched on a promotion orientation
significantly outperformed teams whose members were matched on an individual prevention
orientation. Their explanation of this observed effect, drawn from reactance theory (Brehm,
1966), is that promotion-oriented decision makers highly value their freedom in the pursuit of
goals. They may resist perceived efforts to constrain their thinking and goal pursuit, as could be
the case when groups participate in intentional reflexivity practices.
The mixed empirical findings on the effect of reflexivity on innovation process efficiency
may also suggest that reflexive promotion-oriented teams do not gain the same benefits as
reflexive prevention-oriented teams. Although they do not measure teams’ regulatory style,
Hoegl and Parboteeah (2011) found that reflexivity in innovation teams increased new product
effectiveness but not efficiency (cf. Hammedi et al., 2011). This suggests that reflexivity
positively influences a team’s orientation toward achievement and success (the “Achilles heel”
of a prevention-orientation) more than it positively influences a team’s orientation toward riskreduction and security (the “Achilles heel” of a promotion-orientation). Across a variety of
decision-making contexts besides new product development, the relationship between reflexivity
and team performance has been shown to be more positive when teams have room to improve, or
are low-performing (Schippers et al., 2013). Taken together, these studies suggest that the
benefits of reflexivity may be counter-productive for promotion-oriented teams. Formally stated,
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H3a: Reflexivity positively influences the accuracy of prevention-focused teams’
assessments of co-created new product novelty, but has a negative influence on
promotion-focused teams’ assessment accuracy of novelty.

H3b: Reflexivity positively influences the accuracy of prevention-focused teams’
assessments of co-created new product meaningfulness, but has a negative influence on
promotion-focused teams’ assessment accuracy of meaningfulness.

H3c: Reflexivity positively influences the accuracy of prevention-focused teams’
assessments of co-created new product feasibility, but has a negative influence on
promotion-focused teams’ assessment accuracy of feasibility.

Team Regulatory Focus and Positive/Negative Hits
As discussed previously, the innovativeness of a product is only moderately correlated
with new product success (Szymanski et al., 2007). A variety of other factors, both inside and
outside the firm, can influence whether or not a new product is successful. For example,
implementation issues, NPD processes, and competition can all influence how successful an
innovative new product idea might be (Henard and Szymanski, 2001).
Extant research has empirically supported the finding that promotion-oriented teams are
more successful in commercializing internally-developed new products because of their ability to
develop products that are highly creative. In a co-creation context, however, having a promotion
focus may not be advantageous, as customer ideas are often inherently more novel and
meaningful than products developed internally (Magnusson et al., 2003; Poetz & Schreier, 2012).

72
Given these findings, one can predict that prevention-oriented teams should be more
accurate in recognizing ideas that have the most potential to be successful (positive hits) and the
ideas that are most likely to fail (negative hits). Being prevention-oriented may offer the best of
both worlds in this context. On the one hand, teams with a prevention orientation are more likely
to be sensitive to development risks (e.g., manufacturing and development costs that prohibit
product margins, competitive forces, and implementation capabilities). At the same time, dealing
with co-created ideas may mean the overall quality of the consideration set (in terms of
meaningfulness to customers), is higher, meaning the risk of selecting a false negative is lower.
Therefore, it is expected that teams with a prevention-focus will make more accurate
selection decisions related to both positive hits and negative hits. Formally stated,

H4a: Teams that are prevention-focused have higher rates of positive hits than
promotion-oriented teams when assessing the market potential of product
concepts created by customers.

H4b: Teams that are prevention-focused have higher rates of negative hits than
promotion-oriented team when assessing the market potential of product concepts created
by customers.

Team Reflexivity and Positive/Negative Hits
Reflexivity should increase teams’ rates of both correct acceptances and correct
rejections (i.e., positive hits and negative hits). Since the success of a new product can depend on
a variety of environmental and market factors, such as internal development processes and
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implementation issues, market dynamics, and competitive forces (Henard & Szymanski, 2001), it
is also expected that highly reflexive teams will outperform low reflexive teams in assessing the
actual market potential of customer-generated ideas. This is because of their capacity to consider
products from multiple viewpoints, rather than relying on routine heuristics to assess the
potential of new product concepts. For example, Müller et al. (2009) found that highly reflexive
teams developed new product concepts that were of a higher overall quality, but were not
significantly more creative than ideas developed by teams with low reflexivity. In other words,
reflexive teams may simply be more pragmatic in their approach to determining what will
ultimately be successful in the marketplace, rather than focusing on achieving success on a single
dominant criterion, such as the novelty of the proposed product concept. As such, one can predict
that reflexivity will positively influence a team’s ability to accurately identify which customercreated product concepts are likely to be successful and which concepts are likely to fail if taken
to market. Formally stated,

H5a: Teams that are highly reflexive have higher rates of positive hits, compared to
teams with low reflexivity.

H5b: Teams that are highly reflexive have higher rates of negative hits, compared to
teams with low reflexivity.

Team Regulatory Focus x Team Reflexivity Interaction
Regarding the interaction between reflexivity and regulatory style, it is expected that
reflexivity will not have the same positive influence on promotion-oriented teams as it does on
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prevention-oriented teams. Since promotion is associated with broad thinking, situational
awareness, and creative problem solving (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 1998; Kark & Van
Dijk, 2007), promotion-oriented teams may gain less benefit from reflexivity than preventionoriented teams. In other words, some aspects of reflexivity and awareness may be inherent in a
promotion orientation.
In addition, promotion-oriented teams may be less susceptible to the influence of
interventions designed to modify their modes of thinking and decision-making. For example,
Spanjol et al. (2011) found that, among teams that were explicitly instructed to adopt a “vigilant”
decision-making style, those that had team members matched on a promotion orientation
significantly outperformed teams whose members were matched on an individual prevention
orientation. Their explanation of this observed effect, drawn from reactance theory (Brehm,
1966), is that promotion-oriented decision makers highly value their freedom in the pursuit of
goals. They may resist perceived efforts to constrain their thinking and goal pursuit, as could be
the case when groups participate in intentional reflexivity practices.
The mixed empirical findings on the effect of reflexivity on innovation process efficiency
may also suggest that reflexive promotion-oriented teams do not gain the same benefits as
reflexive prevention-oriented teams. Although they do not measure teams’ regulatory style,
Hoegl and Parboteeah (2011) found that reflexivity in innovation teams increased new product
effectiveness but not efficiency (cf. Hammedi et al., 2011). This suggests that reflexivity
influences a team’s orientation toward achievement and success (the “Achilles heel” of a
prevention-orientation) more than it influences a team’s orientation toward risk-reduction and
security (the “Achilles heel” of a promotion-orientation). Taken together, these studies suggest
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the benefits of reflexivity may be counter-productive for promotion-oriented teams. Formally
stated,

H6a: Reflexivity positively influences the number of prevention-focused teams’
decisions that result in positive hits, but negatively influences the number of positive hits
resulting from promotion-focused team decisions.

H6b: Reflexivity positively influences the number of prevention-focused teams’
decisions that result in negative hits, but negatively influences the number of negative
hits resulting from promotion-focused team decisions.

Moderating Effects of Inventor Expertise
In addition to the problem and solution that a new product offers, development teams
may also assess the characteristics of a product’s inventor to determine if a product concept
merits additional development investment. Externally-focused firms, such as those that adopt cocreation strategies in their innovation activities, are expected to have better and more
sophisticated environmental scanning and information utilization capabilities (Moorman, 1995).
Therefore, one would expect firms that co-create innovation with customers to attend to
information about the consumer-inventors themselves in the course of evaluating co-created
products.
When customers submit product ideas to companies, they are often immature,
incomplete, or under-elaborated (Bayus, 2013). When consumers of end-users have considerable
expertise (e.g., computer programmers who submit code to a software company), one would
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expect those ideas to be significantly more refined and well-articulated. Under-elaborated ideas
may simply require a higher degree of knowledge processing by development teams to get a
clear understanding of the form and function of the product, potentially limiting the cognitive
bandwidth they have to consider higher-level factors, such as marketability and/or profitability.
Here it is hypothesized that greater customer expertise accentuates the positive effect of
reflexivity, as teams have more cognitive capacity to consider factors beyond simply the basic
form and function of the product idea. Formally stated,
H7a: The greater the expertise of a co-created product’s inventor, the stronger the effect
of team reflexivity on the likelihood of a team decision that results in a positive hit.

H7b: The greater the expertise of a co-created product’s inventor, the stronger the effect
of team reflexivity on the likelihood of a team decision that results in a negative hit.

Inventor expertise may also influence prevention-focus and promotion-focused
teams differently. Because of their proclivity to be motivated by safety (Baron, 2004;
Levine et al., 2000), prevention-focused teams may view the expertise and experience of
the inventor as a “safer,” more concrete indication of the positive or negative potential of
a co-created product idea. Because of their motivation to pursue success (Baron, 2004;
Levine et al., 2000), promotion-focus teams may ignore cues from the inventor and focus
instead on external, but less concrete, indicators of a co-created product’s potential, such
as marketability and fit with customer needs. Here, it is hypothesized that inventor
expertise will interact positively with a team’s prevention focus in predicting team
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decisions that are positive hits, but negatively when teams have a promotion focus.
Formally stated,
H8a: The greater the expertise of a co-created product’s inventor, the stronger the
positive (negative) effect of a team’s prevention (promotion) focus on the likelihood of a
team decision that results in a positive hit.

H8b: The greater the expertise of a co-created product’s inventor, the stronger the
positive (negative) effect of a team’s prevention (promotion) focus on the likelihood of a
team decision that results in a negative hit.

Chapter 2 Summary
In this chapter the literature relevant to the co-creation of innovation, regulatory style,
and reflexivity was reviewed and used to develop the hypotheses tested in this dissertation (see
Table 5). Specifically, both regulatory style and reflexivity were used to predict how accurate
development teams are in their assessments of the novelty, meaningfulness, and feasibility of
customer-submitted concepts for new products. These concepts are also used to make predictions
about how well teams can identify both winners and losers as determined by actual new products
sales data. The next chapter explains the methodology and statistical approaches used to test
these hypotheses.
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Table 5. Summary of Hypotheses
H

Hypothesis Wording

H1a

Promotion-oriented teams are more accurate than prevention-oriented teams in their
assessment of the novelty of customers’ new product concepts.

H1b

Prevention-oriented teams are more accurate than promotion-oriented teams in their
assessment of the meaningfulness of customers’ new product concepts.

H1c

Prevention-oriented teams are more accurate than promotion-oriented teams in their
assessment of the feasibility of customers’ new product concepts.

H2a

Highly reflexive teams are more accurate than teams with low reflexivity in their assessment
of the novelty of customers’ new product concepts.

H2b

Highly reflexive teams are more accurate than teams with low reflexivity in their assessment
of the meaningfulness of customers’ new product concepts.

H2c

Highly reflexive teams are more accurate than teams with low reflexivity in their assessment
of the feasibility of customers’ new product concepts.

H3a

Reflexivity positively influences the accuracy of prevention-focused teams’ assessments of
co-created new product novelty, but has a negative influence on promotion-focused teams’
assessment accuracy of novelty.

H3b

Reflexivity positively influences the accuracy of prevention-focused teams’ assessments of
co-created new product meaningfulness, but has a negative influence on promotion-focused
teams’ assessment accuracy of meaningfulness.

H3c

Reflexivity positively influences the accuracy of prevention-focused teams’ assessments of
co-created new product feasibility, but has a negative influence on promotion-focused teams’
assessment accuracy of feasibility.

H4a

Teams that are prevention-focused have higher rates of positive hits than promotion-oriented
teams when assessing the market potential of product concepts created by customers.

H4b

Teams that are prevention-focused have higher rates of negative hits than promotion-oriented
teams when assessing the market potential of product concepts created by customers.

H5a

Teams that are highly reflexive have higher rates of positive hits, compared to teams with
low reflexivity.

H5b

Teams that are highly reflexive have higher rates of negative hits, compared to teams with
low reflexivity.

H6a

Reflexivity positively influences the number of prevention-focused teams’ decisions that
result in positive hits, but negatively influences the number of positive hits resulting from
promotion-focused team decisions.
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Table 5. Continued.
H

Hypothesis Wording

H6b

Reflexivity positively influences the number of prevention-focused teams’ decisions that
result in negative hits, but negatively influences the number of negative hits resulting from
promotion-focused team decisions.

H7a

When co-created new product inventor expertise is high, being highly reflexive
positively influences the number of team decisions that are positive hits.

H7b

When co-created new product inventor expertise is high, being highly reflexive positively
influences the number of team decisions that are negative hits.

H8a

The greater the expertise of a co-created product’s inventor, the stronger the positive
(negative) effect of a team’s prevention (promotion) focus on the likelihood of a team
decision that results in a positive hit.

H8b

The greater the expertise of a co-created product’s inventor, the stronger the positive
(negative) effect of a team’s prevention (promotion) focus on the likelihood of a team
decision that results in a negative hit.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY

Overview of Studies
Three studies were conducted for this dissertation. The conceptual model on which these
studies are based is shown in Figure 3. In Study 1, a 2 x 2, between-subjects design was used.
Two experimental factors were manipulated, collective regulatory focus (prevention/promotion)
and group reflexivity (high/low). In this experiment, the unit of analysis was the team. Teams
were asked to rate customer-generated new product concepts using three dimensions of the
innovativeness of the customer-generated idea – novelty, meaningfulness, and feasibility. Their
decisions were compared against product development experts’ assessments of each product. The
analysis entailed looking for significant differences between groups from each condition in the
degree to which they differed from expert evaluations of novelty, meaningfulness, and
feasibility.

Figure 3. Conceptual Model
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The design for Study 2 was a 2 x 2 between subjects design, with teams as the unit of
analysis. As in Study 1, the model consisted of two two-level factors: collective regulatory style
(prevention and promotion) and group reflexivity (high and low). In Study 2, teams were asked
to evaluate actual sales performance of the products they saw, and the dependent variable was
based on how well their choices lined up with the actual market performance of the product ideas
they reviewed.
Finally, Study 3 was a virtual ethnography which entailed conducting a content analysis
using web video footage from a firm’s product evaluation and selection meetings. These
meetings are held to decide which customer-generated product concepts should be developed.
During the meetings, working professionals are engaged in evaluating and selecting consumergenerated new product concepts to be taken into further development and commercialization.
Regulatory style and reflexivity are collected based on quantifying several qualitative variables
from the video footage. By examining the cognitive processes of regulatory style and reflexivity
among working professionals, Study 3 is designed to apply the experimental work from Studies
1 and 2 into an actual, dynamic decision environment and offer external validity to the studies
conducted in the laboratory. Table 6 shows an overview of Studies 1, 2, and 3.
As with any program of research, these studies have both strengths and weaknesses in
measurement, generalizability, and realism (McGrath, 1981).This sequence of studies was
designed to address this issue so that the empirical results provide a more holistic view of the
phenomenon under study.
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Table 6. Overview of Studies
Study

Hypotheses

Study 1

H1, H2, H3

Study 2

H4, H5, H6

Method
Lab
experiment,
2 x 2 between
subjects design

Lab
experiment,
2 x 2 between
subjects design

Independent
Variables
 Regulatory
Style
 Reflexivity

 Regulatory
Style
 Reflexivity

Dependent
Variables
Distance from
expert assessments
of new product
innovativeness
(novelty,
meaningfulness,
and feasibility)

 Positive Hits
 Negative Hits

Study
Strengths
 Controlled setting
for testing causal
relationships
 Uses real-world
user innovation
idea submissions

 Controlled setting
for testing causal
relationships
 Uses real-world
performance data
as dependent
variable

Study
Weaknesses
 Student sample
 Dependent variable
not based on
objective
performance
 Lab experiment
lacks the external
validity of a field
study

 Student sample
 Lab experiment
lacks the external
validity of a field
study

Contribution
Study 1 is designed to
test the main and
interactive effects of
regulatory style and
reflexivity on team
decisions about
customer idea
innovativeness.

Study 2 replicates and
extends Study 1 by
comparing team
decisions to real-world
co-created product
performance data.
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Table 6. Continued.
Study

Hypotheses

Method

Study 3

H4, H5, H6,
H7, H8

Virtual
ethnography of
evaluation and
selection
meetings for cocreated new
product concepts

Independent
Variables
 Regulatory
Style
 Reflexivity
 Customers’
innovation
expertise

Dependent
Variables
 Positive Hits
 Negative Hits

Study
Strengths
 Looks at
experimental
findings in wider
nomological net
by testing
additional
moderating
variables
 Examines the
conceptual model
using data
collected from
working new
product
development
professionals as
respondents

Study
Weaknesses
All decisions are
within a single firm

Contribution
Study 3 tests the
influence of regulatory
focus and reflexivity
on positive and
negative hits in a field
setting with working
professionals. The
study also examines
how the expertise of
the inventor influences
the effects of
regulatory focus and
reflexivity on decision
quality.
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Study 1 provided a tightly-controlled environment in which to test the proposed causal
relationships, but used a dependent variable that is based on subjective expert ratings rather than
objective market performance data.
Study 2 also provided controlled experimental conditions, but used real-world
performance data. Both of these studies, while affording the opportunity to test causal
relationships in a tightly controlled environment, may lack the degree of external validity of an
empirical investigation using working professionals. Study 3 addresses this issue by utilizing a
sample of professional new product managers.
In both Study 1 and Study 2, student teams of undergraduate business students were used.
The theory tested in the experimental studies deals with an underlying psychological process,
which makes a student sample a more appropriate practice than in some other areas of research.
As Bono and McNamara (2011) argue in their Academy of Management Journal editor’s
commentary, “Important questions – especially those that deal with psychological processes –
can often be answered equally well with university students or organizational employees” (p.
658). In this research, the primary intent of the experimental studies is to determine if the
underlying psychological processes associated with regulatory style and reflexivity cause groups
to be more skillful at recognizing “good” and bad” opportunities, and whether or not there are
significant differences between the groups in these conditions.
Finally, there is a precedent in the innovation literature of using student subjects,
especially when multiple studies are used that include both students and professionals. For
example, Spanjol et al. (2011) used a new product simulation with marketing student teams to
test the effects of a prevention or promotion orientation on speed to market, innovativeness, and
number of new products launched. Dahl and Moreau (2002) conducted multiple studies, which
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included both student designers and working design professionals to test the influence of
analogical thinking styles on new product innovativeness. Some innovation studies have also
looked specifically at differences in novices (usually students) and working professionals and
found novices to by on par with, or better, than professionals in developing ideas for new
products (Magnusson et al., 2003; Poetz & Schreier, 2012). Although these studies have not
explicitly compared professionals with novices in the evaluation and selection process, there is
no theoretical reason to believe that differences between professionals and novices would change
the valence (i.e., flip the sign) of the relationship between regulatory style or reflexivity and
selection accuracy.

Study 1 and 2 Pretest
Prior to conducting the experiments described here for Study 1 and Study 2, the primary
researcher conducted a pretest in the lab to perform manipulation and confounding checks of the
two main constructs of interest, check adapted and adopted scale alpha reliabilities for the postexperiment survey to assess if they fall in an appropriate range (α ≥.70), and assess issues of
respondent fatigue. The pretest experiment consisted of a 2 (prevention/promotion) x 2 (high/low
reflexivity) model, as described in the discussion below of Study 1 and Study 2. The results of
the pretest, including the supporting statistics for manipulation and confound checks, are
discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

Study 1
A 2 (prevention/promotion) x 2 (high/low reflexivity) between subjects model was
experimentally tested using university students as subjects. In this experiment, subjects were
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assigned to groups of two individuals and asked to perform two exercises in which they
imagined themselves to be a group of professional product managers tasked with reviewing a list
of customer ideas for new products. In the first task, a practice exercise, teams viewed several
design concepts and ranked them in the order they thought the designs would be most popular
with customers. In the second task, teams were asked to rate each product on three dimensions of
innovativeness – novelty, meaningfulness, and feasibility. The dependent variable was the
degree to which team ratings of novelty, meaningfulness, and feasibility in the second task match
those of new product development experts. The experiment was conducted online.

Experimental Manipulations
After both members of each team reviewed an informed consent statement and agreed to
continue, teams were placed into one of four experimental conditions: Promotion-Focus/High
Reflexivity, Promotion-Focus/Low Reflexivity, Prevention-Focus/High Reflexivity, and
Prevention-Focus/Low Reflexivity. Teams were first randomly primed for a prevention or
promotion group regulatory focus then randomly given a second prime for high or low team
reflexivity. The wording of the experimental manipulations for regulatory focus is shown in
Table 7 and the wording for the reflexivity manipulations is shown Table 8. Regulatory focus
was primed in two ways. Teams were first told that they worked for a company that rewarded
risk-taking and used an “eager strategy” (Spanjol et al., 2011) in new product development, or
that their firm punished risk-taking and used a “vigilant strategy” (Spanjol et al., 2011) in new
product development. The compensation for participating in the study was then framed in a way
to prime a promotion or prevention focus in group decision making. Teams in the prevention
group started with $10, but could lose money (i.e., be punished) each time they made a poor
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decision. Teams in the promotion group started with $5, but could earn money (i.e., be rewarded)
each time they made a good decision.

Practice Scenario
As part of the experimental procedure for Study 1 and Study 2, a short practice task was
devised to familiarize teams with evaluating co-created product concepts, and to give them to
opportunity to work together in order to develop a working rapport for the main experience
without gaining or losing study compensation. Teams were primed to be prevention- or
promotion focused and to practice high or low reflexivity prior to completing the practice
exercise.
In the practice task, shown in Table 9, groups were shown images and descriptions of
user-submitted graphics to a real-world online t-shirt company that crowdsources its t-shirt
designs to customers. Blind to the actual market results, groups were asked to rank order five tshirt designs in terms of which one they thought would receive the highest rating on the online
design innovation portal at Threadless.com. Once each team had made their ranking decisions,
they were shown the actual results based on online voting at Threadless.com. This task was
designed to familiarize team members with one another, and to promote a product/design
evaluation team mindset.

Study 1 Main Experimental Procedure
For the main experimental task, teams were given a reminder of their regulatory focus
and reflexivity primes, then told that they would need to rate 5 products on a variety of
dimensions, in line with how their firms make innovation decisions, as described in Table 10.

88
Each team was then shown 5 new product concepts submitted by customers of their fictitious
company and asked to rate each one on several dimensions that corresponded with novelty,
meaningfulness, and feasibility. The items used in team ratings are shown in Appendix A. Each
of the five product concepts was taken from a pool of user-submitted innovation concepts that
appeared on a real firm’s online innovation portal.
The firm manufactures consumer-submitted new product concepts across several
consumer product categories including electronics, health and fitness, home and garden, kitchen,
and travel and adventure. In this experiment, each product concept included an illustration of the
proposed new product, as well as a description of the “problem” and the “solution” the product is
designed to address. The order in which the five products appeared was randomized to avoid
ordering effects in team decision-making. The product images and descriptions used are shown
in Appendix B.
Prior to conducting the survey, the principal researcher recruited a panel of 10 new
product development experts to rate each idea on the dimensions of novelty, meaningfulness, and
feasibility, following a similar procedure used by Poetz & Schreier (2012). Their aggregate
scores were used to establish criteria against which to judge team product selections. Similar
variations of these dependent variables have been used in previous literature regarding both team
innovativeness (Amabile et al., 2005; Franke et al., 2006; Kristensson et al., 2004; Moreau and
Dahl, 2005) and comparing user-generated new product ideas with those of professional product
developers (Poetz and Schreier 2012). The results of the statistical analysis used to determine
agreement among the raters are discussed in Chapter 4.
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Table 7. Group Regulatory Focus Experimental Manipulations
Manipulation
Prevention

Wording
Imagine that you are in charge of overseeing new product development for a
company that manufactures products for consumer markets and solicits new
product ideas directly from customers.
Please take a moment to familiarize yourself with the following information
about your firm:
 Your company is very vigilant about finding and commercializing new
ideas, does not like to take risks, and always tries to go with the “safe
bet” in new product endeavors.
 People in your firm who have made poor decisions in the past have
been fired or demoted.
 In your decision process, you should adopt a vigilant evaluation
approach, in line with how your company is run.
 You will be asked to make a series of evaluations and choices about
new product concepts. Your starting compensation for participating in
this exercise is $10.
However, for each product you inaccurately evaluate (based on the real market
performance of these products and/or expert evaluations of each product), you
will be penalized 50 cents, up to a maximum loss of $5 per person. Your
potential total earnings is between $10 and $5 per person.

Promotion

Imagine that you are in charge of overseeing new product development for a
company that manufactures products for consumer markets and solicits new
product ideas directly from customers.
Please take a moment to familiarize yourself with the following information
about your firm:
Your company is very eager to find and commercialize new ideas, likes to take
risks, and always tries to be on the “cutting edge” in new product endeavors.
 People in your firm who have taken risks with new product innovations
in the past, have been given promotions and/or raises.
 In your decision process, you should adopt an eager evaluation
approach, in line with how your company is run.
You will be asked to make a series of evaluations of new product concepts.
Your starting compensation for participating in this exercise is $5. However, for
each product you accurately evaluate (based on the real market performance of
these products and/or expert evaluations), you will earn a 50 cent reward, up to
a maximum gain of $5 extra per person.
Your potential total earnings is between $5 and $10 per person.
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Table 8. Group Reflexivity Manipulations
Manipulation
High Reflexivity

Wording
As previously mentioned, you will be asked to observe and rate a series of new
product concepts.
As you go through each product concept, you should spend a good amount of
time thinking about and discussing each product, making sure you come to a
solid team consensus before submitting your answer.
Some of the things you might discuss as a group include:
1. Would this product be likely to actually sell?
2. Who is the target market for this product?
3. Would this product be likely to work as advertised?
4. Do either of us have knowledge, experience or expertise with this type
of product that might help us make a better decision?
5. Does something similar to this product already exist on the market?

Low Reflexivity

As previously mentioned, you will be asked to observe and rate a series of new
product concepts.
As you go through each product concept, you should engage in as little
discussion as possible about each product. Go with your first instinct and select
the first answer that comes to your mind. If you don't immediately agree, try to
arrive at an answer with very minimal discussion, appointing a "decider" for
each product concept, if necessary.
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Table 9. Practice Scenario
Study

Wording
This task is a practice exercise designed to help orient you to evaluating new
product and design concepts. Your responses in this task will not count
toward your study compensation.

Practice exercise
conducted prior
to Study 1

In this exercise you need to review the design concepts below, taken from a
real online t-shirt company. Please rank them (1 is the best, 5 is the worst) by
dragging them in the order you think will be popular with the firm’s
customers, who are primarily students in the U.S., ages 18-25.
As you complete the task, try to rank the designs in line with your company’s
approach to new product development.

Table 10. Study 1 Main Experimental Scenario
Study

Study 1
Main
Experiment

Wording
You have been asked to review concepts for new products submitted by your
customers to determine which ideas have the most potential to be profitable new
products for your consumer goods firm.
On the next several screens, your team will see 5 concepts for new products and
asked to rate each one on several dimensions.
For each product concept, you will see a visual mock-up, along with a brief
description of the “problem” the product was designed to address and the
“solution” it offers to that problem.
As you complete this task, try to make decisions in line with your company’s
approach to new product development.
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After completing the main exercise for Study 1, groups continued on to a second
experiment explained below in the description of Study 2. Once the studies were complete, each
team was asked to complete several questions to check the experimental manipulations, and to
gather data used as control variables.
After completing the group portion of the survey, each group member was asked to
individually respond to several questions related to demographics, individual chronic regulatory
style, and positive/negative affect. Individual responses on these measures were averaged (Chan,
1998) to create an aggregate individual regulatory focus and an affect control variable for each
team. The teams’ scores were calculated and cash payment was rendered based on their scores
across Study 1 and Study 2.

Statistical Analysis for Study 1
Analysis of the relationships between the independent variables (regulatory style and
reflexivity) and the dependent variables (skill in assessing novelty, meaningfulness, and
feasibility) for Study 1 was conducted by first conducting a profile deviation analysis
(Venkatraman, 1990; Vorhies and Morgan, 2005) using group deviations from the scores of
novelty, meaningfulness, and feasibility rated by the expert evaluators. Team’s assessments were
compared against expert assessments on each of the products used in the analysis, and a
Euclidean distance score was assigned for novelty, meaningfulness, and feasibility. An analysis
of covariance (ANCOVA) was then be used to determine if there are significant differences
between groups in each condition based on how far they deviated from expert ratings on each
dimension. The covariates used included the individuals’ individual regulatory focus scores
averaged across team members, individual positive/negative affects cores averaged across team
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members, how well teams knew one another prior to completing the experiment together, and
their knowledge of the product categories into which the products they reviewed could be
categorized.

Study 2
To be successful, professional new product development teams need to have the ability to
quickly recognize promising (e.g., ideas that create value for customers and the firm) and nonpromising (i.e., ideas that don’t create value for customers and/or the firm) ideas from customers
when they see them (Baron, 2004). Based on how regulatory focus has been conceptualized, it
could be argued that promotion-oriented teams may have higher positive ‘hit’ rates (i.e.,
developing customer ideas for new products that are ultimately successful) because they are
more risk-tolerant and take more products to market, thus increasing their chances of having at
least some successful new products. This also implies however, that they may also have higher
rates of false positive “misses” or developing customer-generated product ideas that are
ultimately unsuccessful in the marketplace.
Conversely, regulatory focus theory also supports the argument that prevention-oriented
teams have higher negative ‘hit’ rates (i.e., stopping development of customer ideas for new
products that would have ultimately failed in the market) because they are more risk-averse and
simply take fewer products to market, overall. This also implies, however, that they may have
higher rates of false negative misses, or killing customer-generated product ideas that would
have been successful in the market, had they been fully commercialized.
Study 2 addresses these issues by asking teams to make decisions about which customergenerated product concepts they think are most- and least-likely to be successful in the
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marketplace. By doing so, it is possible to examine the effects of regulatory style and reflexivity
on a team’s ability to both identify promising ideas from customers and to filter out ideas that
don’t have strong profit potential.
Study 2 extends Study 1 by examining how well teams in the four experimental
conditions make decisions that match up with actual market performance of the ideas for new
products they choose, rather than just their novelty, meaningfulness, or feasibility. Study 2 is
based on a 2 (promotion/prevention) x 2 (high/low reflexivity) between subjects design. The two
dichotomous dependent variables used are the number of positive hits and number of negative
hits. In this study, teams were asked to view several sets of three product ideas and rank the ideas
in each set from best-selling (1) to worst-selling (3). Their choices were then compared to real
sales data. Teams that correctly chose the best-seller for each set scored a positive hit and team
that correctly chose the worst-seller for each set scored a negative hit. The dependent variables
used were the number of positive hits and negative hits summed across each of the product sets.

Study 2 Procedure
This experiment was conducted with the same teams as Study 1, using the same
experimental manipulations as in Study 1 (see Tables 7 and 8 for the wording of the
manipulations). Once teams had finished the main experimental task in Study 1, they were given
a reminder to reinforce their priming for regulatory focus and reflexivity, then asked to continue
on to Study 2. Group members were blind to the actual market performance of each product
presented in the experimental product sets they were asked to rank order and the product sets
were presented in a random order to avoid any ordering effects. The instructions given for Study
2 are shown in Table 11. Each set of three choices contained a high-, moderate, and low- selling
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product concept based on the actual performance (units sold) of the product in its first six months
on the market. Positive hits and negative hits were based on whether or not teams correctly
ranked the “best-selling” or “worst-selling” products in each idea set.

Table 11. Main Experimental Scenario for Study 2
Study

Study 2
Main Experiment

Wording
In this activity, you will see 4 sets of 3 product concepts that were created
by end-user customers. For each set, carefully read and evaluate each
concept, then drag and drop them to rank them in the order which you think
will be the best-selling (1 = best-selling product, 3 = worst-selling
product).
As you complete this task, try to make decisions in line with your
company’s approach to new product development.

Images and descriptions of the products in each idea set are shown in Appendix C. The
total number of positive hits and negative hits across the choice sets was tallied for each team by
the experimenter and used as the dependent variables.
Once Study 2 was complete, teams responded to several manipulation check questions, as
well as individual demographic regulatory focus and positive negative affect questions, as
described above in the discussion of the method for Study 1.

Statistical Analysis for Study 2
Since the primary dependent variables in Study 2 are based on actual performance data,
analysis of Study 2 was conducted using the counts of positive hits and negative hits in two
separate statistical models. An ANCOVA was used to determine if significant differences exist
between the groups in each condition for the number of positive hits and the number of negative
hits, run as separate statistical tests. Since Study 2 also replicates the dependent variable from
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Study 1, the same procedure used in Study 1 was utilized, comparing groups’ deviation from
expert ratings of novelty, meaningfulness, and feasibility, and looking for significant differences
across conditions.

Study 1 and 2 Scale Reliability
Since several of the scales used in Study 1 and Study 2 are adapted from slightly different
marketing and innovation contexts and entail varying degrees of rewording, a pretest was
conducted to check that each scale has a Cronbach’s alpha of .7 or greater. Based on standard
scale purification procedures (Churchill Jr, 1979; Hinkin, 1995), items were dropped and/or
reworded and the scale re-administered in a series of pretests until alpha reliabilities had reached
or exceeded the .7 threshold. The scale items, including manipulation checks, are shown in
Appendix A. The statistical properties of the measures used, including statistical results from
each pretest are discussed in the next chapter.

Study 3
Study 3 entailed conducting a virtual ethnography using video footage. The footage was
taken from a firm’s development meetings in which they evaluate and select which ideas
submitted by customers should be taken into development and commercialization for their
online, direct-to-consumer retail channel. The video footage used in this analysis included
content from 27 hours of evaluation and selection meetings in which 186 concepts were
evaluated. Of those evaluated, 85 resulted in a “yes” development decision. The discussion time
for each product concept ranged from approximately just under 2 minutes to just under 11
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minutes. The discussion for each product was coded by the principal researcher and an
independent coder, blind to the purpose of the study.
The firm used in this study is designed around a business model in which they only
manufacture products submitted to the company through their user community. Therefore, very
accurate evaluation and selection of customers’ new product concepts is a key part of their
success or failure. The company holds public evaluation and selection meetings on a weekly
basis to choose which products submitted to their online user community should be taken into
full development and publicly broadcasts these meetings online. This company is ideal because
the products they manufacture come exclusively from their user community, and the types of
products submitted span a variety of product categories (e.g., electronics, health and fitness,
home and garden, kitchen, and travel and adventure). This firm is also a small company so the
development process and personnel involved are not likely to vary as much as they would in a
large company with multiple SBUs, resulting in less noise due to variance in these factors. In
each meeting, a top company executive, usually the CEO, moderated a discussion among a panel
of firm employees from sales, marketing, design, IT, operations, engineering, accounting, and
finance, as well as guest panelists who are subject matter experts. In the audience during this
meeting were firm employees and members of the development community, who were allowed
to ask questions and to participate in the final vote after each new product concept was
discussed. In addition, each product under consideration was assigned an “innovation
ambassador” who presented a brief overview of the product and its features and benefits, and
acted as an advocate on behalf of the inventor. Innovation ambassadors often did extensive
background investigation into the market potential for the products which they advocated. Once
a product was discussed, it went before the meeting participants for a vote. If more than half of
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those in attendance gave a product a “yes” vote, or if the group decided to explore an idea
further, the product went into the firm’s development and commercialization process. If less than
half of the participants gave a product a “yes” vote, the product was dropped from further
consideration.
Being accepted in one of these meetings doesn’t ensure a product will ultimately go to
market, but it does mean that the firm will commit time and financial resources to developing the
product. As such, they should be highly motivated to be accurate in their selections. This is an
ideal setting to further test the conceptual model for this research for several reasons. First, it
represents a variety of functional areas that are likely to be involved in any firm’s development
teams. Second, from a knowledge diversity perspective, this represents a highly relevant setting
for investigating development team reflexive practices in co-creation. Because of the functional
diversity involved in these meetings, as well as individuals who are assigned to collect additional
data and advocate on behalf of product inventors, the knowledge base is diverse enough that
teams should benefit from being reflexive. This represents a sufficiently complex process to
suggest that reflexivity will be beneficial to the quality of their team decisions (Schippers, West,
& Dawson, 2012).

Study 3 Dependent Variables
At the time of this dissertation’s writing, there was not any sales data available for any of
the products discussed in the video footage, thus an alternative dependent variable was used to
determine how successful the firm’s choices were for each product. To analyze the accuracy of
group choices, the entire set of 186 products reviewed was rated by a consumer panel on their
willingness to consider purchasing the proposed new product. Consumers in this panel were
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presented with a description of five of the products discussed in the video footage, and asked to
rate each concept on a scale of 1 to 7 using the purchase intentions scale created by (Berens,
Riel, & Bruggen, 2005), shown in Appendix A. To prevent fatigue, each respondent was only
asked to rate a 5-product subset of the 186 product concepts, and the products were randomly
and equally displayed to the consumer raters.
Using the willingness to consider purchase ratings from a panel of 1,870 respondents,
positive and negative hits were constructed. Positive hits were measured as a categorical
variable. If a firm chose to develop a product, and the product was rated in the 51st percentile or
higher by a consumer panel on a willingness to consider purchase instrument, the value was
coded as 1, otherwise 0. Negative hits were also measured as a categorical variable. If a firm
chose not to develop a product, and the product was rated in the 49th percentile or lower by a
consumer panel on a willingness to consider purchase instrument, the value was coded as 1,
otherwise 0.

Study 3 Independent Variables
The IVs in this study include team regulatory style, team reflexivity, and inventor
expertise. Table 12 shows how these variables were measured. Reflexivity was measured by
coding the specific discussion topics in the 186 product discussions, and the variable was
calculated as the number of total comments made divided by the unique topics discussed. For
example, if three people made a comment about whether a product would actually sell, their
comments represent three total comments, but only one unique topic. Measured in this way, both
the depth and the breadth of knowledge processing are captured, which fits with the conceptual
definition of reflexivity (e.g., DeDreu, 2002; Schippers et al., 2010).
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Table 12. Operationalization of Main IVs and DVs in Study 3
Variables
Operationalization
Team Characteristics
Team Regulatory Style Calculated as a continuous variable by
dividing the number of promotion-focused
comments by the number of preventionfocused comments. Higher values indicate a
promotion focus; lower values indicate a
prevention focus.

Team Reflexivity Calculated as a continuous variable by
dividing the total number of comment types
(depth of discussion) by the number of
unique comment types (breadth of
discussion).
Consumer Characteristics
Inventor Expertise Taken directly from the website screenshots
in the video footage, this variable is the
number of followers the inventor of each
product had at the time of product
evaluation.
Dependent Variables
Positive Hits Measured as a categorical variable. If a firm
chose to develop a product, and the product
was rated in the 51st percentile or higher by
a consumer panel on a willingness to
consider purchase instrument, the value is 1,
otherwise 0.
Negative Hits Measured as a categorical variable. If a firm
chose not to develop a product, and the
product was rated in the 49th percentile or
lower by a consumer panel on a willingness
to consider purchase instrument, the value is
1, otherwise 0.
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Regulatory style was measured as a continuous variable considering whether the “voice
of promotion” or “voice of prevention” was more dominant in the discussion of each product.
Two raters sorted each comment topic category from the coded comments into preventionfocused topics, promotion-focused topics, or neutral topics. To create the continuous variable,
the ratio of promotion comments to prevention comments was calculated, with higher values
representing a promotion focus and lower values a prevention focus.
Since end users often submit ideas that are unrefined, ambiguous, or under-elaborated
(Bayus, 2013), inventor expertise was measured and included as a variable in the analysis.
Inventors who are experts would be expected to submit ideas that are more clearly articulated,
making them easier to evaluate. Inventor expertise was measured based on information pulled
from the firm’s website for each inventor at the time his or her product was evaluated, and was
measured as the total number of followers an inventor had.

Study 3 Control Variables
Several control variables were used in this study. First, the length of time that each
product was discussed, in seconds, was recorded and used as a control. Second, since past
research has found hedonic products are often more difficult to judge on quality and functionality
(Huang, Lurie, & Mitra, 2009) the product type (hedonic or utilitarian) was measured by creating
a categorical product type variable based on the evaluations of 5 independent judges who viewed
each product and rated them on a hedonic/utilitarian semantic differential scale. The items for
this scale are shown in Appendix A and the statistical results of the judges’ evaluations are
discussed in the next chapter. Third, to account for any evaluation effects resulting from group
fatigue, the order in which every product was discussed during the meeting in which it was
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evaluated was recorded. Finally, past research has supported the idea that interacting with ideas
outside of one’s own might make an inventor better able to develop new product ideas (Bayus,
2013), so this was controlled for in the current dataset. The community connection of each
inventor was included as a control and was measured as the number of other inventor’s products
that each product inventor had interacted with in the online community (e.g., posting comments,
suggestions, etc.). This variable was based on data available in each inventor’s profile during the
video discussions.

Statistical Analysis for Study 3
Since Study 3 uses binary categorical variables as dependent variables, analysis was
conducted using binomial logistic regression. Similar studies investigating idea selection
processes have used a logit model with a binary dependent variable (idea accepted/idea not
accepted (Bayus, 2013). A concern with using discriminant functions and logistic regression
equations is that the model may over fit to the data, resulting in model fit that is unstable (Hair,
Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). To address this concern, a training and holdout sample were
used to validate the results. There are no strict criteria in the literature for what percentage of
observations should be held out to create a holdout sample. Since there were relatively few
observations in the data, an 80%/20% split was used. Eighty percent of the observations were
randomly chosen as a training sample, then the parameter estimates were applied to the
remaining 20% of the observations which had been left out to validate the training sample. This
80/20 split is consistent with other logistic regression analyses reported in the marketing strategy
and strategic management literature (e.g., Mittal, Kamakura, & Govind, 2004; Swamidass, Nair,
and Mistry, 1999).
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Overview of Chapter 3
This chapter presented a review of methodology and analysis for the two experiments and
the virtual ethnography that were conducted in this dissertation research. Study 1 consists of a 2
x 2 between subjects lab experiment using college student teams as subjects. Study 2 consists of
a 2 x 2 between-subjects model that uses positive hits and negative hits, based on actual product
performance data, as the dependent variable. Finally, Study 3 adds a moderator related to the
expertise of the inventor of each idea. Study 3 also represents a field investigation of the
relationships explored in the lab in Studies 1 and 2.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
Overview of Studies
In this chapter, the data collection procedures and results from each of the three studies
are discussed. Studies 1 and 2 were conducted consecutively using the same sample, and the
same experimental manipulations (i.e., the teams were primed in one of the four conditions, then
asked to complete two studies). The combined pretest for Study 1 and Study 2 is presented,
followed by a discussion of the analysis and results for each study individually. After each study,
a short summary of the findings is presented before discussing the subsequent study, and the
findings from all three studies are presented at the end of the chapter.

Study 1
Study 1 was a 2 x 2 between subjects design with two two-level factors, Group
Reflexivity (high/low) and Group Regulatory Focus (prevention/promotion). The unit of analysis
was the team decision. Teams were primed to exhibit a prevention or promotion decision-making
orientation and to exhibit high or low reflexivity in their information processing before making a
team decision. They were presented with five co-created new product concepts and asked to rate
them on the dimensions on novelty, meaningfulness, and feasibility. Their responses were
compared against the ratings of experts on the same dimensions for each product. The dependent
variables were the distance that each team scored from the experts across all of the products on
novelty, meaningfulness, and feasibility.
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Pretesting the Manipulated Variables for Study 1 and Study 2
The products that teams were asked to rate in Study 1 were chosen from among several
hundred products submitted to the ideation portal of Quirky, a firm that manufactures and sells
products invented by end-users. Five different products were selected based on the fact that they
were trending as favorable on the ideation portal – a chicken drumstick holder, a body motion
powered mobile device charger, a video-enabled toy submarine, an under-chair drawer
attachment, and a smoke detector that silenced the low battery chirp at night or in the absence of
light. Trending products were chosen to help ensure that each product concept was at least
moderately challenging to evaluate, and so that evaluation was not easy enough that there were
no differences in the accuracy of each experimental condition. Prior to conducting a pretest, the
survey was administered to three pairs of individuals who were blind to the hypotheses being
tested to get feedback on the logical flow of the experimental exercises, the clarity of the
directions in the manipulations and exercises and the total time required to complete the studies.
The survey was then pretested with a sample of 94 undergraduate and graduate business
students from marketing and supply chain management courses. The initial manipulation checks
for the high/low reflexivity condition and the prevention/promotion group regulatory focus
conditions was not significant. The composite reflexivity manipulation check score of high
reflexivity condition was not significantly different than the composite score of the low
reflexivity condition and the composite regulatory focus score for the promotion group was not
significantly different from the composite score of the prevention group. As a result, the wording
of the manipulations was modified and the scales were adapted to better fit the context of the lab
experiment. Specifically, the manipulation for regulatory focus was altered to add a pay for
performance component, following a similar experimental manipulation of group regulatory
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focus conducted by (Florack & Hartmann, 2007). For reflexivity, the groups were given specific
questions to discuss pertaining to the product selection tasks which included thinking about
target markets, product functionality and market/sales potential.
Based on the changes implemented to the experimental survey instrument after Pretest 1,
a second pretest was administered to check the effectiveness of the experimental manipulations
and the reliability of the scales used in the manipulation check. A sample of 92 teams of
undergraduate students in a marketing and supply chain course were used. For the second pretest,
both of the scales used in the manipulation check showed levels of alpha reliability above the .70
guideline suggested by Nunnally (1978). The Cronbach’s alpha for the Group Regulatory Focus
scale in the pretest was .88, and the Cronbach’s alpha for the Reflexivity scale in the pretest was
.78. The final measures used are shown in Appendix A and discussed later in this chapter.
The manipulation check for the second round of pretest data showed that the high and
low reflexivity conditions differed significantly on the reflexivity manipulation check (t(90) =
5.24, p < .001). The manipulation check for the prevention and promotion Group Regulatory
Focus groups also differed significantly form one another on the manipulation check measure of
regulatory focus (t(90) = 5.29, p < .001). The final wording of the experimental manipulations
for both regulatory focus and reflexivity are shown in Tables 13 and 14.

Measurement Reliability for Study 1 and Study Main Exercises
Based on the main experiment, the scale items for each measured construct were
examined to ensure that they met the .70 threshold for alpha reliability suggested by Nunnally
(1978). The Cronbach’s alpha of each measure used is shown in Table 15 and the individual
items for each of the measures are listed in Appendix A.
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Table 13. Group Regulatory Focus Experimental Manipulations
Manipulation
Prevention

Wording
Imagine that you are in charge of overseeing new product development for a
company that manufactures products for consumer markets and solicits new
product ideas directly from customers.
Please take a moment to familiarize yourself with the following information
about your firm:
 Your company is very vigilant about finding and commercializing new
ideas, does not like to take risks, and always tries to go with the “safe
bet” in new product endeavors.
 People in your firm who have made poor decisions in the past have
been fired or demoted.
 In your decision process, you should adopt a vigilant evaluation
approach, in line with how your company is run.
 You will be asked to make a series of evaluations and choices about
new product concepts. Your starting compensation for participating in
this exercise is $10.
However, for each product you inaccurately evaluate (based on the real market
performance of these products and/or expert evaluations of each product), you
will be penalized 50 cents, up to a maximum loss of $5 per person. Your
potential total earning is between $10 and $5 per person.

Promotion

Imagine that you are in charge of overseeing new product development for a
company that manufactures products for consumer markets and solicits new
product ideas directly from customers.
Please take a moment to familiarize yourself with the following information
about your firm:
Your company is very eager to find and commercialize new ideas, likes to take
risks, and always tries to be on the “cutting edge” in new product endeavors.
 People in your firm who have taken risks with new product innovations
in the past, have been given promotions and/or raises.
 In your decision process, you should adopt an eager evaluation
approach, in line with how your company is run.
You will be asked to make a series of evaluations of new product concepts.
Your starting compensation for participating in this exercise is $5. However, for
each product you accurately evaluate (based on the real market performance of
these products and/or expert evaluations), you will earn a 50 cent reward, up to
a maximum gain of $5 extra per person.
Your potential total earning is between $5 and $10 per person.
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Table 14. Group Reflexivity Manipulations
Manipulation
High Reflexivity

Wording
As previously mentioned, you will be asked to observe and rate a series
of new product concepts. As you go through each product concept, you
should spend a good amount of time thinking about and discussing each
product, making sure you come to a solid team consensus before
submitting your answer.
Some of the things you might discuss as a group include:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Would this product be likely to actually sell?
Who is the target market for this product?
Would this product be likely to work as advertised?
Do either of us have knowledge, experience or expertise with this
type of product that might help us make a better decision?
5. Does something similar to this product already exist on the
market?

Low Reflexivity
As previously mentioned, you will be asked to observe and rate a series
of new product concepts.
As you go through each product concept, you should engage in as little
discussion as possible about each product. Go with your first instinct and
select the first answer that comes to your mind.
If you don't immediately agree, try to arrive at an answer with very
minimal discussion, appointing a "decider" for each product concept, if
necessary.

Group regulatory focus was measured using an adapted three-item semantic differential
scale from (Van Stekelenburg, 2006), and showed an alpha reliability of .75. Group reflexivity
was measured using a 7-point Likert scale adapted from Schippers et al., 2007, and showed an
alpha reliability of .75. The wording of the items, shown in Appendix A, was modified to reflect
the product ranking and selection tasks the teams were asked to complete in Study 1 and Study 2.
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Product novelty, used in Study 1, was measured using a 4-item scale from (Im and
Workman, 2004) and the alpha reliability was calculated separately for each of the four products
used. For each of the four products, the alpha reliability is above .70 (.78, .82, .84, and .73,
respectively).
Table 15. Measure Reliability for Study 1 and Study 2
Variable
Group Reflexivity
Group Regulatory Focus
Feasibility
Drumstick Holder
Video-Enabled Submarine
Under-Chair Drawer
Smoke Detector
Novelty
Drumstick Holder
Video-Enabled Submarine
Under-Chair Drawer
Smoke Detector
Meaningfulness
Drumstick Holder
Video-Enabled Submarine
Under-Chair Drawer
Smoke Detector
Individual Regulatory Focus
Individual Affect

Variable Type
Manipulation Check
Manipulation Check

α
.75
.75

Used to calculate distance score DV
.68
.83
.80
.82
Used to calculate distance score DV
.78
.82
.84
.73
Used to calculate distance score DV
.95
.90
.94
.95
Control Variable
Control Variable

.77
.77

Product meaningfulness, used in Study 1, was measured using a 4-item scale from (Im &
Workman Jr, 2004) and the alpha reliability was calculated separately for each of the four
products used in the Study 1 experiment. The Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was above .90 for
all four of the products used in the main experiment (drumstick holder α = .95, submarine α =
.90, under-chair drawer α = .94, and smoke detector α = .95).
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Product feasibility, used in Study 1 was measured using a 3-item scale, created for this
study and based on a single-item measure used by Poetz and Schreier (2012) and Magnussen et
al. (2003). First, the existing literature in which feasibility (also called realizability) had been
used in a similar manner (i.e., Poetz & Schreier, 2012; Magnussen et al., 2003) was reviewed and
five items were generated (Table 16). The five items were then used in the first pretest with a
sample of 94 teams of two undergraduate students. Based on the first pretest, items 4 and 5 were
dropped due to very low factor loadings in a factor analysis. The resulting 3-item scale had
Cronbach’s alphas of between .76 and .90 across the original five products used in the Study 1
pretest. The refined 3-item scale was then used in the second pretest with a sample of 92 teams
of two undergraduate students. Based on the second pretest, the Cronbach’s alphas of the
feasibility measure were .65 for the drumstick holder, .79 for the body charger, .76 for the
submarine, .78 for the drawer, and .82 for the smoke detector. The scale was then used in the
main experiment, with the alpha reliabilities reported in Table 15. For three of the four products,
the Cronbach’s alphas of the feasibility measure were above .70 (submarine, .83; under-chair
drawer .80; and smoke detector, .82). The drumstick holder showed a reliability for the
feasibility measures lower than .7, but still within a marginally acceptable range (.68).

Table 16. New Product Concept Feasibility Items
Items for Feasibility Scale
Compared to products currently on the market, this new product concept…
1. would be feasible for a company to make
2. could be developed without difficulty
3. would be practical to manufacture
4. would be a complex undertaking to commercialize (R)**
5. would be a challenge to design for mass production (R)**
** These items were deleted in the final scale
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In addition to these variables, two control variables were included for each team in Study
1 and Study 2 – individual regulatory focus of team members and individual positive affect of
team members. Spanjol et al. (2001) found that the chronic regulatory focus of each individual in
an innovation team influenced their overall decision-making quality. To compute this variable,
both team members completed a 5-item, 7-point instrument measuring regulatory focus (Haws,
Dholakia, & Bearden, 2010) and their responses were then averaged to create a single measure.
Isen, Daubman, and Nowicki (1987) found that positive affect positively influences individuals’
creativity and problem-solving ability. Therefore, the individual positive affect of each group’s
team members was measured separately using a 10-item, 7-point scale developed by Watson,
Clark, and Tellegen (1988). The responses of each individual were then averaged to create a
measure of the level of positive affect of the individuals in each team.

Expert Raters
To develop baseline scores for novelty, meaningfulness, and feasibility across the set of
products used in Study 1, a panel of 10 new product development experts were recruited to
complete the same rating exercise for novelty, meaningfulness, and feasibility as the subjects in
Study 1 (see measures in Appendix A for novelty, meaningfulness, and feasibility), but without
the experimental manipulations. To help ensure that the raters had the requisite market
knowledge to assess the products used in the experiments, the new product development experts
used in this study were recruited based on their having experience in developing consumer
goods. All of the raters indicated they had the majority of their professional experience
developing products in either consumer electronics, consumer packaged goods, or consumer
home goods. The breakdown of NPD experience and NPD work roles is shown in Table 17. The
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sample used had an average of 17.6 years of professional experience in new product
development. The average time spent in various new product development roles is as follows:
8.5% in industrial design, 25.5% in engineering, 7.5% in marketing, 5% in sales, 10% in supply
chain management, 21% in project management, 11% in operations and manufacturing, and
11.5% in other NPD roles (Director of R&D, prototyping, research, etc.).

Table 17. Expert Rater Professional Experience
Avg. Time (%) in Various NPD Roles
New Product Industrial Design
New Product Engineering
New Product Marketing
New Product Sales
New Product Supply Chain Management
NPD Project Management
NPD Operations/Manufacturing
Other Roles

Percent
8.5%
25.5%
7.5%
5.0%
10.0%
21.0%
11.0%
11.5%

Total

100%

Expert Rater Reliability
To assess the level of agreement among the expert raters, the Rwg(j) measure of interrater
agreement (James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1993) was used following the formula:
2

Rwg(j) = 1 

Sxj

 E2

(1)

Where 𝑆̅2x j is the mean of the observed variance among the independent raters, and σ2 E is the
expected variance of the uniform (or random) distribution.
Following the recommendation of (LeBreton & Senter, 2007), the following standards
are used here to interpret interrater agreement estimates: .51 to .70 indicates moderate
agreement; .71 to .90 indicates strong agreement; and .91 to 1.00 indicates very strong
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agreement. Based on the results of this calculation, 4 of the 5 products showed moderate or
strong agreement among the 10 expert judges (see Table 18). The mobile device body charger
did not show at least moderate agreement among the expert judges and was dropped from
subsequent analysis in the experiment.
After determining which products had moderate or higher agreement among the raters,
the team rating scores for the novelty, meaningfulness and feasibility dimensions were examined.
The mean distance scores from the expert ratings, along with the standard deviations of the
distance scores for novelty, meaningfulness, and feasibility are shown in Table 19.

Table 18. Inter-Rater Agreement (Mean Rating) for Experimental Product Set
Product
Drumstick Holder
Body Charger a
Video-Enabled Submarine
Under-Chair Drawer
Smoke Detector
a

Feasibility Rwg(j)
.89 (6.70)
.21 (4.70)
.71 (5.47)
.75 (5.97)
.83 (6.33)

Novelty Rwg(j)
.57 (3.00)
.49 (4.40)
.57 (3.95)
.56 (3.10)
.63 (3.58)

Meaningfulness Rwg(j)
.82 (3.83)
.21 (3.68)
.55 (4.83)
.76 (3.63)
.57 (4.48)

The Mobile Body Charger product was dropped from the analysis due to low agreement among the raters.

Table 19. Pretest Distance Means (SD) for Study 1 Product Concepts

Product a
Drumstick holder
Video-Enabled Submarine
Under-Chair Drawer
Smoke Detector
All (Euclidean Distance) b
a

Feasibility Mean
Distance/SD

Novelty Mean
Distance/SD

Meaningfulness Mean
Distance/SD

1.19 (1.09)
1.89 (1.10)
.91 (.72)
1.49 (1.16)
9.75 (1.13)

1.15 (.81)
1.05 (.71)
1.15 (.80)
1.04 (.74)
4.87 (.78)

1.27 (.83)
1.00 (.79)
1.43 (.88)
1.37 (.86)
6.13 (.93)

The Mobile Body Charger product was dropped from the main experiment due to low interrater reliability.
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Study 1 and 2 Team Sample Characteristics
The main experimental exercises for Studies 1 and 2 were conducted consecutively using
the same sample, and the same experimental manipulations (i.e., the teams were primed in one of
the four conditions, then asked to complete Study 1 followed by Study 2). To reinforce the
experimental manipulations over the duration of the exercises, the sample manipulations were
given to each team again between Study 1 and Study 2 (e.g., Barrick & Spilker 2003; Meloy
2000). The sample consisted of 158 teams of two individuals. Undergraduate students from
marketing, advertising, and supply chain classes at a public university in the southeast United
States were recruited for the study. Each team was paid between $10-20 for participating in the
survey ($5-10 per person), depending on how far their answers deviated from the responses
aggregated from a panel of 10 new product development experts with experience in developing
consumer goods and how accurate they were in correctly choosing the best- and worst-selling
products in the Study 2 choice sets. Team members split their total earnings for their
performance in the study 50/50, so both partners received the exact same monetary
compensation.
The individuals used in the sample had an average age of 23.5 years with an average of
3.2 years of full-time work experience. A total of 52.2% of the participants in the study were
female.

Manipulation and Confound Checks
A manipulation and confound check was conducted for the main experiments to ensure
that teams were being correctly primed in their respective experimental conditions, and that the
experimental manipulations were not significantly influencing one another. Two analysis of
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variance (ANOVA) models were analyzed. The first model used the reflexivity composite as the
dependent variable and the two-level experimental factors (reflexivity and regulatory focus) as
independent variables. The second model used the regulatory focus composite as the dependent
variable and the two-level experimental factors (reflexivity and regulatory focus) as independent
variables. The results, shown in Table 20, indicate that the experimental conditions were
manipulated as intended (i.e., the high reflexivity group and promotion groups differed
significantly from their counterparts) and that they did not significantly influence one another.

Table 20. Manipulation and Confound Checks for Study 1 and Study 2
Manipulation

Reflexivity Composite

Regulatory Focus Composite

Reflexivity
(High/Low)

p < .001, η2 = .10

p = .20, η2 = .01

Regulatory Focus
(Prevention/Promotion)

p = .63, η2 = .001

p <.001, η2 = .14

Study 1 Procedure
As described in the previous chapter, teams were primed to adopt a prevention or a
promotion group regulatory focus and to be high or low on the degree to which they reflected on
and processed their knowledge before making a rating decision about five different products – a
drumstick holder, a body-motion mobile device charger, a video-enabled submarine, and underchair drawer attachment and a smoke detector that silenced the low battery chirp at night. The
image and description profiles for each product that each team saw in the rating exercise are
shown in Appendix A.
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After completing a short practice exercise to acclimate them to the task, teams were
asked to rate each of the five products on three dimensions – novelty, meaningfulness, and
feasibility. Team responses for each dimension were then compared to the aggregate expert score
across all 4 products to develop a distance score dependent variable for novelty, meaningfulness,
and feasibility.
To account for potential confounds, several control variables were collected – individual
team member affect, individual team member regulatory focus as a chronic personality trait,
level of familiarity among the team members, and level of product category knowledge for each
of the products displayed in the experiment.

Study 1 Analysis
The data was analyzed using analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with regulatory focus
and reflexivity as independent variables and the Euclidean distance scores across all 4 products
for novelty, meaningfulness, and feasibility as dependent variables. The mean distance score for
novelty across the four products was 4.88 with a standard deviation of .84. The mean distance
score for meaningfulness across the four products was 5.92 with a standard deviation of .98. The
mean distance score for feasibility across the four products was 9.93 with a standard deviation of
1.12. Four covariates were originally included (individual regulatory focus, individual affect,
team familiarity, and product category knowledge), but two were dropped due to nonsignificance in all of the models used (individual affect and team familiarity).
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Study 1 Results
In Study 1, the teams participating in the experiment were asked to view product
concepts invented by consumers and rate them on their level of novelty, feasibility and
meaningfulness. The individual team member affect and team member familiarity covariates
were not significant in any of the models tested for the three dimensions of innovativeness, and
were dropped from the analysis. The ANCOVA results for all of the tests in Study 1 are shown
in Table 21.

Hypothesis Tests for the Main Effect of Group Regulatory Focus
Hypothesis 1a states that teams with a promotion focus will be more accurate at assessing
co-created new product novelty than teams with a prevention focus. The analysis of the main
effect showed that regulatory focus had no significant effect on novelty (MPrevention= 4.89 vs.
MPromotion = 4.86; F(1,151) = .03, NS), thus H1a is not supported.
Hypotheses 1b states that teams with a prevention focus will be more accurate at
assessing co-created new product meaningfulness than teams with a promotion focus. The
analysis showed that teams in the prevention condition rated the products closer to the expert
ratings of meaningfulness than teams in the promotion condition at the p < .10 level but not the p
< .05 level (MPrevention= 5.79 vs. MPromotion = 6.06; F(1,151) = 2.98, p= .09, η2 = .02), see Figure 4.
Based on this result, H1b is marginally supported.
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Table 21. ANCOVA Results for Study 1
Dependent Variable
(Assessment Accuracy)

d.f.

Type III sum
of squares

Model
Error

5
151

Regulatory Focus
Reflexivity
Reg. Focus * Reflexivity

F

R2

8.382
101.521

2.493*

0.08

1
1
1

0.023
0.036
0.018

0.034
0.054
0.026

Category Knowledge
Individual Regulatory
Focus

1

5.181

7.706**

1

1.356

2.017

Model
Error

5
151

15.799
134.614

3.160**

Regulatory Focus
Reflexivity
Reg. Focus * Reflexivity

1
1
1

2.656
0.361
3.759

2.980†
0.405
4.217*

Category Knowledge
Individual Regulatory
Focus

1

0.431

0.484

1

7.281

8.168**

Model
Error

5
151

10.335
187.302

1.67
0.003

Regulatory Focus
Reflexivity
Reg. Focus * Reflexivity

1
1
1

8.155
0.006
0.004

6.575**
0.005
0.003

Category Knowledge
Individual Regulatory
Focus

1

1.657

1

0.561

Model 1:
Co-created New
Product Novelty

Model 2:
Co-created New
Product Meaningfulness
0.11

Model 3:
Cocreated New
Product Feasibility

†

p < .10
p < .05
**
p < .01
*

0.05
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Figure 4. Distance from Expert Ratings of Meaningfulness
Hypothesis 1c states that teams with a prevention focus will be more accurate at assessing
co-created new product feasibility. The analysis of the main effect of regulatory focus showed
that teams in the prevention condition rated the products closer to the expert ratings of feasibility
than teams in the promotion condition (MPrevention= 9.71 vs. MPromotion = 10.17; F(1,151) = 6.58,
p= .01, η2 = .04), see Figure 5. Based on this result, H1c is supported.

Hypothesis Tests for the Main Effect of Reflexivity
Hypothesis 2a states that high reflexivity will positively influence teams’ rating accuracy
on novelty. Reflexivity did not significantly influence teams’ assessments of co-created new
product novelty (MHiReflex= 4.89 vs. MLoReflex = 4.86; F(1,151) = .01, NS), thus H2a is not
supported.
Hypothesis 2b states that high reflexivity will positively influence teams’ rating accuracy
on the meaningfulness dimension. The main effect of reflexivity on co-created new product
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novelty assessment accuracy was also not significant (MHiReflex= 5.97 vs. MLoReflex = 5.87;
F(1,151) = .01, NS), thus H2b is not supported.

Figure 5. Distance from Expert Ratings of Feasibility

Hypothesis 2c states that high reflexivity will positively influence teams’ rating accuracy
on feasibility. The main effect of reflexivity on assessments of co-created new product feasibility
was not significant (MHiReflex= 9.95 vs. MLoReflex = 9.93; F(1,151) = .01, NS), thus H2c is not
supported.

Hypothesis Tests for the Regulatory Focus by Reflexivity Interaction
Hypothesis 3 states that being highly reflexive will have a negative effect on promotionfocused team assessment accuracy, but a positive effect on prevention-focused team assessment
accuracy. This hypothesis was tested separately for the novelty (H3a), meaningfulness (H3b),
and feasibility (H3c) dimensions.
For the novelty dimension, the interaction between group regulatory focus and reflexivity
was not significant (F(1,151) = .03, NS), thus H3a is not supported. For the meaningfulness
dimension, however, the interaction between group regulatory focus and reflexivity was
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significant (F(1,151) = 4.22, p= .04, η2 = .03), such that at high levels of reflexivity, preventionfocused teams were significantly more accurate than promotion-focused teams, while there was
no difference between the prevention and promotion groups at low levels of reflexivity. As such,
H3b is supported. The interaction is shown in Figure 6. For the feasibility dimension, the
interaction between group regulatory focus and reflexivity was not significant (F(1,151) = .003,
NS), thus H3c is not supported.

Figure 6. Interaction between Regulatory Focus and Reflexivity on Meaningfulness

Study 1 Summary of Findings
Overall, three of the three hypotheses for Study 1 were fully or marginally supported. As
predicted, a prevention focus resulted in significantly more accurate ratings of product feasibility
(H1c), and marginally more significant ratings of product meaningfulness (H1b). In addition, the
interaction between regulatory focus and reflexivity was significant for the meaningfulness
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dimension such that the prevention focused teams were significantly more accurate than the
promotion focused teams at high levels of reflexivity. A summary of the hypothesis tests is
shown in Table 22.

Table 22. Summary of Study 1 Hypothesis Tests
Hypothesis
H1a: Promotion  Novelty

Finding
not significant

H1b: Prevention  Meaningfulness

supported at p < .10 level

H1c: Prevention  Feasibility

supported at p < .01 level

H2a: High Reflexivity  Novelty

not significant

H2b: High Reflexivity  Meaningfulness

not significant

H2c: High Reflexivity  Feasibility

not significant

H3a: Prevention x High Reflexivity  Novelty

not significant

H3b: Prevention x High Reflexivity  Meaningfulness
H3c: Prevention x High Reflexivity  Feasibility

supported at p < .05 level
not significant

Study 2
Study 2 was a 2 x 2 between subject experiments. In Study 1, teams were primed to
exhibit either a prevention or promotion orientation and to exercise high or low reflexivity in
their group decision-making. In Study 2, teams were asked to complete a second group decision
exercise under the same conditions, and given a short reminder to reinforce the priming they
received at the start of the activity for both regulatory focus and reflexivity.
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Study 2 Procedure
Teams were asked to view four sets of three products in the same product category and at
a similar price point, then rank the products from 1 to 3 according what they believed to be the
best-selling (1) to the worst-selling (3) product in the group. At the start of Study 1, each team
indicated their familiarity with each of the product categories used in both Study 1 and Study 2.
The products sets used in Study 2 were chosen from the retail website of a firm that
exclusively sells products created by the firm’s online user community. For each product set,
three products were selected that were in a similar price range, had been on the market at least
six months and showed significant differences in sales for the first six months, creating a clear
best-seller and worst-seller in each set. The sets used were mobile phone accessories, kitchen
gadgets, cleaning products, and cord organization products for small electronic devices. These
sets were chosen because they were deemed likely to be categories with which undergraduate
subjects would be at least moderately familiar. The procedure for creating and refining the
product sets is discussed below in the pretest section for Study 2 and the final set of products
used in Study 2 is listed in Appendix C.
Once the teams had completed their rankings of the four product sets they were asked to
identify any of the products they had seen for sale prior to participating in the experiment,
responded to questions measuring group regulatory focus and reflexivity and then answered
several questions individually to measure the individual affect and chronic regulatory focus of
each team member.
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Study 2 Dependent Variables and Analysis Procedure
To analyze the data, positive and negative hits were summed across the four product sets.
A positive hit occurred when a team correctly chose the best-selling product and a negative hit
occurred when team correctly chose the worst-selling product. Since the dependent variable was
constructed from counts of positive and negative hits, a negative binomial regression model was
used to test the hypothesis using the total number of positive or negative hits across all three
product sets as the dependent variable.

Study 2 Pretest
Study 2 was pretested using the same sample and experimental manipulations as in Study
1. Teams were primed in either a prevention or promotion condition, then instructed to be highly
reflexive or not at all reflexive in their team decision making. After completing Study 1, teams
were given a reminder to reinforce their original priming for both regulatory focus and
reflexivity, then asked to complete a choice exercise. Table 23 shows the positive and negative
hit percentages for each choice set in the pretest.

Table 23. Overall Pretest Sample Hit Rates for Study 2 Product Choice Sets
Product Set
Kitchen Gadgets
Mobile Phone Accessories*
Cleaning Supplies*
Overall
0 Hits
1 Hit
2 Hits
3 Hits

Positive Hit Rate
23.9%
4.3%
7.6%

Negative Hit Rate
15.2%
45.7%
78.3%

64.1%
35.9%
0.0%
0.0%

12.0%
42.4%
40.2%
5.4%

* These sets were modified for the main experiment to achieve a higher hit rate.
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Based on the pretest sample, product sets with negative hit rates lower than 15% were
altered for the main experiment in Study 2 to create a more even distribution of hits and misses.
For the Mobile Phone Accessories and Cleaning Products choice sets, the best-selling product
was replaced with an alternative product, since it had a very low overall hit rate. A fourth choice
set was also added for the main experiment in Study 2, which consisted of three cord
management products for small electronics. The final product choice sets for Study 2 are shown
in Appendix B. The actual sales figures used to calculate the best and worst selling products are
shown in Table 24.

Table 24. Overall Sales (in Units) for Study 2 Main Experiment Product Choice Sets
Product Set
Kitchen Gadgets
Stem
Pluck
Poppit
Mobile Phone Accessories
Crossover
Keeper Wallet
Upwrite
a
Cleaning Products
Tether
Loop
Groove
Cord Organizers
Cordies
Contort
Power Curl Mini
a

Sales (Units)
141,862
14,317
1,469
24,894
17,514
248
81,743
9,234
891
60,443
21,508
5,315

This product set was omitted from the analysis

Study 2 Results
In the main data collection, the hits and misses were calculated for each product prior to
aggregating them into a single dependent variable (the sum of positive or negative hits across the
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product sets). For the cleaning supplies product set, the positive hit percentage was 11.6% and
the negative hit percentage was 22.6%. Due to the low overall hit success rate for this product
set, it was dropped from the analysis. As in the previous study, team member familiarity, and the
regulatory focus and positive affect of individual team members were included as controls.
Also included as control variables were the category knowledge (an average of
knowledge across the three categories used) teams had about the product sets, as well as how
many products team had previously seen before completing Study 2. The positive and negative
hits rates of all the product sets are shown in Table 25.

Table 25. Hit Rates for Study 2 Experiment Product Choice Sets
Product Set
Positive Hit Rate Negative Hit Rate
Kitchen Gadgets
35.8%
29.7%
Mobile Phone Accessories
44.3%
84.0%
Cleaning Supplies a
11.6%
22.6%
Cord Organizers
34.9%
28.8%
All (sum)
23.2%
2.0%
0 Hits
36.4%
48.5%
1 Hit
33.3%
80.8%
2 Hits
7.1%
18.2%
3 Hits
a
Product set was omitted from analysis due to low hit rates

Study 2 Hypothesis Tests
Hypothesis 4a, Hypothesis 5a, and Hypothesis 6a were tested using an analysis of
covariance model with positive hits as the dependent variable. The independent variables group
reflexivity and group regulatory focus were included as well as the regulatory focus by
reflexivity interaction effect. Covariates in the model included how well team members knew
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one another, their expertise across the product categories they viewed, an aggregate measure of
individual regulatory focus and an aggregate measure of individual positive affect. The ANOVA
models for Study 2 are shown in Table 26.
H4a states that prevention-oriented teams will have more positive hits than promotion
oriented teams. The effect of regulatory focus was not significant (F(1,100) = .225, p = .64). H5a
states that highly reflexive teams will have more positive hits than teams with low levels of
reflexivity. The effect of reflexivity was also not significant (F(1,100) = 2.162 , p = .15). H6a
states that reflexivity will have a more positive effect on prevention-oriented teams than on
promotion-oriented teams in respect to positive hits. The effect of the interaction was not
significant (F(1,100) = .007, p = .93). Based on these results, H4a, H5a, and H6a are not
supported.
Hypothesis 4b, Hypothesis 5b, and Hypothesis 6b were also tested using an analysis of
covariance model, but with negative hits as the dependent variable. The independent variables
group reflexivity and group regulatory focus were included as well as the regulatory focus by
reflexivity interaction effect. Covariates in the model included how well team members knew
one another, their expertise across the product categories they viewed, an aggregate measure of
individual regulatory focus and an aggregate measure of individual positive affect.
H4b states that prevention-oriented teams will have more negative hits than promotion
oriented teams. The effect of regulatory focus was not significant (F(1,100) = .545, p = .35). H5a
states that highly reflexive teams will have more positive hits than teams with low levels of
reflexivity. The effect of reflexivity was also not significant (F(1,100) = .086 , p = .77). As such,
H4b and H5b are not supported.
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Table 26. ANCOVA Results for Study 2

d.f.

Type III
sum of
squares

Model
Error

7
100

Regulatory Focus
Reflexivity
Reg. Focus * Reflexivity

F

R2

4.797
76.833

0.892

0.06

1
1
1

0.173
1.661
0.006

0.226
2.162
0.007

Category Knowledge
Individual Regulatory Focus
Team Familiarity
Team Affect

1
1
1
1

0.144
0.001
2.566
0.489

0.188
0.002
3.339†
0.637

Model
Error

7
100

6.449
62.097

1.484

Regulatory Focus
Reflexivity
Reg. Focus * Reflexivity

1
1
1

0.545
0.053
2.953

0.878
0.086
4.756*

Category Knowledge
Individual Regulatory Focus
Team Familiarity
Team Affect

1
1
1
1

1.108
0.373
0.612
0.738

1.785
0.601
0.985
1.188

Dependent Variable
Model 1:
Positive Hits

Model 2:
Negative Hits

†
*

0.09

p < .10
p < .05

H6a states that reflexivity will have a more positive effect on prevention-oriented teams
than on promotion-oriented teams in respect to positive hits. The effect of the interaction was
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significant in the hypothesized direction (F(1,107) = 4.756, p < .05, η2 = .05). When reflexivity
was high, prevention-oriented teams scored significantly more negative hits than promotion
oriented teams. The interaction is shown in the interaction plot in Figure 7.

Figure 7. Interaction between Regulatory Focus and Reflexivity for Negative Hits.

Study 2 Summary of Findings
Study 2 consisted of a 2 x 2 between subjects design using group regulatory focus
(prevention/promotion) and group reflexivity (high/low). There were two dependent variables
run as a separate models, positive hits across all three choice exercises; and negative hits across
all three choice exercises. For the positive hits dependent variable, there were no significant
direct or interaction effects. For negative hits, there were no significant direct effects, but the
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interaction effect was significant in the hypothesized direction. An overview of the six
hypotheses and the result of the tests for each hypothesis in Study 2 are shown in Table 27.

Table 27. Summary of Study 2 Hypothesis Tests
Hypothesis

Hypothesis Test Result

H4a: Prevention  Positive Hits

not significant

H4b: Prevention  Negative Hits

not significant

H5a: High Reflexivity  Positive Hits

not significant

H5b: High Reflexivity  Negative Hits

not significant

H6a: Prevention x High Reflexivity  Positive Hits

not significant

H6b: Prevention x High Reflexivity  Negative Hits

supported at p < .05 level

Study 3
Study 3 was a video ethnography in which video footage from a firm’s discussion of 186
new product concepts was coded and analyzed in a statistical model. The firm, Quirky, makes
and sells products invented by consumers, and broadcasts a weekly “Live Eval”1 meeting to
review the products that are trending popular with the online innovation community. The video
discussion for each product was transcribed, including comments by all of the speakers for each
product, and the content was coded for regulatory focus and reflexivity. The firm’s “yes” or “no”
decisions about each product were compared against a consumer panel’s rating for each product
to determine the success of each product decision. Each product was shown to 50 potential
consumers on M-Turk, each of whom rated the product on a 3-item, 7-point willingness to
consider purchase measure developed by Berens et al. (2005). The products were then assigned a

1

The Live Eval is conducted every Thursday evening and is broadcast live online at https://www.quirky.com/live.
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percentile rank based on the consumer ratings for all of the products in the study. When the firm
chose to develop products ranked in the 51st percentile or higher, the product decision was coded
as a positive hit, and when the company rejected products ranked in the 49th percentile or lower,
the product decision was coded as a negative hit. The data was analyzed using logistic
regression, with hits and misses used as dependent variables in separate models.

Coding Approach
The researcher viewed approximately 27 hours of product evaluation meeting video
footage, in which 186 products were discussed. The video footage was then transcribed line-byline and coded for reflexivity and regulatory focus, resulting in 4,471 coded statements from the
evaluation discussions. Although this study uses a quantitative content analysis approach, the
coding process used in grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 2009; Strauss & Corbin, 1990) was
utilized to generate the codes used in the statistical analysis. The researcher first used a sample of
30 product transcripts to create a common set of codes through an open coding process (Strauss
& Corbin, 1990). The codes were then refined as the researcher went through each subsequent
transcript and the coding categories were merged and or updated to accurately reflect the content
of the discussion. For example, a statement such as “I think people would buy this product,” and
a comment by the sales director that he or she could “sell this product” were originally
categorized using two different codes during the open coding process, but ultimately merged into
a code called Sellable in the subsequent refinement of the codes and selective coding process.

Reflexivity Coding
Reflexivity was coded as a ratio of the total number of topics discussed to the number of
unique topics discussed for any given product. The open coding process described above was
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used to determine the unique topics that were discussed through an open and selective coding
process (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). For example, if three individuals commented on the technical
feasibility of an idea and one individual commented on how much the same idea would appeal to
customers, that would count as 4 total topics discussed, but only 2 unique topics discussed; a
ratio of 4/2. This coding process resulted in a total of 40 coding categories, shown in Table 28.

Regulatory Focus Coding
Each of the 40 comment coding categories was sorted into one of three groups:
prevention-focused, promotion-focused, or neutral, according to the conceptual definitions of the
two regulatory focus types in past research (Florack & Hartmann, 2007; Kark & Van Dijk, 2007;
Levine et al., 2000). Comment categories related to avoiding risk and financial losses were
labeled prevention-focused, and comment categories related to pursuing innovation success were
labeled promotion-focused. Comment categories which did not clearly fit with a prevention- or
promotion-focus were labeled as neutral. The regulatory focus variable was created by
calculating the ratio of promotion to prevention-focused comments. For each product discussion,
values above 1 indicate a more promotion-focused discussion, while values below 1 are
indicative of a prevention-focused discussion. The codes labeled as prevention and promotion
are shown in Table 29.
To determine whether or not the regulatory focus of each product discussion was directly
correlated with the firm’s development decision for that product, a t-test was conducted with
development decision as a categorical predictor and regulatory focus as the continuous
dependent variable. Based on this analysis, there is no significant relationship between regulatory
focus and the firm’s development decision (t(184) = -.592, p = .56).
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Coding Reliability Assessment
To assess the reliability of the codes, the Weber protocol (Duriau, Reger, & Pfarrer,
2007; Weber, 1990) was followed using an independent rater, blind to the research questions and
purpose of the study.
First, the independent rater was familiarized with the coding units and categories and was
given a set of 118 of the coded segments to code in order to learn the coding heuristic and the
code book. In this practice sample, multiple segments for all of the codes were represented.
Second, this sample of 118 coded segments was checked for agreement with the coding of the
principal researcher. The initial sample of coded segments produced an agreement of 85%.
The 15% of cases in which there was a discrepancy were then discussed, and the coding
heuristic was refined so that both raters agreed on the coding of the sample segments. Third, the
independent rater was given a much larger sample of 300 coded segments, again representing
multiple instances of every code used in the study, and asked to code them based on the training
provided and the previous round of sample coding. Reliability was measured using a simple
percent agreement calculation for the subset of coded segments. For this larger subset of coded
segments, the independent rater and the principal researcher agreed 89% of the time, using a
percent agreement method, which is well within the acceptable guidelines suggested by
Krippendorff (2012).
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Table 28. Study 3 Reflexivity Coding Categories and Examples
Reflexivity Code

Description

Code %

Representative Quote

Aesthetics

Comment regarding the
aesthetics/appearance of a product

2.9%

“I think this is a beautiful, sophisticated coffee table
version.”

Channels

Comment about potential retail channel
partners through which a product might
be sold

0.8%

“I can see this at Michaels; I can see this at Target.”

Community
Opinion

Reference to the opinion of the online
community in real time during the
evaluation discussions

11.6%

“58% of the community likes it. That is a lot.”

Complexity

Comment about the complexity and or
“over-engineering” of a product

6.3%

“First, I think this thing just has too many features.”

Cost/Expense

Comment about the cost to make a
product

4.7%

“I think it would be very costly to make it if you
want all these different lenses and you want it to be
of quality. I think it would be expensive.”

Inventor
Credibility

An appeal to the credibility/experience of
the inventor in advocating for a product.

1.3%

“We know Mark is like an 85-time inventor. He
invented such wonderful things like Bandits and
Split Sticks, and some of our most successful
products, so he knows what he is doing.”
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Table 28. Continued.
Reflexivity Code

Description

Code %

Representative Quote

Danger/Safety
Issues

Comment regarding whether or not a
product could injure consumers during
use

1.3%

“I agree, it doesn’t look very child safe.”

Development
Imperative

Comment arguing that a product must be
developed by the firm

1.0%

“We should totally do this, and if you don’t, you
hate Quirky.”

Enhances Existing
Products

Comment about how a product might
enhance an existing product

0.6%

“This would be a great product to go with other nail
polishes, as well.”

Existing Product
Analogy

Making an analogy to an existing product
to describe the product being reviewed

2.7%

“It’s like a K-Cup for a French Press [coffee
maker].”

Expert Opinion

Soliciting or appealing to the opinion of a
subject matter expert on the product under
discussion

2.7%

“Allen is on the manufacturing quality team at
General Electric.”

Suggestion that a product concept needs
further exploration before making a
commitment.

1.3%

“I think that we could explore this idea, figure out
the validity of it and how it would work.”

Explore Further
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Table 28. Continued.
Reflexivity Code

Description

Code %

Representative Quote

Firm Capability

Comment about whether or not a product
fits the focal firm’s capabilities and/or
product development strategy

0.2%

“Quirky doesn’t make medical supplies.”

Functionality

Comment about how a product would
function (or not function) properly

9.2%

“I would never put it in my car because I don't care
how strong the magnet is, it will fly off at some
point.”

Future Project

Comment that the product idea might be
viable in the future, but not now

0.3%

“I think we’re not there yet, because most of our
phones wouldn’t work with it, but it’s something for
the future.”

Innovative

Comment about the
innovativeness/creativity of a product

6.9%

“I think like the battery thing [solved by this
product] is like the last frontier in electronics. The
first person who helps solves that, that's like the next
big gold rush in this category.”

Interesting/Fun

Comment about whether a product
generates interest or excitement

3.9%

“Even people who are not into yoga seem to love it.”

Inventor Effort

Comment about the amount of effort and
preparation the inventor put into the
development of a product, regardless of
the merit of the product idea

0.8%

“I appreciate the amount of thought that has
obviously gone into this submission.”
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Table 28. Continued.
Reflexivity Code

Description

Code %

Representative Quote

Legal/Ethical
Issues

Comment regarding whether or not a
product is legal to sell (non-IP related)

0.6%

“I’m just saying, we’ve got Department of
Transportation regulations to think about probably.”

Market Trend

Reference to market trends related to the
product being evaluated

2.1%

“In the last decade, the pet industry has grown so
much.”

Meaningful

Comment about the likelihood consumers
would want and/or use a product; whether
or not a product solves a “real” customer
problem

42.2%

“A lot of people are identifying with this problem.
Its gross, it's something they don't want to do, this
seems like a great solution.”

3.7%

“Perfect for backpacking, for camping, for fishing, a
variety of different activities.”

Multiple Uses

Comment about multiple potential uses
for the product being evaluated

Negative
Feedback Seeking

Soliciting negative feedback from the
group

0.6%

“Does anyone dislike this? Do you want to talk
about why you dislike this?”

Novelty

Comment about the existence (or lack
thereof) of the same or similar products

5.5%

“It’s just not different enough. There are too many
similar products on the market.”

Other Firm
Interest

Comment about a product having
development interest from other
companies

0.01%

“The inventor already has some retail interest in this
product”
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Table 28. Continued.
Reflexivity Code

Description

Code %

Representative Quote

Partner

Comment that a strategic partnership with
another firm would be needed to develop
the product idea under review

0.1%

“It will be important for Quirky to find a partner in
the toy space.”

Patent/IP Issues

Comment regarding whether or not a
product is already patented or could be
patentable

0.3%

“This is a pretty cool technology but it's really
protected, it's a pretty heavily protected space. We're
going to hit some patent problems in the future.”

Positive Feedback
Seeking

The CEO/moderator soliciting positive
comments from the group

0.5%

“I want to hear from someone who actually really
loves this and thinks they need it tomorrow.

Product Extension

Comment about how well a product fits
into an existing line of products sold by
the firm

1.9%

“Yeah, I like the idea because it's an extension of
something that we had out already. I think that's
great to keep a family of products.”

Product Growth
Potential

Comment about the growth potential of a
product

0.2%

“This product would be a great entry into Asia and
places like that for us.”

Prototype

Comment about whether or not the
inventor has a working prototype

2.4%

“[The inventor] has a working prototype that he built
himself, so I definitely think it’s something we
should be looking at.”

7.1%

“I don't how many of these we are going to sell, it’s
kind of a limited market.”

Sellable

Comment about whether or not a product
would sell well
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Table 28. Continued.
Reflexivity Code

Substitutes

Description

Comment about substitutes that
consumers might use in lieu of the
product

Suggested
Alternative

Suggesting a completely different product
to solve the same problem as the product
being reviewed

Suggested
Enhancement

Comment in which the speaker suggests
an enhancement to the product being
reviewed

Superior to
Alternatives

Code %

Representative Quote

8.9%

“You could use a rack a on a baking sheet and
get the same thing.”

1.1%

“I think this should be an app not a hardware
device.”

7.9%

“If you can have some sort of handle on this…so it
is not extremely hot when you take it out [of the
oven] to make it easier to handle this thing, that'd be
really cool, and more usable.”

Comment arguing why the product being
reviewed is superior to alternative
products

4.2%

“The other brilliant thing about this is the way that it
pivots in way that a Swiffer does not, so you can
really clean the surface area.”

Target Market

Comment about a specific target market
for the product.

3.7%

“I can see this being a real premium product for
people who travel a lot.”

Technical
Feasibility

Comment about a product’s technical
feasibility

8.4%

“I think the technology is here for this product, there
are some inline semiconductor current meters that
are the size of a button that will do the measuring on
this thing here, and can clipped on.”
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Table 28. Continued.
Reflexivity Code

Description

Code %

Representative Quote

Unclear

Speaker having a hard time understanding
and/or conceptualizing what the product
function is

1.0%

“I'm really confused, can anyone like clearly
articulate what this invention is.”

0.2%

“I love it. I think people would talk about it online
from a digital marketing perspective”

Word of
Mouth/Buzz

Comment about the speculated “buzz”
that could be generated by a product
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Table 29. Regulatory Focus Coding
Regulatory Focus Codes

Codes

Coding Percentage

Prevention-Focused
Comments

Community Opinion
Complexity
Cost/Expense
Danger/Safety Issues
Existing Product Analogy
Expert Opinion
Functionality
Inventor Credibility
Legal/Ethical Issues
Negative Feedback Seeking
Other Firm Interest
Patent/IP Issues
Prototype
Sellable
Substitutes
Suggested Alternative
Target Market
Technical Feasibility
Unclear

45.2%

Promotion-Focused
Comments

Aesthetics
Development Imperative
Enhances Existing Products
Innovative
Interesting/Fun
Inventor Effort
Market Trend
Meaningful
Multiple Uses
Novelty
Positive Feedback Seeking
Product Extension
Product Growth Potential
Suggested Enhancement
Superior to Alternatives
Word of Mouth/Buzz

54.8%
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To analyze the video for regulatory focus, the principal researcher conducted a card
sorting exercise, using sample comments for each of the discussion topic codes used for the
reflexivity measure and sorting them into one of three categories: prevention, promotion, or
neither. The principal researcher then had a second rater do the same sorting exercise using
sample comments for each code and sorting them into the same three categories. The two raters
discussed the few areas of disagreement they had about how each code should be categorized,
and adjusted how codes were assigned to the three categories until they reached a 100%
agreement (Antia, Zheng, & Frazier, 2013; Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011).

Constructing the Dependent Variables: Positive and Negative Hits
To construct the dependent variable, all 186 products were grouped into 10 general
product categories, adapted from the categories assigned each product by Quirky: electronics,
garage/shop tools, health and wellness, home and garden, kitchen/cooking, toys, pet accessories,
home safety, travel and leisure, and women and baby. A sample of 1,860 M-Turk users was then
recruited to rate the products in each category on a willingness to purchase scale (Berens et al.,
2005), such that each product received approximately 50 ratings. Subjects were randomly shown
five of the products from the categories they selected and were asked to rate them. Participants
were paid $0.75 for their participation, and the exercise took about 10 minutes to complete.
Prior to rating the products on a willingness to purchase scale, respondents were informed
that in order to qualify for the survey, they needed to have at least moderate product knowledge
of the category for which they were evaluating products. Further, an initial screening question for
product category knowledge, on a 1-5 scale, was given. Respondents who indicated their
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knowledge to be moderate or above for any given category (3, 4, or 5) were allowed to complete
the survey, while those who had a low knowledge of any given category (1 or 2) were not
allowed to complete the survey due to a lack of product category knowledge and asked to choose
another category for which they had more knowledge. Across all 10 product categories, this
filtering process excluded 16 total participants due to low category knowledge. The product
categories and number of respondents for each category are shown in Table 30.
The products were randomly and evenly displayed so that each product received ratings
from approximately 50 different potential consumers who had at least a moderate knowledge of
each product’s respective product category. An attention filter was included to ensure that the
questions were being carefully read and understood, and respondents who incorrectly answered
the attention filter were excluded from the analysis. A total of 3 responses were dropped due to
failing to answer the reading filter correctly. At the end of the survey, respondents answered a
few short demographic questions, then were thanked for their participation.
The willingness to consider purchase scale consisted of 3 items, which were averaged
together across all respondents for each product to create a composite willingness to consider
purchase score. To construct the binomial dependent variable, the willingness to consider
purchase ratings were sorted from highest to lowest. If, based on the group discussions captured
in the videos, the firm chose to develop a product that ranked in the 51st percentile or higher of
the willingness to purchase scores, it was coded as a positive hit (1). If the firm chose to reject a
project that was ranked in the 49th percentile or lower, it was coded as a negative hit (1).
Products that were neither a positive nor a negative hit (i.e., ranked highly but rejected by the
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firm or ranked low but accepted by the firm) were coded as 0. This categorical variable was then
used as the dependent variable in a binomial logistic regression model.

Table 30. Categories and Responses for Willingness to Purchase Variable
Product Category

Products

Respondents

Consumer Electronics Products
Garage/Shop Products
Health and Wellness Products
Home and Garden Products
Kitchen/Cooking Products
Toys and Novelty Products
Pet Accessories
Home Safety Products
Travel and Leisure Products
Women and Baby Products

36
21
7
9
40
26
8
15
17
7

360
210
70
90
400
260
80
150
170
70

186

1860

Totals

Inventor Expertise
Inventor expertise was measured as the number of online followers in the innovation
community the inventor of each product had at the time that his or her product was discussed in
the Quirky product evaluation. On the Quirky website, users with an account can subscribe to the
news feeds of other inventors, receiving updates about new submissions, the status of existing
submissions, development progress of accepted product ideas, etc. Inventors with a high
following are considered experts because they have developed product ideas which have
attracted the attention and support of other consumers in the innovation community, or have
ideas that the community feels have the most potential to be successful.
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The information about the inventor’s community connection for each product was
available on Quirky’s website, and included with information about the inventor on each product
idea submission webpage. To ensure the information was accurate for the exact date that each
product was reviewed, this data was pulled from the screenshot shown in each video clip, so the
inventor follower totals were accurate for the exact day and time of each product evaluation.

Control Variables
Several control variables were used: the total time each product was discussed, the order
in which the product was evaluated, product type (hedonic or utilitarian), and the connection that
each inventor had to other inventors in the Quirky community. Time was included to account for
the fact that more discussion could occur the longer a conversation went on, and was measured
as the duration, in seconds, of each product discussion. The video footage consisted of 27
approximately hour-long meetings in which 5-12 products were evaluated in a single sitting.
Evaluation order was included to account for any fatigue factor the group might experience after
discussion of several products. Indeed, there was a small, but significant negative correlation
between discussion order and time, a potential indication that the group was less inclined to
deeply discuss a product the longer the meeting went. For this reason, the evaluation order was
included. Bayus (2013) found that members of online customer innovation communities who
actively contributed to other inventors’ ideas (e.g., suggestions for improvement, constructive
feedback, etc.) had a higher likelihood of submitting high-quality ideas themselves. To account
for this possibility, the number of other community members’ ideas each product’s inventor had
contributed to at the time of evaluation was collected from the web screen shot in each video.
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Finally, researchers have found that hedonic, experience-based products are typically
harder for consumers to objectively evaluate than utilitarian products (Huang et al., 2009). For
this reason, a categorical measure of product type was used as a control. Five independent raters
were used to assess whether products were hedonic or utilitarian, using the 3-item, 7-point
semantic differential scale developed by (Berens, Riel, and Bruggen, 2005). The Rwg formula
was used to calculate agreement among the five raters. Since the raters showed less than
moderate agreement on 38 of the 186 products, aggregating the responses by averaging them into
a continuous variable was not justified. Instead, the responses were averaged and the median
split was used to create a categorical variable of the product type (1 = hedonic, 0 = utilitarian).

Descriptive Statistics
The correlations, means, and standard deviations for the continuous variables in the
model are shown in Table 31. The product discussions had a mean duration (Time) of 357.87
seconds, with a mean reflexivity level (Reflex) of 2.16, and a mean regulatory focus (RegFocus)
level of 2.17. The products themselves had a mean willingness to purchase (W2P) score of 4.35
on a 7-point scale.
Since all of these products were prescreened before being presented to the firm at an
evaluation meeting, the fact that the mean score is above the midpoint of the scale range is not
surprising. On average, the inventors of the products had participated in developing 148.90 ideas
from other inventors (CommtyPart).
The descriptive percentages for the categorical variables used in Study 3 are shown in
Table 32. The firm accepted 84 of the 186 products reviewed (45.2%). In total, the firm made the
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correct development decision based on consumer willingness to purchase ratings 51.3% of the
time. The firm accepted products they should have accepted 46.7% of the time and rejected
products they should have rejected 58.2% of the time. Of the products that were reviewed, 30.1%
of them were categorized as hedonic using the hedonic utilitarian ratings of the five independent
consumer judges.

Table 31. Correlation of Continuous Variables in Study 3
(Means on the Diagonal)

Order
Time
CommtyPart
Reflex
RegFocus
W2P

Order
(5.01)
-.238**
-.063
-.091
.085
-.072

Time

CommtyPart

Reflex

RegFocus

W2P

(357.87)
.116
.240**
-.151*
-.159*

(149.316)
.050
-.058
.017

(2.16)
.163*
.079

(2.17)
.218**

(4.35)

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 32. Description of Study 3 Categorical Variables
Variable

Descriptives

Product Type (Hedonic)
Development Decision (Yes)
Positive Hits (Accepted 51st percentile and above)
Negative Hits (Rejected 49th percentile and below)
Total Correct Decisions (Positive and Negative Hits)

56/186 (30.1%)
84/186 (45.2%)
43/92 (46.7%)
53/91 (58.2%)
96/186 (51.3%)
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Analysis
Since the dependent variables of interest were binomial (positive hit/miss or negative
hit/miss), binary logistic regression was used to analyze the data. A concern in logistic
regression, particularly with small samples, is that the model can over-fit to the data, but be
significantly less accurate when applied to a new random sample from the population. To help
safeguard against this over-fitting problem, a training sample of 80% of the total observations
was used to create a logistic regression function that was applied to the remaining 20% holdout
sample. If the correct classification percentage of the holdout sample is less than approximately
10% lower than the training sample, the model was deemed stable. If the model was deemed
stable, the data was run again using the entire sample, the results of which were used to report
beta coefficients and significance levels.

Study 3 Results
Hypothesis 4a, Hypothesis 5a, and Hypothesis 6a from Study 2 were tested in a field
context in Study 3. The model used to test these three hypotheses is shown in Table 33. Positive
Hits is the dependent variable which was used. The model includes group regulatory focus,
group reflexivity, product type, inventor expertise, and the inventor’s level of community
connection as independent variables and regulatory focus by reflexivity as an interaction effect.
Control variables include the total time of discussion and the order in which each product
was reviewed compared to other products evaluated in the same evaluation meeting. The model
was run using a training sample (80%) and a holdout sample (20%). For this model, the training
sample had a 78.1% classification accuracy and the holdout sample had a 74.3% classification
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accuracy, indicating that the model was not over-fitting to the data. The model was then run
using the entire sample, which had a classification accuracy of 78%. The Hosmer and Lemeshow
Goodness-of-Fit test for logistic regression equations was not significant (χ2 = 14.459, p = .071),
indicating that the model had acceptable fit (Hosmer Jr, Lemeshow, & Sturdivant, 2013).

Table 33. Logistic Regression Model for H4a, H5a, and H6a - Positive Hits
Model Term
Constant
Main Effects

Coefficient
-4.503**

Group Regulatory Focus
Group Reflexivity
Inventor Expertise

2.744*
1.767*
.001

Interaction Term
Regulatory Focus * Reflexivity

-1.223*

Controls
Discussion Time
Evaluation Order
Product Type
Inventor Community Connection
-2 Log likelihood
Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit (d.f. = 8)
Nagelkerke R2
Classification Percentage
*p<.05
**p<.01

-.003
-.037
.270
-.002
186.702
14.459
.123
78%

H4a states that prevention-oriented teams will have more positive hits than promotion
oriented teams. The result was significant but in the opposite direction (β = 2.74, p <.05). Being
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promotion-oriented during the firm’s development discussions was positively associated with the
likelihood of achieving a positive hit, or accepting a product that was rated by consumers in the
51st percentile or higher on the willingness to purchase measure. As such, Hypothesis 4a is not
supported.
H5a states that highly reflexive teams will have more positive hits than team with low
levels of reflexivity. The result was positive and significant in the hypothesized direction (β =
1.77, p <.05). Being more reflexive during the firm’s development discussions was positively
associated with the likelihood of achieving a positive hit, or accepting a product that was rated
by consumers in the 51st percentile or higher on the willingness to purchase measure. Based on
this result, Hypothesis 5a is supported.
H6a states that reflexivity will have a more positive effect on prevention-oriented teams
than on promotion-oriented teams with respect to positive hit rates. The result of the interaction
was negative and significant (β = -1.22, p <.05). When reflexivity is low, promotion-oriented
teams have a higher probability of making a positive hit decision than prevention-oriented teams.
However, when reflexivity is high, prevention-oriented teams have a higher probability of
making a positive hit decision. As such, Hypothesis 6a is supported. The graph of the interaction
is shown in Figure 8.
Hypothesis 4b, Hypothesis 5b, and Hypothesis 6b from Study 2 were also tested in a field
setting in Study 3. Negative Hits is the dependent variable in this model. The model (shown in
Table 34) includes group regulatory focus, group reflexivity, product type, inventor expertise,
and the inventor’s level of community connection as independent variables, and the interaction
between regulatory and reflexivity. Control variables include the time of discussion and the order
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in which each product was reviewed compared to other products evaluated in the same meeting.
The training sample correct classification rate was 74.8% and the holdout sample rate was 60%,
indicating the logistic regression equation likely over-fit to the training sample. The correct
classification rate of the entire sample was 72.6%.

Figure 8. Interaction between Regulatory Focus and Reflexivity

H4b states that prevention-oriented teams will have more negative hits than promotion
oriented teams. The result was not significant (β = -.715, p = .368), indicating Hypothesis 4b is
not supported. H5b states that highly reflexive teams will have more negative hits than teams
with low levels of reflexivity. The result was not significant (β = -.282, p = .630). Based on this
finding, Hypothesis 5b is not supported. H6b states that reflexivity will have a more positive
effect on prevention-oriented teams than on promotion-oriented teams with respect to negative
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hits. The result of the interaction was not significant (β = .340, p = .296). Given this finding,
Hypothesis 6b is also not supported.

Table 34. Logistic Regression Model for H4a, H5a, and H6a - Negative Hits
Model Term
Constant
Main Effects

Coefficient*
-.942

Group Regulatory Focus
Group Reflexivity
Inventor Expertise

-.715
-.282
.000

Interaction Term
Regulatory Focus * Reflexivity

.340

Controls
Discussion Time
Evaluation Order
Product Type
Inventor Community Connection
-2 Log likelihood
Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit (d.f. = 8)
Nagelkerke R2
Classification Percentage

.001
.068
-.242
.000
217.956
7.695
.033
72.6%

*None of the coefficients in this Negative Hits model were significant

Inventor Expertise Interactions
Hypothesis 7a and Hypothesis 8a test the interaction between regulatory focus and
product inventor expertise, as well as reflexivity and inventor expertise, respectively. In this
model, positive hit rate was used as the dependent variable. As with the previous tests, a training
and holdout sample was used. The holdout sample classification rate was 80.0% and the training
sample classification rate was 77.5%, indicating there were no issues with the data over-fitting to
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the training sample. The classification rate of the entire sample was 78.0%. The Hosmer and
Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit test was not significant, indicating the model had acceptable fit
(Hosmer Jr et al., 2013). The model used to test H7a and H8a is shown in Table 35.

Table 35. Logistic Regression Model for H7a and H8a – Positive Hits
Model Term

Coefficient
-2.456†

Group Regulatory Focus
Group Reflexivity
Inventor Expertise
Interaction Terms
Regulatory Focus * Inventor Expertise
Reflexivity * Inventor Expertise

.739*
.325
.002*

Constant
Main Effects

-.001*
.000

Controls
Discussion Time
Evaluation Order
Product Type
Inventor Community Connection
-2 Log likelihood
Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit (d.f. = 8)
Nagelkerke R2
Classification Percentage
†
p<.01
*p<.05

-.003
-.011
.307
-.001
187.808
2.823
.105
78.0%

H7a states that inventor expertise positively moderates the relationship between a
prevention orientation and inventor expertise. The term was significant in the predicted direction
(β = -.001, p < .05). When regulatory focus tended toward prevention and inventor expertise was
high, the group’s decisions were more accurate. The opposite was also true. When regulatory
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focus tended toward promotion and inventor expertise was high, the firm’s decisions were less
accurate. A graph of the interaction effect is shown in Figure 9.

Figure 9. Regulatory Focus x Inventor Expertise Interaction for Positive Hits

H8a predicts that inventor expertise will positively moderate the relationship between
group reflexivity and positive hits. In the model, the interaction between reflexivity and inventor
expertise is not significant (β = .000, p = .64). As a result, H8a is not supported.
Hypothesis 7b and Hypothesis 8b, respectively, test the interaction between regulatory
focus and product inventor expertise, as well as reflexivity and inventor expertise. In this model,
negative hits is the dependent variable. As with the previous tests, a training and holdout sample
was used, and the holdout sample (57.1% classification accuracy) showed a deviation from the
training sample (74.8%) of greater than 10%, indicating that the model was likely over-fit to the
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training sample. Using the entire sample showed a correct classification rate of 71.5%. The
Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit test was not significant, indicating the model had
acceptable fit. The model used to test H7b and H8b is shown in Table 36.

Table 36. Logistic Regression Model for H7a and H8a – Negative Hits
Model Term
Constant
Main Effects

Coefficient
-2.193†

Group Regulatory Focus
Group Reflexivity
Inventor Expertise

.107
.277
.000

Interaction Terms
Regulatory Focus * Inventor Expertise
Reflexivity * Inventor Expertise

.000
.000

Controls
Discussion Time
Evaluation Order
Product Type
Inventor Community Connection
-2 Log likelihood
Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit (d.f. = 8)
Nagelkerke R2
Classification Percentage
†
p<.10

.001
.061
-.257
.000
219.034
10.706
.025
71.5%

H7b which predicts a positive interaction between a prevention focus and inventor
expertise on negative hits was not supported (β = .00, p = .97). H8b which predicts a positive
interaction between reflexivity and inventor expertise was also not supported (β = .00, p = .86).
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Study 3 Summary
In Study 3, both the direct and interaction effects of group regulatory focus were tested,
as well as the interaction effects between regulatory focus and inventor expertise and reflexivity
and inventor expertise. Three of the 10 hypotheses (H5a, H6a, and H7a) were supported. One
hypothesis test (H4a) was not supported, but was significant in the opposite direction. A
summary of the hypothesis tests and results is shown in Table 37.

Table 37. Summary of Study 3 Hypothesis Tests
Hypothesis
H4a: Prevention Positive Hits

Results
opposite direction

H4b: Prevention  Negative Hits

not supported

H5a: Reflexivity  Positive Hits

supported

H5b: Reflexivity  Negative Hits

not supported

H6a: Prevention x Reflexivity  Positive Hits

supported

H6b: Prevention x Reflexivity  Negative Hits

not supported

H7a: Regulatory Focus x Inventor Expertise  Positive Hits

supported

H7b: Regulatory Focus x Inventor Expertise  Negative Hits

not supported

H8a: Reflexivity x Inventor Expertise  Positive Hits

not supported

H8b: Reflexivity x Inventor Expertise  Negative Hits

not supported

Summary of Results across Study 1, Study 2, and Study 3
In Study 1, the results showed that a group prevention focus was positively associated
with how accurate teams were in assessing both the feasibility and meaningfulness of a cocreated new product concept. The study also showed a significant interaction between group
regulatory focus and group reflexivity for co-created new product concept meaningfulness.
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In Study 2, there were no significant results for the model using either positive hits or
negative hits as a dependent variable. Several reasons as to why Study 2 failed to yield
significant results are addressed in the discussion in the next chapter. When reflexivity was high,
prevention-focused groups were more accurate in their assessment of meaningfulness.
Conversely, when group reflexivity was low, promotion-focused groups were more accurate in
their assessment of meaningfulness.
In Study 3, the results showed that a promotion focus and high reflexivity were positively
related to the probability of positive hits, or correctly accepting products which were highly rated
by consumers on a willingness to purchase measure. The results also showed a significant
interaction between regulatory focus and reflexivity. When reflexivity was high, a preventionoriented focus was associated with a higher probability of positive hits. When reflexivity was
low, a promotion focus was associated with a higher probability of positive hits.
Past research has shown that, out of the three dimensions of innovativeness examined in
Study 1, meaningfulness has the highest correlation with new product success (Szymanski,
Kroff, and Troy, 2007). Although the results across the three studies were largely nonsignificant, the primary point of convergence is in the significant interaction between regulatory
focus and reflexivity and its influence on assessment of products with the most potential,
meaningfulness in Study 1 and positive hits in Study 3. The supported hypotheses for each of the
three studies are shown in Table 38.
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Table 38. Summary of Hypothesis Tests across Studies 1, 2, and 3
Hypothesis

Study 1

Study 2

Study 3

not sig.
marginal
support
supported

.

.

.

.

.

.

H2a: High Reflexivity  Novelty

not sig.

.

.

H2b: High Reflexivity  Meaningfulness

not sig.

.

.

H2c: High Reflexivity  Feasibility

not sig.

.

.

H3a: Prevention x High Reflexivity  Novelty

not sig.

.

.

supported

.

.

not sig.

.

.

H4a: Prevention Positive Hits

.

not sig.

opp.dir.

H4b: Prevention  Negative Hits

.

not sig.

not sig.

H5a: Reflexivity  Positive Hits

.

not sig.

supported

H5b: Reflexivity  Negative Hits

.

not sig.

not sig.

H6a: Prevention x Reflexivity  Positive Hits

.

not sig.

supported

H6b: Prevention x Reflexivity  Negative Hits

.

supported

opp.dir.

H7a: Prevention x Inventor Expertise  Positive Hits

.

.

supported

H7b: Prevention x Inventor Expertise  Negative Hits

.

.

not sig.

H8a: Reflexivity x Inventor Expertise  Positive Hits

.

.

not sig.

H8b: Reflexivity x Inventor Expertise  Negative Hits

.

.

not sig.

H1a: Promotion  Novelty
H1b: Prevention  Meaningfulness
H1c: Prevention  Feasibility

H3b: Prevention x High Reflexivity  Meaningfulness
H3c: Prevention x High Reflexivity  Feasibility
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Chapter 4 Conclusion
In this chapter, the methodology, applicable pretests, and main results were presented for
Study 1, Study 2, and Study 3. Studies 1 and 2 were experiments, while Study 3 was a video
ethnography in which content from a firm’s evaluation and selection meetings were analyzed.
The details of each study were described, as well as a summary of findings across the three
studies. In the next chapter, these findings are discussed in depth, including implications for both
theory and practice, as well as limitations and future research directions.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION

This dissertation began by presenting for consideration research questions which asked
how group regulatory focus and group reflexivity operate, individually and in interaction with
each other, to influence the quality of co-created new product evaluation and selection decisions.
These research questions were addressed over the course of three studies, for which the
conceptual model is shown in Figure 10. Study 1 was a lab experiment that investigated the
influence of regulatory focus and reflexivity on group assessments of the novelty,
meaningfulness, and feasibility of co-created new product ideas. Study 2 was a second
experiment conducted in the lab that looked at how regulatory focus and reflexivity influence
teams’ ability to accurately identify the market potential of co-created product ideas. Study 3
investigated these same constructs in a field setting to determine how regulatory focus and
reflexivity influenced professional product development teams’ judgements of co-created new
product concepts. In this chapter, the findings from these three studies are discussed, including
insights from each study, implications for theory, implications for managers, limitations, and
future research directions.

Regulatory Focus and Reflexivity in Evaluating Co-created New Product Concepts
The main effects investigated in these three studies were group regulatory focus
(prevention/promotion) and reflexivity (high/low). Group regulatory focus (Baron, 2004;
Brockner et al., 2004; Florack & Hartmann, 2007) describes how teams are motivated in their
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decision-making – either by avoiding punishment and negative consequences (prevention focus)
or pursuing achievement and success (promotion focus). Reflexivity describes the degree to
which teams reflect on their shared knowledge and the decision-making process they use to
identify market opportunities (West, 1996).

Figure 10. Conceptual Model for Studies 1, 2, and 3

Main Effects of Regulatory Focus: Overview and Insights
All three studies examined the main effects of regulatory focus on decision making in a
co-creation of innovation context. The decision context in Study 1 involved rating a series of
product concepts in the lab, such that all of the co-created product concepts were rated
independently of one another. All of the teams were primed for either a prevention focus or a
promotion focus. In Study 2, the context was lab-based, and involved rating the perceived best-
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seller and the perceived worst-seller from several sets of three product ideas. As was done in
Study 1, all of the teams were primed for either a prevention or a promotion focus. Study 3 was
conducted in the context of real co-creation decisions by working professionals, and discussants
evaluated and voted on each product idea independently of the other ideas that they saw. They
could have potentially chosen to adopt all or none of the 186 products rather than rating them in
comparison to one another as in Study 2. Since regulatory focus could not be manipulated in this
context, it was measured as a continuous variable, as described in the previous chapters.

Study 1
In Study 1, the results showed a significant main effect of regulatory focus on the
meaningfulness and the feasibility of co-created new product concepts. Specifically, groups in
the prevention condition were more accurate in their assessments of both of these dimensions of
new product innovativeness. The study did not show, however, any significant effect of
regulatory focus on co-created new product novelty.
The explanatory power of the Novelty model in Study 1 was modest (R2 = .08), so the
results should be interpreted with caution. However, there are several potential insights which
emerge from Study 1. First, the lack of relationship between regulatory focus and accurate
assessment of novelty may be due to the fact that that accurately evaluating novelty is simply a
function of product category expertise. The more knowledge that a team has about a particular
product category, the more the team may be able to make accurate judgements about how novel
products in that category are. There is empirical evidence for this assertion in the findings for
Study 1, since product category knowledge was a significant covariate, (F(1,151) = .38, p = .01,

163
η2 = .05), in the model predicting the teams’ accuracy of co-created new product novelty.
Novelty, in effect, is always relative to other products, and without at least a moderate
understanding of a product category novelty, is a difficult dimension to judge accurately.
Following the hypothesized direction, a prevention focus was associated with greater
accuracy in assessing co-created new product meaningfulness and co-created new product
feasibility. For the feasibility dimension, the explanatory power of the model was modest (R2 =
.05), so inferences about this dimension should be made with caution. In assessing these
dimensions, a promotion orientation may operate on a more abstract level of construal (White,
MacDonnell, & Dahl, 2011; Ziamou & Veryzer, 2005), which can be a double-edged sword. On
one hand, it would allow evaluators in a promotion-focused team to visualize the technical
feasibility and customer need fulfillment potential of a new product idea, even when the idea is
not clearly-articulated. On the other hand, it may cause teams to underestimate the risks involved
in a given product idea by being less attentive to the specific details of how a product would need
to be designed, and how well it would fulfill customer needs. This finding fits with how a
promotion focus has been conceptualized at the group level in regulatory focus theory.
Promotion-focused groups tend to underestimate the actual amount of risk involved in any given
decision, while prevention-focused groups are more aware of inherent risks (Brockner et al.,
2004).

Study 2
In Study 2, the main effects of both reflexivity and regulatory focus were not significant.
Although there were several main effects found in Studies 1 and 3, Study 2, seemed to yield little
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in the way of insight due to non-significant results (only one significant interaction was found).
These non-findings could be due to several possible reasons. First, the product set categories
used in Study 2 may simply not have been products with which the sample of undergraduate
student teams were highly familiar. For example, looking at the product category knowledge
scores shows phone accessories had the highest mean level of self-reported product category
knowledge (Mphone = 4.11 vs. Mkitchen = 3.81 vs. Mcord = 2.93). In looking at positive and negative
hits for the only phone accessories category, which had the highest level of category knowledge,
prevention was approaching significance as a predictor of positive hits (F(1,124) = 2.518, p =
.115, η2 = .02) and a prevention focus was very significantly related to negative hits (F(1,124) =
12.148, p < .001, η2 = .09). This finding suggests that differences in prevention and promotion
orientations in predicting evaluation and selection quality for co-created product ideas may only
be manifest when the raters’ product category knowledge is relatively high.
A second issue which may have been a factor in the non-significant findings of Study 2
was the relative inexperience of the sample used (i.e., undergraduate students) in the area of new
product development. This could have presented itself in two ways. First, the teams may have
used inappropriate heuristics in assessing each of the products in each product set. Spence and
Brucks (1997) found that when tasks were highly structured or when tasks were highly
ambiguous, experts were only slightly superior to novices in the quality of their decision-making.
In highly structured tasks, the decision heuristic is often obvious, and in tasks with no structure,
there may be no optimal decision criteria. In both of these extreme cases novices and experts
were found to perform similarly. Significant differences emerged, however, when a task had only
a moderate level of structure. In this case, they found that experts significantly outperformed
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novices because novices tended to use heuristics that were not-well-suited to the decision task,
whereas experts applied existing schemas to adequately structure the problem and arrive at a
solution.
In the case of the product sets used in Study 2, novices were being asked to evaluate
product ideas and predict sales. This could be categorized as a moderately structured task, since
the task itself was relatively straightforward and structured (rank a limited choice set of products
from best-seller to worst-seller), but the knowledge and insight needed to determine what might
make one product a best-seller compared to others created a moderate degree of ambiguity. What
may have been lacking for the majority of the teams involved in the experiment was a lack of
understanding of the implementation, environmental, and cultural issues involved in taking a
good idea to market. Several scholars have noted that all of these factors have significant
correlations with ultimate new product performance over and above the influence of the quality
of the idea (Cooper, 1999; Henard & Szymanski, 2001; Szymanski et al., 2007). Cooper (1999)
emphasizes the difference between “doing the right projects” (i.e., selecting products that have
inherent potential) and “doing projects right” (i.e., focusing on the optimal actions of the firm in
the process of developing new products). In his conceptualization, firms not only have to start
with good ideas, but they also must implement them efficiently in order to be profitable. This
implementation factor knowledge may not have played a role in the decision-making heuristics
of novices. The professionals in Study 3, on the other hand, frequently discussed technical
feasibility, supply chain issues, and production costs. Novices seem capable of accurately
assessing idea potential (as in Study 1), but not necessarily idea performance (as in Study 2)
given the complexities of the implementation process.
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Study 3 and Integration of Insights across Studies
In Study 3, the main effect of regulatory focus was significant. Specifically a promotionfocused discussion was positively associated with positive hits (i.e., accepting products rated in
the 51st percentile or higher by the panel of consumers). For negative hits (i.e., rejecting products
rated in the 49th percentile or lower), a prevention-focused discussion was a significant predictor.
In Study 1, a prevention focus was significantly and positively related to accurate
assessments of meaningfulness and feasibility. In Study 3, a promotion focus was significantly
and positively related to the probability of positive hits, while a prevention focus was a
significant predictor of negative hits. Although the dependent variables used in Study 1 and
Study 3 were different, the results of the main effect of regulatory focus seem somewhat
conflicting, particularly given past research which has shown a significant correlation between
meaningfulness and NPD performance (Szymanski et al., 2007).
Aside from the sample type and context differences in Study 1 and Study 3, there was a
significant difference that might explain the opposite findings. In Study 1, the task teams were
asked to perform was a pure evaluation decision; teams simply reviewed the product concepts
and rated them on a numerical scale. In Study 3, however, the discussants did not merely review
the products and choose them or reject them based on their concrete attributes. Instead, many of
the product discussions revolved around determining what features and technologies could be
applied to make the product better, what alternative uses might be ideal for the product over and
above the inventor’s original intent, and to which new markets the products might be attractive.
In this sense, the evaluation of the products in Study 3 was not merely a problem of selection, but
a substantial amount of creativity and problem solving across a broad variety of conceptual
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domains (e.g., engineering, customer insights, design, etc.) was required. This fits with the
observation of one scholar that, “Ideas from the crowd often show a low degree of elaboration
and thus can sometimes be vague and immature” (Bayus, 2013, p. 227). Essentially, when ideas
are under-elaborated, they may require a degree of creativity on the part of firm managers to
determine if they are viable development options.
Given that promotion-focused teams are considered to be superior in these types of
activities (Baron, 2004; Brockner et al., 2004), it fits with the logic of regulatory focus theory
that a promotion focus should be superior in the evaluation and selection process when creative,
additive thinking is necessary. The managerial challenges inherent in co-creating innovation with
customers are, at their root, evaluation and selection problems (i.e., firms make concrete
decisions to pursue some ideas and not others), but a good deal of creativity goes into evaluation
and selection as teams often think abstractly about the potential of a consumer-invented new
product concept (e.g., improvements, design, form and function). It would seem obvious that this
type of creative evaluation would occur in co-creation. However, given that many firms are
overwhelmed by the sheer volume of new product ideas submitted by their customers (Gloor &
Cooper, 2012), this may not always be the case.
In support of this assertion, an examination of the coded product discussions from Study
3 shows2 that almost 10% of the coded comments involved some form of abstract, creative, or
future-looking evaluation over and above a straightforward assessment of the products exactly as
they were presented by the inventor. Furthermore, comments that involved a creative

2

The codes that indicated a willingness to evaluate a product beyond what was explicitly stated in the product
submission were: explore further, future projects, multiple uses, product growth potential, and suggested
enhancements.
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contribution to the product under review (e.g., ideas for enhancement and product improvisation)
were present in nearly half the 186 product discussions, indicating that a good deal of creative
problem-solving was involved.

Main Effects of Reflexivity: Overview and Insights
Reflexivity, as conceptualized here in the literature, refers to the degree to which teams
reflect on their shared knowledge and decision process, and deeply process the information
available to them in order to arrive at a decision (West, 1996). Each of the three studies also
examined the direct influence of reflexivity on the accuracy and quality of team decisions about
co-created new product ideas. In Study 1 and Study 2, reflexivity was operationalized by
instructing participants to either have extensive discussions about the innovativeness and market
potential of the products they saw (high-reflexivity), or to make decisions with little discussion
or deliberation (low reflexivity). Since Study 3 involved field data from real co-created new
product evaluation and selection decisions, reflexivity wasn’t manipulated, but measured based
on the number of unique topics discussed in each product evaluation discussion, and how deeply
those topics were discussed.
In Study 1 and Study 2, the main effect of reflexivity was not significant, but there was a
significant and positive effect of reflexivity in Study 3. The setting in which reflexivity was
tested may help explain why the same effect was not found in the experiments. In coding for
reflexivity, 40 unique topics were identified across all of the Quirky product evaluations. The
average product discussion included 23.9 total comments and discussion of 11.2 unique topics.
According to how reflexivity has been conceptualized in the literature, knowing what
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information to process and what information to ignore is a critical part of the relationship
between reflexivity and the quality of team decision-making (DeDreu, 2002; Müller et al., 2009).
While the exact content of the team discussions in the two experiments was not captured as a
part of this research, it seems unlikely that undergraduate teams reflected as deeply or broadly on
relevant information as the participants in the sample of working product development
professionals.
Reflexivity may also be more significant when teams have a larger shared base of
knowledge and experiences on which to reflect. In the first two studies, team members were
familiar with one another, but likely had or no experience making product decisions together. In
contrast, the teams in Study 3 that worked in the same firm were accustomed to the evaluation
and subsequent development process. The implication is that reflexivity may be a practice that
pays dividends over longer periods of time, as teams develop heuristics for processing
information based on shared understandings or mental models, which was likely not present in
the lab-based teams. It may also be that teams need to include individuals who have a minimum
threshold of relevant domain knowledge (e.g., engineering, marketing, supply chain
management, design, etc.), which may not have been present in teams who self-selected and
were brought together for a relatively brief lab experiment (as opposed to working in the same
firm over a weeks, months, or years). For example, while engineers were not called upon to
comment on every product evaluated in the Quirky-based study, they were frequently deferred to
when a particularly challenging technical question arose. This diversity of the information and
knowledge each individual holds may make reflexivity more effective in a professional
environment.

170
Interaction between Regulatory Focus and Reflexivity: Overview and Insights
All three studies also examined the interaction between regulatory focus and reflexivity.
In Study 1, there was a significant interaction between regulatory focus and reflexivity on teams’
assessment accuracy of co-created new product meaningfulness, but not for feasibility or
novelty. Prevention-focused teams were most accurate on the meaningfulness dimension when
reflexivity was high; promotion-focused teams were most accurate when reflexivity was low.
The analysis of Study 2 showed no significant effects of the regulatory focus by
reflexivity interaction for positive hits, but it did show a significant effect for negative hits.
Specifically, when reflexivity was low, a promotion focus was positively associated with a
negative hit (i.e., correctly choosing the worst-selling product in the sets). When reflexivity was
high, a prevention focus was positively associated with negative hits.
In Study 3, there was a significant interaction effect between reflexivity and regulatory
focus for positive hits, but not for negative hits. For positive hits, prevention focused teams had a
higher probability of making a positive hit when reflexivity was high, while promotion-focused
discussions had a higher probability of positive hits when reflexivity was low.
Although the dependent variables which were predicted by the regulatory focus by
reflexivity interaction were slightly different from study-to-study (meaningfulness in Study 1,
negative hits in Study 2, and positive hits in Study 3), all three studies showed results that
suggest promotion-focused teams make more accurate decisions when reflexivity is low and
prevention-focused teams make more accurate decisions when reflexivity is high. One possible
explanation for this paradox could be that being highly reflexive may move promotion-focused
teams too far away from concrete thinking, which ultimately must be applied in some measure to
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accurately assess the pros and the cons of a given product idea. When reflexivity is high and
teams are able to process information more broadly and more deeply, those same tendencies
toward creative problem-solving and abstract thinking may be counterproductive. Reflexivity
may move promotion-focused teams so far away from economic constraints, technical realities,
and consumer preferences for a given co-created product idea that abstract thinking becomes a
hindrance to decision-making. They may simply suffer from information overload as they seek to
process an ever-widening field of knowledge, or they may get fixated on thinking creatively
about issues that have little bearing on product performance.

Moderating Effects of Inventor Expertise
Study 3 also tested for the interaction effects of inventor expertise with both reflexivity
and regulatory focus. Neither the reflexivity/expertise interaction, nor the regulatory
focus/expertise interaction significantly influenced the negative hit probability. While there was
no significant interaction between reflexivity and inventor expertise on positive hits, there was a
significant effect of the interaction between regulatory focus and expertise on positive hits.
Specifically, prevention-focused discussions had a higher probability of resulting in a positive hit
when inventor expertise was high, but promotion-focused discussions had a higher probability of
resulting in a positive hit when inventor expertise was low.
These results make sense given the previous discussion about the role of creativity and
problem-solving in the evaluation and selection of co-created product ideas. When inventor
expertise is high, ideas are likely to be better-articulated and well-developed, whereas inventors
with little expertise are likely to submit more vague, immature product concepts (Bayus, 2013).
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Product ideas developed by expert inventors may simply need less creative evaluation and are
better-suited for a more straightforward assessment of the pros and cons involved in developing
the product idea, for which prevention-focused groups should be better-suited (Baron, 2004;
Brockner et al., 2004).

Contributions to Theory
The results of these studies have several important implications for theory. First, past
research has looked at co-creation primarily from a consumer perspective (e.g., Nambisan &
Baron, 2009; Tynan et al., 2010; Schreier et al., 2012), and from high-level strategy perspective
(e.g., Antorini et al., 2012; Nishikawa et al., 2013; Verhoef et al., 2013). This research is among
the first to examine the complex decision-making process involved when managers evaluate and
select customers’ co-created new product ideas, and shed light on the black box of decision
making in this increasingly common innovation practice. Addressing the decision-making
process itself can help to explain the disconnect between competing research findings about the
effectiveness of the practice of co-creation. On the one hand, researchers have found that cocreation initiatives fail 50% of the time (Verhoef et al., 2013), while on the other hand,
researchers have also found that co-created new products that do survive are several times more
profitable than internally-developed new products (Nishikawa et al., 2013).
Second, past research has explored regulatory focus in the context of new product idea
generation, but not in the context of evaluating and selecting customers’ new product ideas. In
these studies, the data show that regulatory focus operates somewhat differently across these
development contexts. When a decision task involves pure selection of ideas, prevention focused
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groups appear to be more accurate in their assessments. However, when a co-creation decision
task involves not just selection, but requires participants to also be creative in envisioning how a
customer’s product idea might need to be changed, altered, or positioned differently, a promotion
focus appears to be a more accurate regulatory orientation.
Third, the interaction between group regulatory focus and group reflexivity has not
previously been explored in the academic literature. The data, specifically from Study 1 and
Study 3 support the idea that prevention-focused teams work best when they are able to engage
in careful deliberation and deep information processing. In contrast, promotion-focused teams
appear to work best when they engage in less group processing and deliberation before making a
decision.
Fourth, social cognition researchers who study innovation have suggested that a team
promotion focus may be better-suited for idea generation and a team prevention focus better
suited for idea selection (Baron, 2004; Brockner et al., 2004). In these studies, we empirically
test that assertion. The answer, it seems, is not as straightforward as has been conceptualized in
the existing literature. Whether prevention or promotion orientation is better-suited for choosing
co-created new products depends on several factors. First, the degree to which teams deeply
process information and shared knowledge (i.e., reflexivity) influences whether a prevention or
promotion focus is more beneficial to the quality of team selection decisions. Second, the results
of these studies suggest that the degree of creativity and abstract thinking involved in the
evaluation process of co-created new product ideas influences how regulatory focus is related to
decision-making. In Study 1, where the task did not require teams to make any creative
contributions to the products under evaluation, prevention-focused teams were more accurate.
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When teams made a creative contribution as part of the evaluation process, as in Study 3, a
promotion-orientation was superior in choosing the best co-created products.

Implications for Practice
These studies also offer insights for managers overseeing co-creation innovation efforts
with consumers. Customer co-creation of innovation is a growing trend, and many firms that
previously would not have considered opening the development process to their customers, may
find themselves considering this strategy as a way to develop higher-quality and/or more
profitable new market offerings.
First, managers should be aware of the regulatory focus motivating the decisions of their
innovation teams when evaluating co-created new product ideas. For teams that show a more
conservative, cautious approach to new product development (i.e., a prevention focus), deep
discussion, knowledge sharing and extensive development team information processing may
help them reach better decisions about which customer-generated new product ideas to pursue.
On the other hand, for firms that are more proactive in the pursuit of innovation and new product
success (i.e., a promotion focus), deep deliberation and information processing may be
counterproductive.
Second, managers should be aware of how the management of idea flow may influence
their ability to make quality evaluations of customers’ product ideas. In their study of team
regulatory focus, Florack and Hartmann (2007) found that extreme time pressure causes
promotion-focused groups to adopt the motivation and cognitive style of prevention-focused
groups. Given that co-creation often involves a good deal of time pressure, since managers are
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overwhelmed with the volume of ideas that need to be evaluated in a given time period (Gloor &
Cooper, 2012; Hoyer et al., 2010), development teams that would normally be considered
promotion-focused may find themselves adopting a prevention focus. In these circumstances,
managers should consider ways to lengthen the amount of time that development teams spend
processing information. For example, Quirky, LEGO, and Dell all use customer co-creation to
develop new innovation, but rely on the innovation community itself to prescreen ideas, resulting
in fewer submissions that company managers evaluate. To do so, these firms all maintain an
innovation platform online where end-consumers can both submit their ideas, but also vote on
others’ ideas. At LEGO, only ideas that receive 10,000 votes go up for formal company
evaluation, and Dell has created a sophisticated scoring system to identify only those ideas with
the most potential.
Third, managers should also consider the nature of the selection task at hand, and adapt
their team decision-making practices accordingly. When the task is selection-based only, without
the expectation that ideas can be modified or change, these studies suggest a more hawkish,
prevention-focused approach would be more appropriate. However, when managers are faced
with under-elaborated ideas that require teams to creatively evaluate the potential of a product
that isn’t well-articulated, a promotion focus may be more appropriate.
Fourth, managers should be cognizant of the expertise of the inventors who submit new
product ideas. When customers have high degrees of expertise, development teams may find it
advantageous to take a “pure selection,” prevention approach since these ideas are less likely to
require substantial adaptation and/or elaboration to be viable market offerings. Likewise,
development teams may find it advantageous to adopt a more collaborative, promotion
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evaluation style to determine whether or not novice inventors’ product ideas have the potential to
be profitable new products.
Fifth, given the findings from Study 1 related to assessing new product novelty, firms
should be aware of their own limitations when evaluating products outside of their normal areas
of expertise. Without a moderately high knowledge of a particular product category,
development teams may not recognize how novel a customer’s new product idea really is or
isn’t. In cases where firms receive ideas that fall outside their areas of expertise, managers may
need to consider recruiting subject matter experts, or even customer inventors themselves to help
assess the novelty aspect of how innovate a new product idea is.
Finally, there is a growing body of literature which has found group brainstorming to
often be counterproductive, and instead prescribes that team members submit their evaluations
individually without processing the information as a group (Diehl & Strobe, 1987; Larey &
Paulus, 1999; West, 2002). In these studies, it is argued that group information processing may
serve to silence minority dissent, create a groupthink environment in which the opinions of
dominant group members disproportionally drive decisions, or create a type of cognitive inertia
that causes groups to fixate on particular solutions to the exclusion of others. In this study, that
seems to be the case for promotion-focused teams, since their decisions typically were less
accurate the more reflexive they were. Prevention-focused teams, on the other hand, seemed to
benefit from this practice. Therefore, for prevention-focused innovation teams, warnings about
the perils of group processing in decision-making may be overstated.
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Limitations and Future Research Directions
These studies have several limitations, which point toward opportunities for future
research. First, Study 1 and Study 2 were conducted in the laboratory using undergraduate
students. While this sample and study setting may help researchers understand the underlying
psychological processes that occur when groups make decisions (Bono & McNamara, 2011),
they also may not represent the contextual dynamics that occur in the field, when professional
product development teams are faced with the same choices. Future research should further
investigate the choices of working professionals, in teams that represent a wider spectrum of
reflexivity and regulatory focus
Although the measures used to evaluate the potential of new products in Study 1 and
Study 3 were collected from independent third parties, they still relied on subjective assessments
from a panel of experts in Study 1 and a panel of potential consumers in Study 3. Future research
could take a more longitudinal approach, following products from inception to
commercialization, using objective performance data as the independent variable.
For Study 3, data was collected from a single firm. Quirky makes products across several
different product categories (e.g., simple kitchen gadgets and whole-home electronic monitoring
systems), and the meeting participants varied, so the findings can be considered generalizable.
However, firm-level variables, such as culture, leadership, and working norm were unlikely to
vary greatly from product-to-product. Future research should investigate a wider cross-section of
firms to develop even more generalizable insights about managing the co-creation of innovation.
Related to this, Quirky, the firm used in Study 3, would likely be categorized as
innovation-oriented, and the empirical investigation of their meetings showed that they had a
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tendency toward both a promotion-focus and high reflexivity in their group discussions. Future
research should investigate group regulatory focus and group reflexivity across firms that vary in
the degree to which a promotion or prevention focus is embedded in their corporate culture, and
the degree to which they deliberate about co-created new product ideas.
There are also several logical extensions of this work that may prove to be fruitful
directions for future studies. First, these studies focused on co-creation of new product ideas, but,
as mentioned in the literature review of this dissertation, many companies are using co-creation
for initiatives other than new product development. For example, for the past several years,
Doritos has hosted an open contest for its customers to produce their own Doritos Super Bowl
commercials, with the winning submission earning a substantial prize and being aired during the
game. Compared to the co-creation of new product concepts, firms’ evaluation and selection of
user-generated content may influence outcomes differently since end-users are typically echoing
messages and value propositions that have already been established by the firm rather than
creating completely new sources of value.
Second, future studies should look at a more longitudinal view of the process of
developing co-created product ideas, from ideation to commercialization. This would allow
researchers to potentially draw connections between evaluation and selection during the front
end of innovation and the ultimate market potential of these types of products. Although Study 3
was collected over the course of several months, the ultimate market outcomes of the 186
products evaluated in the video footage is unknown at the time of this dissertation’s writing.
Although many of the products that were evaluated will eventually make it to market, many of
the products selected may be abandoned before the commercialization process is completed.
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Determining how team evaluations are related to eventual survival rates of co-created new
product concepts would be an important contribution to both new product development theory
and new product development practice.
Third, this study looked exclusively at co-created new product ideas, but many firms
have begun to transition to developing new services or goods-services hybrid offerings (Fang,
Palmatier, & Steenkamp, 2008; Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011). Promotion-focused teams may be
better suited to evaluating services than prevention-focused teams, given that services typically
are more abstract and ambiguous in how they are designed and delivered than goods (Bitner,
Ostrom, & Morgan, 2008; Zeithaml, Parasuraman, & Berry, 1985). Future research should
empirically examine the cognitive differences which may lead to superior evaluation of customer
co-created service innovations.
Finally, other variables related to team cognition remain unexplored in the context of
managing co-creation. Team leadership, team member intelligence, transactive memory systems,
and other group characteristics in organizations may play a significant role in how accurate
teams are in their evaluation and selection of co-created product ideas.

Conclusion
Although the practice of co-creation has shown considerable promise in terms of its
potential to result in profitable products that survive on the market over the long-term
(Nishikawa et al., 2013), the decision-making process firms make in evaluating and selecting
new product concepts created by customers has not been previously explored in the literature. In
the classic “funnel” model (Hauser et al., 2006) of how ideas are evaluated on the fuzzy front
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end, and in the more recent open innovation model of the funnel (Chesbrough, 2003) where ideas
also permeate the queue from external sources of knowledge, it is implicitly assumed that firms
accurately assess the ideas that pass through their evaluation and selection process. This series of
studies shows that in the co-creation of innovation, where customer knowledge and expertise
may be distant from firm knowledge and expertise, the evaluation process itself is subject to
cognitive biases and thinking styles, and that the funnels (i.e., team evaluation processes) firms
use to select new product ideas from customers is not inherently accurate.
The findings in this study are a first step toward developing a better understanding of the
cognitive factors that influence the process and decision quality of managers as they evaluate
new product concepts invented by consumers. The data in this dissertation show that regulatory
focus and reflexivity can indeed influence the quality of decision-making in selecting co-created
products, particularly in the way they interact to influence selection quality. Hopefully, these
studies will serve as a starting point from which other studies can draw in developing a more
complete understanding of the evaluation and selection decision process involved in choosing
co-created new product ideas.
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Appendix A. Measurement Scales
Scale Name and Items

Study

α

Manipulation
Check for Study
1 and 2

.75

Manipulation
Check for Study
1 and 2

.75

Group Regulatory Focus
Adapted from Van Stekelenburg (2006)
7-point semantic differential scale
For each pair of statements below, choose the point between the
statements that best indicates the way your team actually made
decisions in the exercises you completed.
1. Better safe than sorry/Fortune favors the bold
2. Stick to what you know best/Variety is the spice of life
3. Stay inside your comfort zone/Nothing ventured, nothing
gained

Group Reflexivity
Adapted from Schippers et al. (2007)
7-point Likert scale
In completing these exercises, we…
1. considered different points of view when evaluating each
product concept
2. evaluated whether our discussion would produce the
intended result.
3. discussed the potential we thought products had to be
successful.
4. discussed what types of consumers might buy these
products (e.g. gender, age, lifestyle habits, etc.).
5. picked the first response that came to mind, without much
discussion (R)
6. tried to understand what each product was used for before
making decisions or ratings.
7. spent a lot of time discussing products we disagreed about
initially.
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Scale Name and Items
Cocreated New Product Concept Novelty
Adopted from Im and Workman (2004)
7-point Likert scale
Compared to products currently on the market, this new product
concept…
1. is really “out of the ordinary.”
2. can be considered as revolutionary.
3. provides radical differences from industry norms.
4. shows an unconventional way of solving problems.

Study

α

Study 1

.73-.84

Study 1

.90-.95

Study 1

.68-.83

Cocreated New Product Concept Meaningfulness
Adopted from Im and Workman (2004)
7-point Likert scale
Compared to products currently on the market, this new product
concept…
1. is relevant to customers’ needs and expectations.
2. is considered suitable for customers’ desires.
3. is appropriate for customers’ needs and expectations.
4. is useful for customers.

Cocreated New Product Concept Feasibility
7-point Likert scale
Compared to products currently on the market, this new product
concept…
1. would be feasible for a company to make
2. could be developed without difficulty
3. would be practical to manufacture
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Scale Name and Items
Individual Regulatory Focus
7-point Likert scale
Promotion Focus (5 Measures)
1. When it comes to achieving things that are important to
me, I find that I don’t perform as well as I would ideally
like to do.
2. I feel like I have made progress toward being successful in
my life.
3. When I see an opportunity for something I like, I get
excited right away.
4. I frequently imagine how I will achieve my hopes and
aspirations.
5. I see myself as someone who is primarily striving to reach
my “ideal self”—to fulfill my hopes, wishes, and
aspirations.

Study

α

Study 1 and 2

.77*

Prevention Focus (5 Measures)
1. I usually obeyed rules and regulations that were established
by my parents.
2. Not being careful enough has gotten me into trouble at
times.
3. I worry about making mistakes.
4. I frequently think about how I can prevent failures in my
life.
5. I see myself as someone who is primarily striving to
become the self I “ought” to be—fulfill my duties,
responsibilities and obligations.
* Since prevention and promotion represent opposite dimensions in regulatory focus theory, only the promotion
dimension was used.
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Scale Name and Items
Individual Positive/Negative Affect
Watson et al. (1988) and Thompson (2007)
7-point Likert scale
Indicate to what extent you feel (today)…
1. upset
2. hostile
3. alert
4. ashamed
5. inspired
6. nervous
7. determined
8. attentive
9. active
10. afraid

Study

α

Study 1 and 2

.77

Study 3

.81

Study 3

.80

Willingness to Consider Purchase
Berens, Riel, and Bruggen (2005)
7-point Likert scale
1.
2.
3.

If you were planning to buy a product of this type,
would you choose this product?
Would you purchase this product?
If a friend were looking for a product of this type,
would you advise him or her to consider purchasing
this product?

Product Type (Hedonic/Utilitarian)
Wakefield and Inman (2003)
7-point semantic differential scale
Think of the situation in which each of the following products
would be typically used:
1.
Practical Purposes/Just for Fun
2.
Purely Functional/ Pure Enjoyment
3.
For a Routine need/For Pleasure
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Appendix B. Study 1 Product Concepts.
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204

205
Appendix C. Study 2 Product Sets
Kitchen Gadgets Product Set:

206
Mobile Phone Accessories Product Set:

207
Cord Organization Product Set:
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